David Hum e’s Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion
(Com plete Notes)
In tr odu ction
Sum m ar y
The Dialogue Concerning Natural Religion begins with a discussion of dialogue form
itself. Our narrator, Pamphilus, is about to relate a fascinating conversation he
overheard between his teacher, Cleanthes, and two of his teacher's friends, Demea and
Philo. Before launching into the retelling, Pamphilus reflects a while on the topic of
conversation—the possibility of natural religion (that is, of a religion based on reason
rather than on revelation)—is so well-suited to dialogue form. Usually, he says, dialogue
form hinders true learning by preventing order, brevity, and precision. There are,
however, three sorts of topics that make dialogue form preferable to a pure analytic
form. Matters of fact that are so obvious that they cannot be disputed, but that are so
important that they cannot be discussed too often, are best put in dialogue form because
in that way they are made more interesting and can withstand constant repetition. Also,
philosophical questions which are so difficult and obscure that human reason is
incapable of answering them definitively, but which human fascination makes difficult
to leave alone are best treated in dialogue form because this form does not require us to
give any definitive answers, but rather allows us to continually explore the question. The
topic of natural religion, he tells us, has all of these characteristics. Nothing is so obvious
as the fact that God exists; nothing is more important than this truth; and nothing is
more difficult to grasp than God's nature (which includes his attributes, his decrees, and
his plan of providence). Dialogue form then, is the only proper way in which to treat this
topic.
After this introduction, Pamphilus begins to relate the conversation between the three
learned men. The three characters, it becomes obvious from the very start, represent
three very different theological positions. Cleanthes is an empirical theist; that is, he
believes that it is possible to come to an understanding of God's existence and nature by
inferring it from the natural world. In other words, he thinks that by looking at the
world, we can gather evidence that will allow us to justifiably draw conclusions about
what God is really like. He is the only one who clearly and adamantly believes in the
possibility of natural religion (that is, in the possibility of grounding religious belief in
reason).
,Demea, the traditional, orthodox Christian seems to be ambivalent toward the idea of
reason-based faith. He is not wholly against the idea, but he is not wholly comfortable
with it either. Furthermore, he is convinced that if there is any possible ground for faith
in reason, it is not through the sort of empirical reasoning that Cleanthes urges. Instead,
any rational grounding for faith is going to come from the certain and stable a priori
arguments that use pure reason to come to indubitable conclusions. He seems to truly
sympathize with fideism, which asserts that religious belief cannot be grounded in
reason, but must be grounded in pure and irrational faith.
Philo is the only character who shows no tendency toward natural religion. Philo,
introduced to us by Pamphilus as a philosophical skeptic, is adamant in his claim that
reason cannot get us to an understanding of God's nature. It is Philo's arguments
against Cleanthes' empirical theism that comprise the main theme of the Dialogues.
An alysis
In addition to the advantages Pamphilus cites, dialogue form also has another
advantage: it allows the author to mask his true opinion. Hume seems to have made the
most of this feature of dialogue. Though Philo often seen as Hume's mouthpiece, it is
never wholly obvious when Hume does and does not agree with something Philo says. It
is almost certainly false to claim that Hume would assent to everything Philo asserts,
and it seems almost as obviously false to claim that he would disagree with everything
said by the other two.
Choosing Pamphilus as the narrator of the dialogue (rather than, for instance, allowing
us to directly listen in on the dialogue itself) makes it even harder to tell where Hume's
sympathies lie. Pamphilus introduces each of the characters, gives a running
commentary throughout the conversation, and, finally, of declares the dialogue's victor.
Pamphilus is probably not a completely reliable narrator, since he is Cleanthes's
student, and so it is important not to immediately believe everything that he says. For
instance, he says that Cleanthes has an "accurate philosophical turn," whereas Philo is a
"careless skeptic." In the dialogue, though, it actually seems to be Cleanthes who is
careless and Philo who is staggeringly methodical and accurate. His characterization of
Demea's orthodoxy as "rigid and inflexible" might also be a little too harsh.
Hume had good reason to want to place as many layers between himself and his readers.
His reputation as an atheist plagued him throughout his entire adult life, made it
impossible for him to obtain a university post, and even lead to a close brush with
excommunication. He was so afraid of his powerful religious enemies, in fact, that he
suppressed the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion for twenty five years, waiting
until he was on his deathbed to begin plans for publication. (And even these plans fell
through due to fear of recrimination. Hume's friend Adam Smith backed out of his
,tentative promise to publish the work, and it was not until Hume's nephew decided to
have the work published three years later that it was finally made public.)
