To what extent was Stalin’s attitude to foreign powers before 1929 driven by ideology?
(25 marks)
Stalin’s principle foreign policy objectives were clear, he concentrated consistently on domestic interests,
which sought to quench his relentless desire for security by expanding the Soviet borders outwards,
making Russia the dominant power. This objective was driven mostly by circumstance, and Stalin’s
paranoia- which made security his chief concern. Ideology was ultimately a second-hand factor that went
into decision-making and only partially affected policy- the main aim was achieving national security.
During the early 1920s, Stalin saw pursuing Comintern (an organisation set up to spread permanent
revolution) as low priority and an ideological fantasy for the extreme left of the party. After the Russian
Revolution, the Bolsheviks took over the old Russian empire in 1918, they faced enormous odds against
the German empire due to World War 1, and then against both domestic and international enemies in
the bitter civil war. Rather than focus on expanding Marxism-Leninism to a rather unaccepting world,
Stalin preferred to fixate on national security and developed policies such as ‘Socialism in One Country.’
Here, Stalin’s main aim for foreign policy were personal- strengthen his own position and the USSR’s
position rather than concentrate on expanding a proletariat for an unlikely world-wide revolution;
ideology was underwhelmingly significant at this point. Comintern was an unwelcome nuisance for Stalin-
whilst diplomats and People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel) took steps to secure
relations with foreign powers, the Comintern continued to engage in foreign propaganda in an effort to
spread the worldwide revolution. These two strains of Soviet foreign affairs were at odds with one
another, to the point of being mutually exclusive. Thus, establishing foreign relationships through
diplomacy became complicated by the existence of Comintern- eventually Chicherin (foreign commissar)
petitioned the Politburo to separate Comintern from the government. It’s clear the Soviet Union’s more
significant objective for foreign policy was to achieve diplomatic and conventional recognition by foreign
powers rather than attempting to ideologically proselytise other nations. However, the change to more
aggressive ambitions abroad in 1928 at the sixth Comintern were driven by ideology. Stalin saw that
world capitalism was facing a terminal crisis, and that the time was right for an all-out attack on anti-
communist Social Democratic parties in Europe- Stalin pushed the Comintern to purge ‘weak elements’
(as well as Trotskyists) and social fascists to prepare for return to fight to spread revolution across the
world. The focus here seems to be ideological as Stalin is sharpening down on communism however
some historians have argued that this was not the case and that Stalinist foreign policy was reactive and
opportunistic. Ultimately, Stalin acted based on the particular situation and opportunistically communist
ideology fit him- it was the perfect time to launch an attack on anti-communist parties as there was a
capitalist emergency. His foreign policy through Comintern was driven through circumstance over
ideology.
Stalin’s foreign policy focus changed from ideology to protecting the interest of the Soviet State- this
is most clear towards his policy of the Communist Party in China (CCP), which Stalin bitterly attacked.
Stalin was obsessed with borders because he believed that without their extension Russia was
vulnerable; he took this as priority over ideology. Paranoia was behind everything Stalin did. As Raymond
Birt demonstrates, ‘the clinical description of the paranoid almost perfectly describes Stalin’s
personality’; Stalin could not trust even those closest to him, let alone communist groups in China. The
CCP hoped to carry out a communist revolution and expected support from Stalin and the Comintern
however Stalin did not trust their adapted and independent interpretation of Marxist ideology. Instead,
Stalin preferred to back Jiang Jieshi, leader of the revolutionary-nationalist movement, the Guomindang
(GMD). Stalin believed the GMD were more likely to bring stability to a key strategic area on Russia’s
eastern borders. Correspondingly, here Stalin’s attitude is more concentrated on national security. But in
April 1927, Jiang struck and massacred 30,000 to 40,000 Communists in Shanghai. Just a week earlier
Stalin had boasted that they would use the Chinese bourgeoisie and ‘throw it away like a squeezed
lemon’. The policy failed and secured Trotsky’s belief that Stalin was the ‘grave digger of the revolution’.
Again, Stalin prioritised his own motives and national security- Stalin couldn’t place his faith in the CCP
over their ideological beliefs yet he trusted the GMD despite them being a greater ideological rival since
they were revolutionary-nationalists.
