, 1. Dworkin’s Communalist Theory and the Objectivist Perspective on
Judicial Decision-Making
Ronald Dworkin’s communalist theory is grounded in the objectivist
approach to judicial decision-making, asserting that judges operate within a
shared interpretive community that determines the principles guiding legal
reasoning (Dworkin 1986: 225). According to Dworkin, legal interpretation
is not an isolated activity; rather, it is embedded within a broader legal
culture where judges collectively construct and refine legal principles over
time.
Dworkin argues that judicial decision-making is a form of constructive
interpretation, meaning that judges do not merely apply rules mechanically
but engage with legal materials in a manner that fits within and justifies the
legal tradition (Dworkin 1986: 230). He introduces the concept of “law as
integrity,” suggesting that legal principles should be interpreted consistently
and coherently within the framework of existing legal practices. This
perspective implies that judicial decisions are not purely subjective but are
shaped by established norms and values shared within the legal
community.
Judicial Decision-Making
Ronald Dworkin’s communalist theory is grounded in the objectivist
approach to judicial decision-making, asserting that judges operate within a
shared interpretive community that determines the principles guiding legal
reasoning (Dworkin 1986: 225). According to Dworkin, legal interpretation
is not an isolated activity; rather, it is embedded within a broader legal
culture where judges collectively construct and refine legal principles over
time.
Dworkin argues that judicial decision-making is a form of constructive
interpretation, meaning that judges do not merely apply rules mechanically
but engage with legal materials in a manner that fits within and justifies the
legal tradition (Dworkin 1986: 230). He introduces the concept of “law as
integrity,” suggesting that legal principles should be interpreted consistently
and coherently within the framework of existing legal practices. This
perspective implies that judicial decisions are not purely subjective but are
shaped by established norms and values shared within the legal
community.
