Philosophy of Mind, Brain and Behavior
Lecture 1.
• Mind = umbrella-term for all mental states
• Mental:
1) intentional (they refer to outside something itself)
2) phenomenal (subjective experience)
most mental states are both intentional and phenomenal
Two kinds of dualism:
• Substance dualism: mind is a non-physical substance (soul) that is causally
connected to the body
→ most people thought this for a long time, but not anymore
• Property dualism: the mind is produced by the physical brain, but some of its
properties (phenomenal properties) are non-physical. There is always
something that cannot be explained.
Methodological problems with dualism
• Dualism implies introspection (self-reporting how you feel/what you think etc.)
as the only feasible methodology
• Introspection is neither objective, nor intersubjective (you cannot check it and
have to trust that people are telling the truth)
• Unconscious mental states cannot be topics of scientific research
→ Response: define psychology as a behavioral science
‘’Mind is too complicated’’
Logical behaviorism (part of philosophy)
The interaction problem: If the soul is immaterial and the body is
physical, how do they interact?
→ Descartes thought this interaction was done by the pineal gland
…
even if there is something like this in the pineal gland, it would be caused by
something physical.
Logical behaviorism (part of philosophy)
Mind and body are depicted as a puppeteer and puppet
We postulate the mind as a hidden locus of control in order to explain the difference
between intelligent and non-intelligent behavior
• sneezing, tripping, hiccupping etc. → body doing its own stuff
• solving path problems etc. → operated by the mind
(= wrong idea)
we feel like we need to explain this difference in behavior, but this is not needed.
→ ‘’Mind’’ is a word for intelligent behavior, not a hidden cause of it
,‘’The Concept of Mind’’ by Gilbert Ryle
• Mental states are behavioral dispositions (it has a tendency to show certain
behavior under certain conditions, just like sugar has a tendency to dissolve if
you put it in water) the idea that the mind is present 'in' our behaviour does not
fly in the face of the fact that we have all sorts of mental states that do not
show themselves in our behaviour.
• You can explain what someone thinks in behavioral terms
• Skinner and Watson (behaviorism) are not ignoring the mind, like they think
they are doing, but studying the mind
• ‘Mind’ is not a thing (=category mistake, like thinking the university is different
from the collection of categories of buildings)
• ‘Mind’ is like an atmosphere. you can have a great atmosphere at a party due
to a collection of different things, like people interaction, good music etc. but
you cannot see ‘’the atmosphere’’, which is an combination of all those things
• Thinking the mind is a thing, leads to bad science and bad philosophical
questions
Problems with behaviorism
1) Super Stoic and the Perfect Pretender
• If you can think it’s possible for someone to experience extreme pain, but not
show it in behavior, then experience is something distinct from behavior
• You can mimic pain so that you cannot distinguish a pretender from a person
who is actually feeling pain
2) Mental holism: believes you cannot break things down to study them, but
instead that everything has to be understood in relation to the whole or the
sum of its parts.
Edwin G. Boring:
Conscious processes = Brain processes
If we assume he is right…
• Ryle right about beliefs, hopes etc. (all the states that are about intentionality)
• Boring right about inside aspects (all the states that are about phenomenality)
→ complete respectable scientific alternative for substance dualism
J.C.C. Smart
‘’the mind is as manipulable as the brain’’
• This is going back to dualism and the picture of the
puppeteer and puppet.
…The mind and body are separate things that are causally
connected…
• The difference: the controlling locus is not immaterial, but
physical (the brain)
, • Mind = brain
• Anything that happens to our mind, has a parallel neural process/change
Identity theory
• Mentalistic language is topic neutral
• Dualism might have been true, but it isn’t, because evidence suggest
otherwise
if we found a profound change in the mind, without a parallel change in the
brain → would be evidence for dualism
• Mind = brain (is identical with)
• This is very suggestive and blunt, which Smart is aware of and is also aware
of the fact he might be disproven
• It’s a discovery
Two problems of the identity theory
• The ‘explanatory gap’
• Stating that mental states are brain states doesn’t explain anything.
• How can something mental (intentionality and phenomenality), be
something physical?
• Water = H2O example is not convincing (definition of molecules and
chemical theories explains this) we understand this and it is an actual
explanation
• Multiple realization
• Every time there is a certain brain stimulation → that same thought is being
activated
• This means that organisms with different brains cannot have the same
types of mental state
• This is unlikely (e.g., think of pain)
Lecture 1.
