The Glosten and Milgrom (1985) Model:
Basic idea:
If the insiders in the market are buyers, then the market maker will experience a fall in her stock
inventory and will increase the ask price to avoid large losses. They will increase this ask price to
V H as the ask price was too low. The stock inventory will decrease because buyers will buy more
and more stocks due to them having the knowledge, meaning the stock inventory decreases.
The reverse happens if the insiders are sellers.
In this model, the insiders perform a useful function: they push prices in line with the true value
b
P.
This gives a favourable picture of the activities of insiders, unlike the King and Roell model where
they found that insider trading was harmful.
First trade:
We call the initial expectation μ the prior expectation and 0.5 the prior probability of a high
value outcome, V H . Denote these initial values as μ1 and p1 to indicate that they are only valid
for the first trade.
Recall that the market maker sets the initial ask price Pa (if she thinks the trade will happen)
such that she breaks even in expectation if a sale takes place.
So Pa is the posterior expectation conditional upon finding a buyer at the first trade.
By the same argument, Pb is the posterior expectation conditional upon meeting a seller.
Second trade:
Once the first trade is completed, a rational market maker will reset μ2 and the trading process
will move into the next round.
The only complication is that the probability a high value has changed, from prior probability of
0.5 to posterior probability, p2. NOT P1 because it is the second trade.
Then because the expectation is a probability weighted average, we have:
μ2= p2 V H +(1− p2 )V LWhere p2 V H is the probability of a high value and (1− p 2)V L is the
probability of a low value.
This can be rewritten as:
μ2−V L = p2 (V H −V L )
μ2−V L
OR: p2= (1) => this is what the posterior probability will be
V H −V L
Note that q, V H , V L are fixed.
Now suppose that the market maker happened to meet a buyer
on the first trade. If the first client buys then μ2=P a
We have already seen that in the one-shot case: (previous lecture)
Pa=μ+ 0.5 q(V H −V L )
a
Hence, by using μ2=P and μ=μ 1
, μ2=μ 1+0.5 q (V H −V L ) (2)
Substituting (2) into (1), we get:
μ2−V L
p2 = and now sub in μ2=μ 1+0.5 q (V H −V L )
V H −V L
μ1 +0.5 q( V H −V L )−V L
p2 =
V H −V L
μ1 +0.5 q V H −0.5 qV L−V L
p2 =
V H −V L
Separate out the fraction
μ1−V L 0.5 q V H −0.5 qV L
p2 = +
V H −V L V H −V L
Second fraction can be simplified
μ1−V L 0.5 q (V H −V L )
p2 = +
V H −V L (V ¿ ¿ H −V L )¿
μ1−V L
p2 = +0.5 q
V H −V L
μ1−V L q
p2= +
V H −V L 2
μ2−V L μ1−V L
Above, we found that p2= so p1=
V H −V L V H −V L
Therefore:
q
p2= p1 + > p1 (3)
2
The dealer revises up the probability of a high value.
If the first client that the MM meets is a seller then μ2=P b and
going through the same algebra, the probability of a high value is:
Remember in the one-shot case: Pb=μ−0.5 q (V H −V L )
By using μ2=P b and μ=μ 1
μ2=μ 1−0.5 q(V H −V L )
μ2−V L
Like we did before, sub this equation in p2=
V H −V L
μ1−0.5 q (V H −V L )−V L
p2 =
V H −V L
Basic idea:
If the insiders in the market are buyers, then the market maker will experience a fall in her stock
inventory and will increase the ask price to avoid large losses. They will increase this ask price to
V H as the ask price was too low. The stock inventory will decrease because buyers will buy more
and more stocks due to them having the knowledge, meaning the stock inventory decreases.
The reverse happens if the insiders are sellers.
In this model, the insiders perform a useful function: they push prices in line with the true value
b
P.
This gives a favourable picture of the activities of insiders, unlike the King and Roell model where
they found that insider trading was harmful.
First trade:
We call the initial expectation μ the prior expectation and 0.5 the prior probability of a high
value outcome, V H . Denote these initial values as μ1 and p1 to indicate that they are only valid
for the first trade.
Recall that the market maker sets the initial ask price Pa (if she thinks the trade will happen)
such that she breaks even in expectation if a sale takes place.
So Pa is the posterior expectation conditional upon finding a buyer at the first trade.
By the same argument, Pb is the posterior expectation conditional upon meeting a seller.
Second trade:
Once the first trade is completed, a rational market maker will reset μ2 and the trading process
will move into the next round.
The only complication is that the probability a high value has changed, from prior probability of
0.5 to posterior probability, p2. NOT P1 because it is the second trade.
Then because the expectation is a probability weighted average, we have:
μ2= p2 V H +(1− p2 )V LWhere p2 V H is the probability of a high value and (1− p 2)V L is the
probability of a low value.
This can be rewritten as:
μ2−V L = p2 (V H −V L )
μ2−V L
OR: p2= (1) => this is what the posterior probability will be
V H −V L
Note that q, V H , V L are fixed.
Now suppose that the market maker happened to meet a buyer
on the first trade. If the first client buys then μ2=P a
We have already seen that in the one-shot case: (previous lecture)
Pa=μ+ 0.5 q(V H −V L )
a
Hence, by using μ2=P and μ=μ 1
, μ2=μ 1+0.5 q (V H −V L ) (2)
Substituting (2) into (1), we get:
μ2−V L
p2 = and now sub in μ2=μ 1+0.5 q (V H −V L )
V H −V L
μ1 +0.5 q( V H −V L )−V L
p2 =
V H −V L
μ1 +0.5 q V H −0.5 qV L−V L
p2 =
V H −V L
Separate out the fraction
μ1−V L 0.5 q V H −0.5 qV L
p2 = +
V H −V L V H −V L
Second fraction can be simplified
μ1−V L 0.5 q (V H −V L )
p2 = +
V H −V L (V ¿ ¿ H −V L )¿
μ1−V L
p2 = +0.5 q
V H −V L
μ1−V L q
p2= +
V H −V L 2
μ2−V L μ1−V L
Above, we found that p2= so p1=
V H −V L V H −V L
Therefore:
q
p2= p1 + > p1 (3)
2
The dealer revises up the probability of a high value.
If the first client that the MM meets is a seller then μ2=P b and
going through the same algebra, the probability of a high value is:
Remember in the one-shot case: Pb=μ−0.5 q (V H −V L )
By using μ2=P b and μ=μ 1
μ2=μ 1−0.5 q(V H −V L )
μ2−V L
Like we did before, sub this equation in p2=
V H −V L
μ1−0.5 q (V H −V L )−V L
p2 =
V H −V L