Given Hume's use of dialogue, it is not a trivial matter to discern his true opinion on the
many matters that come up for discussion. One such matter, which is first mentioned in
the introduction but is then repeated by all four characters several times throughout the
book, is the claim that God's existence is indubitable. That God exists, the characters
affirm repeatedly, is so obvious that it is not even up for discussion; the only interesting
point of discussion concerns God's nature, not his being. If Hume actually believed this,
his reputation as an atheist seems rather undeserved. In addition, he himself seems to
have contradicted this claim in several of his other writings. This question further shows
that it is important to be aware that one should constantly ask not only what the three
characters are saying but what Hume himself believed.
Par t I
Sum m ar y
The conversation between Demea, Cleanthes, and Philo begins with a question
concerning education: when is it best to begin teaching students theology? Demea
argues that theology should only be taught to a mature mind: a student should first
study logic, ethics, and physics, and only then should they turn to theology. He has two
reasons for preferring this order. First, by studying the other disciples first, the mind is
trained and readied for the most difficult subject of all, theology. Second, and more to
the point of the Dialogues, he wants his students to first see how very limited philosophy
really is. He wants them to see, for instance, that learned men can rarely reach firm
conclusions amongst themselves, and that the wisest often come up with the most
absurd hypotheses. By revealing the limits of philosophy to his students, Demea believes
that he ensures that they will not be so arrogant as to think that they can use reason to
overthrow religious beliefs.
Demea's second motivation sounds a great deal like a fideist position. Philo picks up on
this fideist strain and expands upon it. He stresses just how weak and limited human
reason really is, and also the importance of this realization (i.e. of reason's limits) for
piety. Given how frail human reason is, he contends, it is ill-advised to try to apply it to
matters as difficult and important as theology.
Cleanthes, of course, is appalled that his two friends are proposing to rest religious faith
on philosophical skepticism rather than on reason. He spends the rest of the chapter
trying to expose Philo's skepticism as insincere. Philo responds by continually revising
his skeptical position into more and more subtle forms. Initially, it sounds as if Philo is
claiming that we cannot really believe anything. Cleanthes asks, then, whether he will
, leave by the door or by the window when they finish their discussion: that is, is he
skeptical enough about the laws of gravity that he will leap several stories?
Philo tells Cleanthes that he has mischaracterized his skeptical position: Philo does
believe what his reason tells him to believe, but he proportions his belief to the evidence.
In areas where we have a great deal of experience, and thus much evidence on which to
base our conclusions (areas such as everyday life, morals, politics, trade, jumping out of
windows), Philo explains, we can believe strongly in our conclusions. But when it comes
to those subjects about which we have no direct experience, such as the formation of the
world, or the nature of God, we have no basis on which to rationally justify any of our
conclusions. Instead of a very radical claim that we cannot believe anything, Philo is
actually making the much more modest claim that we should only believe what we have
good evidence to believe, and that we only have good evidence in those areas of
knowledge where we have direct experience.
Cleanthes, though, is not satisfied with this modest skeptical claim. He points out that
Philo and his skeptical colleagues seem to have no trouble drawing conclusions when it
comes to the speculative sciences. For instance, they seem to trust in the conclusions
drawn by Newton, Copernicus, and Galileo even though these concern topics very
remote from our everyday experience. It is pure prejudice, he declares, that prevents
them from allowing the same method of reasoning in theology. If human reason is good
enough to justify theoretical scientific theories, in other words, it is good enough to
justify theological theories. He concludes by asserting that there is really no difference
between a skeptic and an atheist.
Philo defends himself against the claim of atheism, affirming his strong belief in God's
existence. However, he points out that religious institutions actually seem to go back
and forth in their opinion of skepticism: they embrace skepticism whenever reason
seems to threaten their power, and they embrace reason when it becomes the only way
to keep their influence.
An alysis
Philo's brand of philosophical skepticism is immediately familiar to readers of Hume's
other works, in particular readers of the Treatise on Human Nature and the Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding. Hume was continually interested in showing that
we are not justified in believing something that we thought we were justified in
believing; and he often shows that our beliefs are irrational by showing that we have no
experience of the relevant kind.
