Systematic extermination emerged as the ‘final solution’ to the Jewish question as
a result of the chaotic nature of the Nazi state
Paragraph 1 - chaotic nature of the state
It is argued that the chaotic nature of the state provided the environment for such a
radical ‘final solution’ to emerge.
The polycratic nature and Hitler’s distance from the everyday workings of politics
resulted in a lack of coordination and communication between central and regional
power. The lack of checks on regional power allowed for decisions to be made without
limitations of control.
The police chief in Riga, Friedrich Jeckeln, had a train load of Berlin Jews shot on
arrival before Himmler’s orders not to kill him. Shows how the lack of
communication (stemming from the chaotic polycratic nature of power) led to
regional power bases taking action without the orders of those higher up.
Hitler’s distance from politics also allowed for those who he put in charge of different
regions to search for their own solutions to the ‘Jewish question’. This is exacerbated by
the fact that everyone was ‘working towards the Fuhrer’ and thus competing with each
other to fulfil Hitler’s racial ideology and thus becoming more and more radical:
Pressure from the Gauleiters and Himmler in the West to deport their Jews in
1941 led to radical solutions being explored at a local level in the east. Arthuer
Greiser of Warthegau asked for matters to be taken into his own hands.
The police chief in Lublin ordered the construction of gassing facilities at camp
Belzec for killing Jews incapable of work. Similarly in Lodz, Jews were being shot
and gassed in vans, in 1941, 100,000 Jews were gassed in vans at Chelmno.
The range of ‘solutions’ before the final solution indicate a lack of plans and a sense of
ad hoc development.
This is also exemplified by the pursuit of a policy of emigration, the final solution
only emerged after no other country was willing to accept the Jews, and the idea
of sending all Jews to Madagascar was deemed unsuitable due to logistical
obstacles.
Paragraph 2 - evolving circumstances of war
Practical issues
The war brought about practical issues for the Nazis with regards to the Jewish
question.
The invasion of other countries in Europe meant there were an increasing number of
Jews in occupied Germany:
The invasion of Poland in 1939 led the absorption of 3 million Jews.
The other practicality issue that the war brought about was highlighted by Operation
Barberossa. The invasion of the USSA in 1941 put great strain on the German war
economy. The Germans were forced to cut back costs, and this highlighted an issue,
which was that it was costing too much to keep Jews in Ghettos. It was after this that
Hitler made it clear to his generals that they were to embark on a ‘war of
extermination’:
July 1941, SS brigades, consisting of 11,000 members committed to help the
work of the Einsatzgruppen, and by the winter of 1941 an estimated 700,000
Jews had been killed.
Essentially operation Barbarossa acts as the trigger for the final solution, it caused the
‘issue’ to be so desperately in need of a solution, that it provided justification in Hitler’s
mind to embark on the systematic killing of the Jews (decisions made about the final
solution were all made by summer 1941-2, which was the timeframe of operation
Barbarossa).
Sentiment
a result of the chaotic nature of the Nazi state
Paragraph 1 - chaotic nature of the state
It is argued that the chaotic nature of the state provided the environment for such a
radical ‘final solution’ to emerge.
The polycratic nature and Hitler’s distance from the everyday workings of politics
resulted in a lack of coordination and communication between central and regional
power. The lack of checks on regional power allowed for decisions to be made without
limitations of control.
The police chief in Riga, Friedrich Jeckeln, had a train load of Berlin Jews shot on
arrival before Himmler’s orders not to kill him. Shows how the lack of
communication (stemming from the chaotic polycratic nature of power) led to
regional power bases taking action without the orders of those higher up.
Hitler’s distance from politics also allowed for those who he put in charge of different
regions to search for their own solutions to the ‘Jewish question’. This is exacerbated by
the fact that everyone was ‘working towards the Fuhrer’ and thus competing with each
other to fulfil Hitler’s racial ideology and thus becoming more and more radical:
Pressure from the Gauleiters and Himmler in the West to deport their Jews in
1941 led to radical solutions being explored at a local level in the east. Arthuer
Greiser of Warthegau asked for matters to be taken into his own hands.
The police chief in Lublin ordered the construction of gassing facilities at camp
Belzec for killing Jews incapable of work. Similarly in Lodz, Jews were being shot
and gassed in vans, in 1941, 100,000 Jews were gassed in vans at Chelmno.
The range of ‘solutions’ before the final solution indicate a lack of plans and a sense of
ad hoc development.
This is also exemplified by the pursuit of a policy of emigration, the final solution
only emerged after no other country was willing to accept the Jews, and the idea
of sending all Jews to Madagascar was deemed unsuitable due to logistical
obstacles.
Paragraph 2 - evolving circumstances of war
Practical issues
The war brought about practical issues for the Nazis with regards to the Jewish
question.
The invasion of other countries in Europe meant there were an increasing number of
Jews in occupied Germany:
The invasion of Poland in 1939 led the absorption of 3 million Jews.
The other practicality issue that the war brought about was highlighted by Operation
Barberossa. The invasion of the USSA in 1941 put great strain on the German war
economy. The Germans were forced to cut back costs, and this highlighted an issue,
which was that it was costing too much to keep Jews in Ghettos. It was after this that
Hitler made it clear to his generals that they were to embark on a ‘war of
extermination’:
July 1941, SS brigades, consisting of 11,000 members committed to help the
work of the Einsatzgruppen, and by the winter of 1941 an estimated 700,000
Jews had been killed.
Essentially operation Barbarossa acts as the trigger for the final solution, it caused the
‘issue’ to be so desperately in need of a solution, that it provided justification in Hitler’s
mind to embark on the systematic killing of the Jews (decisions made about the final
solution were all made by summer 1941-2, which was the timeframe of operation
Barbarossa).
Sentiment
