Philosophy : Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, Baedeker.

Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, B (1) It is commonplace to speak of there being tensions between potentially competing values: e.g., throughout philosophy and literature, we find authors speaking of and dramatizing a clash, within societal and personal life, between liberty and equality, between familial piety and civic duty, between self-interest and duty, between happiness and morality, between religious and moral duties, and so on. Dworkin denies that this commonplace conception gets things right. (2) Why might it appear that the values of liberty and equality could conflict? Why might it appear that the values of both liberty and equality, on the one hand, and the value of democracy, on the other, could conflict? Why might it appear that law and morality could conflict? Why might it appear that morality and happiness could conflict, and vice versa? (3) Why, according to Dworkin, must these apparent conflicts between these values be illusory? (4) What does Dworkin mean when he says that the quest to understand the meaning of absolute (moral and political) values in axiology is akin to solving for variables in simultaneous equations in a system of multi-variable equations? Why might this be an appropriate metaphor?