PVL3703
ASSIGNMENT 1 SEMESTER 1 2025
UNIQUE NO.
DUE DATE: MARCH 2025
, PVL3703
Assignment 1 Semester 1 2025
Unique Number:
Due Date: March 2025
Law of Delict
1.1 Did Lethabo act for the purposes of the law of delict?
In the law of delict, conduct must be voluntary for liability to arise. According to Grobler
v Naspers Bpk 2004 (4) SA 220 (C), delictual liability requires an act or omission that is
wrongful, culpable, and causes harm. Sleepwalking (somnambulism) is considered an
involuntary state in legal terms, as seen in R v Schoonwinkel 1953 (3) SA 136 (A),
where the court found that conduct during sleepwalking is not voluntary and therefore
does not meet the requirement for delictual liability.
However, Lethabo’s failure to take his prescribed medication is a key factor. In Minister
van Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A), the court confirmed that an omission can be
wrongful if there is a duty to act. Lethabo was aware of his condition and the necessity
of his medication. His failure to take the medication increased the likelihood of harm,
potentially constituting negligence. Thus, while the stabbing itself was involuntary, his
prior omission (not taking his medication) could be deemed negligent. This could lead to
liability under Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A), which established that
foreseeability and preventability of harm are key to negligence.
1.2 Would the answer change if this was Lethabo’s first sleepwalking episode?
If Lethabo had never suffered from insomnia or sleepwalking before, he would have had
no reason to foresee or prevent the episode. In Kruger v Coetzee foreseeability of harm
is essential for negligence. Since he had no prior knowledge of his condition, he could
not have anticipated the risk, making his omission (not taking medication) irrelevant.
ASSIGNMENT 1 SEMESTER 1 2025
UNIQUE NO.
DUE DATE: MARCH 2025
, PVL3703
Assignment 1 Semester 1 2025
Unique Number:
Due Date: March 2025
Law of Delict
1.1 Did Lethabo act for the purposes of the law of delict?
In the law of delict, conduct must be voluntary for liability to arise. According to Grobler
v Naspers Bpk 2004 (4) SA 220 (C), delictual liability requires an act or omission that is
wrongful, culpable, and causes harm. Sleepwalking (somnambulism) is considered an
involuntary state in legal terms, as seen in R v Schoonwinkel 1953 (3) SA 136 (A),
where the court found that conduct during sleepwalking is not voluntary and therefore
does not meet the requirement for delictual liability.
However, Lethabo’s failure to take his prescribed medication is a key factor. In Minister
van Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A), the court confirmed that an omission can be
wrongful if there is a duty to act. Lethabo was aware of his condition and the necessity
of his medication. His failure to take the medication increased the likelihood of harm,
potentially constituting negligence. Thus, while the stabbing itself was involuntary, his
prior omission (not taking his medication) could be deemed negligent. This could lead to
liability under Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A), which established that
foreseeability and preventability of harm are key to negligence.
1.2 Would the answer change if this was Lethabo’s first sleepwalking episode?
If Lethabo had never suffered from insomnia or sleepwalking before, he would have had
no reason to foresee or prevent the episode. In Kruger v Coetzee foreseeability of harm
is essential for negligence. Since he had no prior knowledge of his condition, he could
not have anticipated the risk, making his omission (not taking medication) irrelevant.