Even if you are not familiar with Hume's other works, it helps to have some familiarity
with his other skeptical arguments in order to better understand his position in
the Dialogue. The most famous of his skeptical arguments is his argument concerning
Concerning Natural Religion
(Com plete Notes)
In tr odu ction
Sum m ar y
The Dialogue Concerning Natural Religion begins with a discussion of dialogue form
itself. Our narrator, Pamphilus, is about to relate a fascinating conversation he
overheard between his teacher, Cleanthes, and two of his teacher's friends, Demea and
Philo. Before launching into the retelling, Pamphilus reflects a while on the topic of
conversation—the possibility of natural religion (that is, of a religion based on reason
rather than on revelation)—is so well-suited to dialogue form. Usually, he says, dialogue
form hinders true learning by preventing order, brevity, and precision. There are,
however, three sorts of topics that make dialogue form preferable to a pure analytic
form. Matters of fact that are so obvious that they cannot be disputed, but that are so
important that they cannot be discussed too often, are best put in dialogue form because
in that way they are made more interesting and can withstand constant repetition. Also,
philosophical questions which are so difficult and obscure that human reason is
incapable of answering them definitively, but which human fascination makes difficult
to leave alone are best treated in dialogue form because this form does not require us to
give any definitive answers, but rather allows us to continually explore the question. The
topic of natural religion, he tells us, has all of these characteristics. Nothing is so obvious
as the fact that God exists; nothing is more important than this truth; and nothing is
more difficult to grasp than God's nature (which includes his attributes, his decrees, and
his plan of providence). Dialogue form then, is the only proper way in which to treat this
topic.
After this introduction, Pamphilus begins to relate the conversation between the three
learned men. The three characters, it becomes obvious from the very start, represent
three very different theological positions. Cleanthes is an empirical theist; that is, he
believes that it is possible to come to an understanding of God's existence and nature by
inferring it from the natural world. In other words, he thinks that by looking at the
world, we can gather evidence that will allow us to justifiably draw conclusions about
what God is really like. He is the only one who clearly and adamantly believes in the
possibility of natural religion (that is, in the possibility of grounding religious belief in
reason).
,Demea, the traditional, orthodox Christian seems to be ambivalent toward the idea of
reason-based faith. He is not wholly against the idea, but he is not wholly comfortable
with it either. Furthermore, he is convinced that if there is any possible ground for faith
in reason, it is not through the sort of empirical reasoning that Cleanthes urges. Instead,
any rational grounding for faith is going to come from the certain and stable a priori
arguments that use pure reason to come to indubitable conclusions. He seems to truly
sympathize with fideism, which asserts that religious belief cannot be grounded in
reason, but must be grounded in pure and irrational faith.
Philo is the only character who shows no tendency toward natural religion. Philo,
introduced to us by Pamphilus as a philosophical skeptic, is adamant in his claim that
reason cannot get us to an understanding of God's nature. It is Philo's arguments
against Cleanthes' empirical theism that comprise the main theme of the Dialogues.
An alysis
In addition to the advantages Pamphilus cites, dialogue form also has another
advantage: it allows the author to mask his true opinion. Hume seems to have made the
most of this feature of dialogue. Though Philo often seen as Hume's mouthpiece, it is
never wholly obvious when Hume does and does not agree with something Philo says. It
is almost certainly false to claim that Hume would assent to everything Philo asserts,
and it seems almost as obviously false to claim that he would disagree with everything
said by the other two.
Choosing Pamphilus as the narrator of the dialogue (rather than, for instance, allowing
us to directly listen in on the dialogue itself) makes it even harder to tell where Hume's
sympathies lie. Pamphilus introduces each of the characters, gives a running
commentary throughout the conversation, and, finally, of declares the dialogue's victor.
Pamphilus is probably not a completely reliable narrator, since he is Cleanthes's
student, and so it is important not to immediately believe everything that he says. For
instance, he says that Cleanthes has an "accurate philosophical turn," whereas Philo is a
"careless skeptic." In the dialogue, though, it actually seems to be Cleanthes who is
careless and Philo who is staggeringly methodical and accurate. His characterization of
Demea's orthodoxy as "rigid and inflexible" might also be a little too harsh.
Hume had good reason to want to place as many layers between himself and his readers.
His reputation as an atheist plagued him throughout his entire adult life, made it
impossible for him to obtain a university post, and even lead to a close brush with
excommunication. He was so afraid of his powerful religious enemies, in fact, that he
suppressed the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion for twenty five years, waiting
until he was on his deathbed to begin plans for publication. (And even these plans fell
through due to fear of recrimination. Hume's friend Adam Smith backed out of his
,tentative promise to publish the work, and it was not until Hume's nephew decided to
have the work published three years later that it was finally made public.)
