It is submitted that Sandra may be guilty of Theft as per s1 of the Theft Act 1968 and Raymond may be guilty of
Robbery as per s8 of the same act so we shall assess their liability as well as discussing the extent to which these
offences are based upon the notion of fault.
Sandra
Firstly, we shall assess whether Sandra is guilty of Theft which, as per s1 of the Theft Act 1968, is “dishonestly
appropriating property belonging to another with intention to permanently deprive”. We shall begin by discussing
whether Sandra satisfies the Actus Reus or AR of theft which is appropriation of property belonging to another.
“Appropriation” is defined in s3 of the Theft Act as assuming the rights of the owner which include the right to sell,
possess, lend, destroy and consume, as demonstrated in the case of R v Pittham v Hehl where the defendants
assumed the owners’ rights to sell their furniture. Regarding our defendant Sandra, it is evident that by merely
taking the earrings, she is assuming the right to possess not to mention she intends on assuming the right to sell,
thus meaning s3 is satisfied. This appropriation must be of property, as seen in s4, and there are two types of
property: tangible which can be touched and non-tangible which cannot be touched and must be put into action in
order to be classed as theft as seen in Oxford v Moss. It is autre clare that the earrings are tangible property. There
are some exceptions to this such as res naturii and body parts, however earrings are neither of these and thus are
property. The final part of the AR which we must assess is “belonging to another” as per s5 of the Theft Act. As shall
be discussed later when assessing Raymond’s liability, belonging to another merely means that another is in
possession of it rather than is the owner and this is exemplified in the case of R v Turner where D stole his own car as
it was not in his possession. In our case, the earrings are in the possession of the store and thus belonged to another.
Therefore, it is aute clare that Sandra has satisfied the MR of Theft and one must now assess whether she fits the MR
to see if she is guilty.
The Mens Rea or MR of Theft is dishonestly (s2 of the Theft Act) and intention to permanently deprive (s6 of the
Theft Act. The original test used for dishonestly came from the case of R v Ghosh and was a two part test: would a
reasonable person consider D’s actions dishonest and was D aware that his actions would be considered dishonest.
This test has since been replaced in Ivy v B Casinos with its use in criminal law confirmed in R v Barton and states:
would a member of normal, reasonable, moral society consider D dishonest in regard to the circumstances? This test
seems to ignore whether the defendant thought themselves dishonest unlike the Ghosh test, however “in regard to
the circumstances” may have a similar effect. Nonetheless, assessing Sandra’s actions, it is evident that she was
dishonest, especially considering how long she spent debating whether to take the earrings. The defendant must
also have intention to permanently deprive as seen in s6 and this refers to intention to remove all goodness and
virtue from the purpose of the property for a period of time, as seen in R v Velumyl where he intended to give the
money back yet still permanently deprived. This can also be seen in R v Raphael where similarly, the defendant
returned the car for a fee but still permanently deprived for that period. Despite Sandra intending to return the
jewellery if she cannot sell it, she still intends to permanently deprive for that period of time, as seen in the
aforementioned cases as she intends to remove the goodness and virtue of the purpose of the property, which is for
the owner to sell it. Therefore, it is evident that Sandra satisfies the MR of theft and, as she fits both the AR and MR,
is guilty of theft.
Robbery as per s8 of the same act so we shall assess their liability as well as discussing the extent to which these
offences are based upon the notion of fault.
Sandra
Firstly, we shall assess whether Sandra is guilty of Theft which, as per s1 of the Theft Act 1968, is “dishonestly
appropriating property belonging to another with intention to permanently deprive”. We shall begin by discussing
whether Sandra satisfies the Actus Reus or AR of theft which is appropriation of property belonging to another.
“Appropriation” is defined in s3 of the Theft Act as assuming the rights of the owner which include the right to sell,
possess, lend, destroy and consume, as demonstrated in the case of R v Pittham v Hehl where the defendants
assumed the owners’ rights to sell their furniture. Regarding our defendant Sandra, it is evident that by merely
taking the earrings, she is assuming the right to possess not to mention she intends on assuming the right to sell,
thus meaning s3 is satisfied. This appropriation must be of property, as seen in s4, and there are two types of
property: tangible which can be touched and non-tangible which cannot be touched and must be put into action in
order to be classed as theft as seen in Oxford v Moss. It is autre clare that the earrings are tangible property. There
are some exceptions to this such as res naturii and body parts, however earrings are neither of these and thus are
property. The final part of the AR which we must assess is “belonging to another” as per s5 of the Theft Act. As shall
be discussed later when assessing Raymond’s liability, belonging to another merely means that another is in
possession of it rather than is the owner and this is exemplified in the case of R v Turner where D stole his own car as
it was not in his possession. In our case, the earrings are in the possession of the store and thus belonged to another.
Therefore, it is aute clare that Sandra has satisfied the MR of Theft and one must now assess whether she fits the MR
to see if she is guilty.
The Mens Rea or MR of Theft is dishonestly (s2 of the Theft Act) and intention to permanently deprive (s6 of the
Theft Act. The original test used for dishonestly came from the case of R v Ghosh and was a two part test: would a
reasonable person consider D’s actions dishonest and was D aware that his actions would be considered dishonest.
This test has since been replaced in Ivy v B Casinos with its use in criminal law confirmed in R v Barton and states:
would a member of normal, reasonable, moral society consider D dishonest in regard to the circumstances? This test
seems to ignore whether the defendant thought themselves dishonest unlike the Ghosh test, however “in regard to
the circumstances” may have a similar effect. Nonetheless, assessing Sandra’s actions, it is evident that she was
dishonest, especially considering how long she spent debating whether to take the earrings. The defendant must
also have intention to permanently deprive as seen in s6 and this refers to intention to remove all goodness and
virtue from the purpose of the property for a period of time, as seen in R v Velumyl where he intended to give the
money back yet still permanently deprived. This can also be seen in R v Raphael where similarly, the defendant
returned the car for a fee but still permanently deprived for that period. Despite Sandra intending to return the
jewellery if she cannot sell it, she still intends to permanently deprive for that period of time, as seen in the
aforementioned cases as she intends to remove the goodness and virtue of the purpose of the property, which is for
the owner to sell it. Therefore, it is evident that Sandra satisfies the MR of theft and, as she fits both the AR and MR,
is guilty of theft.