Stalin’s foreign policy attitude towards Germany also reflected his driving factors- ideology was only
partially significant and national security was of the utmost importance. The failed Spartacus uprising in
1919 proved that Germany was not ready for a revolution so there was no real chance of spreading
(25 marks)
Stalin’s principle foreign policy objectives were clear, he concentrated consistently on domestic interests,
which sought to quench his relentless desire for security by expanding the Soviet borders outwards,
making Russia the dominant power. This objective was driven mostly by circumstance, and Stalin’s
paranoia- which made security his chief concern. Ideology was ultimately a second-hand factor that went
into decision-making and only partially affected policy- the main aim was achieving national security.
During the early 1920s, Stalin saw pursuing Comintern (an organisation set up to spread permanent
revolution) as low priority and an ideological fantasy for the extreme left of the party. After the Russian
Revolution, the Bolsheviks took over the old Russian empire in 1918, they faced enormous odds against
the German empire due to World War 1, and then against both domestic and international enemies in
the bitter civil war. Rather than focus on expanding Marxism-Leninism to a rather unaccepting world,
Stalin preferred to fixate on national security and developed policies such as ‘Socialism in One Country.’
Here, Stalin’s main aim for foreign policy were personal- strengthen his own position and the USSR’s
position rather than concentrate on expanding a proletariat for an unlikely world-wide revolution;
ideology was underwhelmingly significant at this point. Comintern was an unwelcome nuisance for Stalin-
whilst diplomats and People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel) took steps to secure
relations with foreign powers, the Comintern continued to engage in foreign propaganda in an effort to
spread the worldwide revolution. These two strains of Soviet foreign affairs were at odds with one
another, to the point of being mutually exclusive. Thus, establishing foreign relationships through
diplomacy became complicated by the existence of Comintern- eventually Chicherin (foreign commissar)
petitioned the Politburo to separate Comintern from the government. It’s clear the Soviet Union’s more
significant objective for foreign policy was to achieve diplomatic and conventional recognition by foreign
powers rather than attempting to ideologically proselytise other nations. However, the change to more
aggressive ambitions abroad in 1928 at the sixth Comintern were driven by ideology. Stalin saw that
world capitalism was facing a terminal crisis, and that the time was right for an all-out attack on anti-
communist Social Democratic parties in Europe- Stalin pushed the Comintern to purge ‘weak elements’
(as well as Trotskyists) and social fascists to prepare for return to fight to spread revolution across the
world. The focus here seems to be ideological as Stalin is sharpening down on communism however
some historians have argued that this was not the case and that Stalinist foreign policy was reactive and
opportunistic. Ultimately, Stalin acted based on the particular situation and opportunistically communist
ideology fit him- it was the perfect time to launch an attack on anti-communist parties as there was a
capitalist emergency. His foreign policy through Comintern was driven through circumstance over
ideology.
Stalin’s foreign policy focus changed from ideology to protecting the interest of the Soviet State- this
is most clear towards his policy of the Communist Party in China (CCP), which Stalin bitterly attacked.
Stalin was obsessed with borders because he believed that without their extension Russia was
vulnerable; he took this as priority over ideology. Paranoia was behind everything Stalin did. As Raymond
Birt demonstrates, ‘the clinical description of the paranoid almost perfectly describes Stalin’s
personality’; Stalin could not trust even those closest to him, let alone communist groups in China. The
CCP hoped to carry out a communist revolution and expected support from Stalin and the Comintern
however Stalin did not trust their adapted and independent interpretation of Marxist ideology. Instead,
Stalin preferred to back Jiang Jieshi, leader of the revolutionary-nationalist movement, the Guomindang
(GMD). Stalin believed the GMD were more likely to bring stability to a key strategic area on Russia’s
eastern borders. Correspondingly, here Stalin’s attitude is more concentrated on national security. But in
April 1927, Jiang struck and massacred 30,000 to 40,000 Communists in Shanghai. Just a week earlier
Stalin had boasted that they would use the Chinese bourgeoisie and ‘throw it away like a squeezed
lemon’. The policy failed and secured Trotsky’s belief that Stalin was the ‘grave digger of the revolution’.
Again, Stalin prioritised his own motives and national security- Stalin couldn’t place his faith in the CCP
over their ideological beliefs yet he trusted the GMD despite them being a greater ideological rival since
they were revolutionary-nationalists.
Stalin’s foreign policy attitude towards Germany also reflected his driving factors- ideology was only
partially significant and national security was of the utmost importance. The failed Spartacus uprising in
1919 proved that Germany was not ready for a revolution so there was no real chance of spreading