Given Hume's use of dialogue, it is not a trivial matter to discern his true opinion on the
many matters that come up for discussion. One such matter, which is first mentioned in
the introduction but is then repeated by all four characters several times throughout the
book, is the claim that God's existence is indubitable. That God exists, the characters
affirm repeatedly, is so obvious that it is not even up for discussion; the only interesting
point of discussion concerns God's nature, not his being. If Hume actually believed this,
his reputation as an atheist seems rather undeserved. In addition, he himself seems to
have contradicted this claim in several of his other writings. This question further shows
that it is important to be aware that one should constantly ask not only what the three
characters are saying but what Hume himself believed.
Par t I
Sum m ar y
The conversation between Demea, Cleanthes, and Philo begins with a question
concerning education: when is it best to begin teaching students theology? Demea
argues that theology should only be taught to a mature mind: a student should first
study logic, ethics, and physics, and only then should they turn to theology. He has two
reasons for preferring this order. First, by studying the other disciples first, the mind is
trained and readied for the most difficult subject of all, theology. Second, and more to
the point of the Dialogues, he wants his students to first see how very limited philosophy
really is. He wants them to see, for instance, that learned men can rarely reach firm
conclusions amongst themselves, and that the wisest often come up with the most
absurd hypotheses. By revealing the limits of philosophy to his students, Demea believes
that he ensures that they will not be so arrogant as to think that they can use reason to
overthrow religious beliefs.
Demea's second motivation sounds a great deal like a fideist position. Philo picks up on
this fideist strain and expands upon it. He stresses just how weak and limited human
reason really is, and also the importance of this realization (i.e. of reason's limits) for
piety. Given how frail human reason is, he contends, it is ill-advised to try to apply it to
matters as difficult and important as theology.
Cleanthes, of course, is appalled that his two friends are proposing to rest religious faith
on philosophical skepticism rather than on reason. He spends the rest of the chapter
trying to expose Philo's skepticism as insincere. Philo responds by continually revising
his skeptical position into more and more subtle forms. Initially, it sounds as if Philo is
claiming that we cannot really believe anything. Cleanthes asks, then, whether he will
, leave by the door or by the window when they finish their discussion: that is, is he
skeptical enough about the laws of gravity that he will leap several stories?
Philo tells Cleanthes that he has mischaracterized his skeptical position: Philo does
believe what his reason tells him to believe, but he proportions his belief to the evidence.
In areas where we have a great deal of experience, and thus much evidence on which to
base our conclusions (areas such as everyday life, morals, politics, trade, jumping out of
windows), Philo explains, we can believe strongly in our conclusions. But when it comes
to those subjects about which we have no direct experience, such as the formation of the
world, or the nature of God, we have no basis on which to rationally justify any of our
conclusions. Instead of a very radical claim that we cannot believe anything, Philo is
actually making the much more modest claim that we should only believe what we have
good evidence to believe, and that we only have good evidence in those areas of
knowledge where we have direct experience.
Cleanthes, though, is not satisfied with this modest skeptical claim. He points out that
Philo and his skeptical colleagues seem to have no trouble drawing conclusions when it
comes to the speculative sciences. For instance, they seem to trust in the conclusions
drawn by Newton, Copernicus, and Galileo even though these concern topics very
remote from our everyday experience. It is pure prejudice, he declares, that prevents
them from allowing the same method of reasoning in theology. If human reason is good
enough to justify theoretical scientific theories, in other words, it is good enough to
justify theological theories. He concludes by asserting that there is really no difference
between a skeptic and an atheist.
Philo defends himself against the claim of atheism, affirming his strong belief in God's
existence. However, he points out that religious institutions actually seem to go back
and forth in their opinion of skepticism: they embrace skepticism whenever reason
seems to threaten their power, and they embrace reason when it becomes the only way
to keep their influence.
An alysis
Philo's brand of philosophical skepticism is immediately familiar to readers of Hume's
other works, in particular readers of the Treatise on Human Nature and the Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding. Hume was continually interested in showing that
we are not justified in believing something that we thought we were justified in
believing; and he often shows that our beliefs are irrational by showing that we have no
experience of the relevant kind.
Even if you are not familiar with Hume's other works, it helps to have some familiarity
with his other skeptical arguments in order to better understand his position in
the Dialogue. The most famous of his skeptical arguments is his argument concerning
