Assignment 1: Human rights are too anthropocentric
Yara Langeveld (2760223)
Workgroup 3/subgroup 10 - Health, Globalisation and Human Rights - MPA
06/11/2023
391 words
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) serves as a guideline for all humans
worldwide to treat each other with dignity and advocates for equality, liberty and security for
everyone, but what about non-human animals1? How can this broad, diverse group be excluded
from receiving universal rights, while they are also moral living beings with an equal intrinsic
value? Therefore, the UDHR is too anthropocentric and fundamental rights should be developed
for non-human animals as well.
The UDHR includes twelve core rights for all humans worldwide, among which the right not to
be discriminated against and to life, healthcare and freedom of expression1. These rights are
anthropocentric of nature and developed specifically for humans. However, non-human animals
have an equal intrinsic value as humans and from an ethical perspective they are therefore
entitled to certain rights2. Hereby, animals cannot be regarded merely as resources for human
purposes, by which they are discriminated against in society, but should be treated with dignity
instead. Moreover, animals have emotions, such as compassion, patience and anger, and
cognitive capacities, such as a sense of what is fair or not3. As De Waal & Andrews4 argue, this
provides evidence for their morality and humans thus have the moral obligation to recognise the
harm they cause to animals, and subsequently protect their well-being through universal rights
to prevent such harm. On the other hand, implementing the UDHR for animals gives rise to some
problems, such as animals having the right to vote or own property, which has consequences for
the current social order. These problems with social order are, however, the result of the UDHR
being designed solely for humans, which makes them currently inapplicable to non-human
animals. Therefore, fundamental rights for both humans and animals should be designed to
provide justice for animals, thereby also addressing and alleviating the violence, oppression and
suffering of animals in human societies5.
In conclusion, the UDHR is too anthropocentric, which is demonstrated by the fact that in its
current state it is not even applicable to non-human animals. As such, fundamental rights should
be designed for both humans and animals to recognise the equal intrinsic value of animals, and
their emotions and cognitive capacities that indicate their morality2,3. As a result, all humans and
animals will be treated with dignity and are equal, free and secure in a universal way.
1
Jongman, J.J. & Schmidt, A.P. (1994). Monitoring Human Rights. Leiden, PIOOM.
2
Regan, T. (2004) The Case for Animal Rights. 2nd edn. Berkeley: University of California Press.
3
Monsó, S., Benz-Schwarzburg, J., & Bremhorst, A. (2018). Animal morality: What it means and
why it matters. The Journal of Ethics, 22(3–4), 283–310.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-018-9275-3
4
De Waal, F. B. M., & Andrews, K. (2022). The question of animal emotions. Science, 375(6587),
1351–1352. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abo2378
Yara Langeveld (2760223)
Workgroup 3/subgroup 10 - Health, Globalisation and Human Rights - MPA
06/11/2023
391 words
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) serves as a guideline for all humans
worldwide to treat each other with dignity and advocates for equality, liberty and security for
everyone, but what about non-human animals1? How can this broad, diverse group be excluded
from receiving universal rights, while they are also moral living beings with an equal intrinsic
value? Therefore, the UDHR is too anthropocentric and fundamental rights should be developed
for non-human animals as well.
The UDHR includes twelve core rights for all humans worldwide, among which the right not to
be discriminated against and to life, healthcare and freedom of expression1. These rights are
anthropocentric of nature and developed specifically for humans. However, non-human animals
have an equal intrinsic value as humans and from an ethical perspective they are therefore
entitled to certain rights2. Hereby, animals cannot be regarded merely as resources for human
purposes, by which they are discriminated against in society, but should be treated with dignity
instead. Moreover, animals have emotions, such as compassion, patience and anger, and
cognitive capacities, such as a sense of what is fair or not3. As De Waal & Andrews4 argue, this
provides evidence for their morality and humans thus have the moral obligation to recognise the
harm they cause to animals, and subsequently protect their well-being through universal rights
to prevent such harm. On the other hand, implementing the UDHR for animals gives rise to some
problems, such as animals having the right to vote or own property, which has consequences for
the current social order. These problems with social order are, however, the result of the UDHR
being designed solely for humans, which makes them currently inapplicable to non-human
animals. Therefore, fundamental rights for both humans and animals should be designed to
provide justice for animals, thereby also addressing and alleviating the violence, oppression and
suffering of animals in human societies5.
In conclusion, the UDHR is too anthropocentric, which is demonstrated by the fact that in its
current state it is not even applicable to non-human animals. As such, fundamental rights should
be designed for both humans and animals to recognise the equal intrinsic value of animals, and
their emotions and cognitive capacities that indicate their morality2,3. As a result, all humans and
animals will be treated with dignity and are equal, free and secure in a universal way.
1
Jongman, J.J. & Schmidt, A.P. (1994). Monitoring Human Rights. Leiden, PIOOM.
2
Regan, T. (2004) The Case for Animal Rights. 2nd edn. Berkeley: University of California Press.
3
Monsó, S., Benz-Schwarzburg, J., & Bremhorst, A. (2018). Animal morality: What it means and
why it matters. The Journal of Ethics, 22(3–4), 283–310.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-018-9275-3
4
De Waal, F. B. M., & Andrews, K. (2022). The question of animal emotions. Science, 375(6587),
1351–1352. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abo2378
