LJU4801 LEGAL PHILOSOPHY UNISA 2022 ASSIGNMENT NUMBER 2- 2022

S - The Marketplace to Buy and Sell your Study Material Want to earn $103 per month? LJU4801 LEGAL PHILOSOPHY UNISA 2022 ASSIGNMENT NUMBER 2- 2022 written by THE HUB LLB EXAM PACKS AND TUTORIALS Past paper solutions, notes, summaries, assignment packs & tuitions LJU4801 ASSIGNMENT 2 MEMO SUPER SEMESTER LJU4801 LEGAL PHILOSOPHY UNISA 2022 ASSIGNMENT NUMBER 2 TOTAL: 20 MARKS For this assignment, you need to read the following article and answer the questions. The article can be found under Additional resources -> Prescribed reading. Metz T "Towards an African moral theory" 2007 Journal of Political Philosophy 321 – 341 1. The author argues that Western and African philosophies agree on 6 moral principles, but that African philosophy includes a further 6 principles not found in western philosophy. In your own words, explain what these principles are. (Max word count 200.) (5) When it comes to the reproach about the vagueness of Ubuntu as a philosophical thought, Thaddeus Metz examines six theoretical interpretations of the concept of Ubuntu: U1: An action is right just insofar as it respects a person’s dignity; an act is wrong to the extent that it degrades humanity. U2: An action is right just insofar as it promotes the well-being of others; an act is wrong to the extent that it fails to enhance the welfare of one’s fellows. U3: An action is right just insofar as it promotes the well-being of others without violating their rights; an act is wrong to the extent that it either violates rights or fails to enhance the welfare of one’s fellows without violating rights. U4: An action is right just insofar as it positively relates to others and thereby realizes oneself; an act is wrong to the extent that it does not perfect one’s valuable nature as a social being. U5: An action is right just insofar as it is in solidarity with groups whose survival is threatened; an act is wrong to the extent that it fails to support a vulnerable community. U6: An action is right just insofar as it produces harmony and reduces discord; an act is wrong to the extent that it fails to develop community (Metz, 2007). While arguing that the concept U4 is the most accepted in literature, Matz himself argues in favour of the concept U6 as the basis of the ethics is rooted not in the subject, but in the object (Metz, 2007). 2. Do these "additional" principles meet the characteristics of African legal philosophy as set out in the study guide? Why do you say that? (Max word count 500.) (10) In his philosophical writings, Metz employs the phrase ‘African ethics’ to refer to “values associated with the largely black and Bantu-speaking peoples residing in the sub-Saharan part of the continent, thereby excluding Islamic Arabs in North Africa and white Afrikaners in South Africa, among others”4 (Metz, 2007: 321). This definition indicates four important factors about African ethics. The four factors in Metz’s view of African ethics are (1) “values associated with the largely black people”, (2) the Black people in question are “Bantu-speaking”, (3) they reside “in the sub-Saharan part of the [African] continent”, and (4) therefore exclude “Islamic Arabs in North Africa and white Afrikaners in South Africa, among others”. The four factors from the Metz’s definition provides a valuable tool to systematically separate African thought on ethics from other thoughts such as Oriental ethics and to be clear on what is meant by African ethics. One important consideration regarding Metz’s interpretation of African ethics requires that we clarify the idea ‘African’ in the phrase ‘African ethics’. Metz’s uses the word ‘African’ to refer to a set of “... salient beliefs and practices of many sub-Saharan peoples” (Metz, 2010: 50) and adds that he does “not mean that either it or the intuitions on which it is grounded are unique to the African continent” (50). Central to Metz’s definition of what makes some value(s) and practice(s) is its salience in this region and across time. Metz captures the property of salience in this fashion - “to count as African, an idea or behaviour need not be present everywhere in Africa, and it need not be present solely in Africa” (50) and “only that they are prominent there in a way they are not everywhere else” (50). In other words, the values characteristic of African cultures are dominant in this region than in other parts of the world. Metz does give us a rough sense of the values dominant below the Sahara in this fashion: Another important point to note with regards to Metz’s interpretation of ubuntu is to consider whether it favours ethical naturalism or ethical supernaturalism. The major debate in this regard revolves around accounting for morality entirely in secular or religious terms. Metz stipulates an approach to African moral thought that is secular at heart. Regarding why he takes ethical naturalism, he makes the following comment - “...it is clear that at least many African societies are best interpreted as believing moral norms to be logically independent of supernaturalist theses” (Metz, 2007: 328). Metz clarifies his interpretation of ubuntu in secular terms by sharing his personal view that “I am not out to defend an anthropological representation of the nature of African belief systems here; I instead stipulate that I seek to develop a moral theory that is non- religious at its base” (Metz, 2007: 238). As such, Metz offers an interpretation of ubuntu that is secular at heart. Now that I have indicated what Metz means by ‘African ethics’, I will now turn my attention to highlighting how he interprets the term ubuntu. In doing so, Metz starts by indicating that the word ubuntu “is a word used by the Zulu people of South Africa, and is difficult to translate into English because it has many different connotations associated with it” (Metz, 2007: 323). It is important that Metz starts his engagement and interpretation of ubuntu by indicating its origin and that it “is difficult to translate into English” (323) as already indicated. This gives us a sense of the complexity and depth of the idea of ubuntu. It is therefore not surprising that most non-Zulu or non- Nguni language speakers often misconstrue the idea of ubuntu because as matter of fact, the concept of ubuntu is difficult to translate into any other non-African language5. According to Metz, the word of ubuntu could be explained to “roughly mean humanness” (Metz, 2007: 323). He also holds that ubuntu often figures into maxim “a person is a person through other persons.” In what follows, we shall turn our attention to the moral facets of this idea, as promised above. The moral sense of the aphorism ‘a person is a person through other persons’ enjoins that “one ought to be a mensch, in other words, morally should support the community in certain ways” (Metz, 2007: 323). The idea of a Mensch means “a person of integrity” (323). A mensch is someone who is responsible, has a sense of right and wrong, and is the sort of person other people admire. A mensch shows up for her friends. In the English language, the word has come to mean ‘a good- hearted, dependable, solid person’.