• Mind = umbrella-term for all mental states
• Mental:
1) intentional (they refer to outside something itself)
2) phenomenal (subjective experience)
most mental states are both intentional and phenomenal
Two kinds of dualism:
• Substance dualism: mind is a non-physical substance (soul) that is causally
connected to the body
→ most people thought this for a long time, but not anymore
• Property dualism: the mind is produced by the physical brain, but some of its
properties (phenomenal properties) are non-physical. There is always
something that cannot be explained.
Methodological problems with dualism
• Dualism implies introspection (self-reporting how you feel/what you think etc.)
as the only feasible methodology
• Introspection is neither objective, nor intersubjective (you cannot check it and
have to trust that people are telling the truth)
• Unconscious mental states cannot be topics of scientific research
→ Response: define psychology as a behavioral science
‘’Mind is too complicated’’
Logical behaviorism (part of philosophy)
The interaction problem: If the soul is immaterial and the body is
physical, how do they interact?
→ Descartes thought this interaction was done by the pineal gland
…
even if there is something like this in the pineal gland, it would be caused by
something physical.
Logical behaviorism (part of philosophy)
Mind and body are depicted as a puppeteer and puppet
We postulate the mind as a hidden locus of control in order to explain the difference
between intelligent and non-intelligent behavior
• sneezing, tripping, hiccupping etc. → body doing its own stuff
• solving path problems etc. → operated by the mind
(= wrong idea)
we feel like we need to explain this difference in behavior, but this is not needed.
→ ‘’Mind’’ is a word for intelligent behavior, not a hidden cause of it
,‘’The Concept of Mind’’ by Gilbert Ryle
• Mental states are behavioral dispositions (it has a tendency to show certain
behavior under certain conditions, just like sugar has a tendency to dissolve if
you put it in water) the idea that the mind is present 'in' our behaviour does not
fly in the face of the fact that we have all sorts of mental states that do not
show themselves in our behaviour.
• You can explain what someone thinks in behavioral terms
• Skinner and Watson (behaviorism) are not ignoring the mind, like they think
they are doing, but studying the mind
• ‘Mind’ is not a thing (=category mistake, like thinking the university is different
from the collection of categories of buildings)
• ‘Mind’ is like an atmosphere. you can have a great atmosphere at a party due
to a collection of different things, like people interaction, good music etc. but
you cannot see ‘’the atmosphere’’, which is an combination of all those things
• Thinking the mind is a thing, leads to bad science and bad philosophical
questions
Problems with behaviorism
1) Super Stoic and the Perfect Pretender
• If you can think it’s possible for someone to experience extreme pain, but not
show it in behavior, then experience is something distinct from behavior
• You can mimic pain so that you cannot distinguish a pretender from a person
who is actually feeling pain
2) Mental holism: believes you cannot break things down to study them, but
instead that everything has to be understood in relation to the whole or the
sum of its parts.
Edwin G. Boring:
Conscious processes = Brain processes
If we assume he is right…
• Ryle right about beliefs, hopes etc. (all the states that are about intentionality)
• Boring right about inside aspects (all the states that are about phenomenality)
→ complete respectable scientific alternative for substance dualism
J.C.C. Smart
‘’the mind is as manipulable as the brain’’
• This is going back to dualism and the picture of the
puppeteer and puppet.
…The mind and body are separate things that are causally
connected…
• The difference: the controlling locus is not immaterial, but
physical (the brain)
, • Mind = brain
• Anything that happens to our mind, has a parallel neural process/change
Identity theory
• Mentalistic language is topic neutral
• Dualism might have been true, but it isn’t, because evidence suggest
otherwise
if we found a profound change in the mind, without a parallel change in the
brain → would be evidence for dualism
• Mind = brain (is identical with)
• This is very suggestive and blunt, which Smart is aware of and is also aware
of the fact he might be disproven
• It’s a discovery
Two problems of the identity theory
• The ‘explanatory gap’
• Stating that mental states are brain states doesn’t explain anything.
• How can something mental (intentionality and phenomenality), be
something physical?
• Water = H2O example is not convincing (definition of molecules and
chemical theories explains this) we understand this and it is an actual
explanation
• Multiple realization
• Every time there is a certain brain stimulation → that same thought is being
activated
• This means that organisms with different brains cannot have the same
types of mental state
• This is unlikely (e.g., think of pain)
