Yes, a good lawyer can be a good person if they work with zeal whilst being a guardian of
democracy. Questions on legal ethics have torn scholars and lawyers asunder since time
immemorial. Legal ethics scholars are largely split into two camps: those proscribing to the standard
conception of legal ethics, and those advocating for common morality, or individual moral agency.
Both are useful tools for examining legal ethics.
A good lawyer and a good person would work zealously for their client. In other words, the client-
devoted lawyer would work hard, energetically, and creatively. But, not necessarily to win at all
costs.
Charles Fried boldly and influentially argued that a lawyer should zealously pursue the interests of
his client, as one would do for a friend. Friends help each other completely, have unwavering loyalty
and do not subject each other to moral judgment. For Fried, upholding a client’s legal rights is always
morally laudable. Fried goes so far to argue that the lawyer’s duty to the client goes above the
‘collective interest’.1 Practically and morally for Fried, the lawyer has a duty to secure the client’s
autonomy and to promote the case, even at the expense of the public good. 2 In this argument, it was
the public good for the public to have complete faith in its lawyers. The justice system then ‘would
often target the vulnerable’ in one-sided trials. 3 A strong defence by an overly zealous lawyer
protected the defendant, mitigating social unrest at the time. In the same vein, the hyper-zealous
Markovits radically asserted that client advocacy permits even lying to the court. 4 However, blatant
lying by counsel would undermine a fair trial. Lying contradicts the Solicitors’ Regulation Authority
(SRA) Codes of Conduct (CDC)1.4 to ‘not mislead clients’ or the courts. Indeed, in Brett v SRA, the
courts struck off the dishonest lawyer who mislead the court.
A zealous lawyer might serve his client well through other legal means. Following the SRA CDC2.2 a
lawyer cannot ‘generate false evidence’ and has a duty to disclose relevant documents. A good,
zealous lawyer and a good person could present to opposing counsel the full bank statement of a
client for three months without pointing out the single helpful transaction. Thus, the opponents’
competence as lawyers and standard of argument become important for the outcome of the case.
Guidance from the courts would suggest this is valid. The Supreme Court held in Barton that litigants
are expected to familiarise themselves with the rules of court. The lawyers were not deemed guilty
of ‘playing technical games’ by waiting until the limitation period expired before telling the claimant
his claim form had not been validly served. 5
Although these scholars unlocked questions in legal ethics still relevant today, their solutions are not
as relevant. The justice system now prioritises the need for a fair trial, which invalidates Fried’s logic.
A good person and good lawyer would not be so over-zealous as Fried to pressurise a witness, to
distort documentary evidence or to lie to the court for his client. More recent scholars promote a
tamer version of partisanship, more palatable to modern times and to the SRA’s guidance. Dare
advocates ‘mere zeal’ where lawyers vigorously but less so than in antiquity like under Fried, legally
1
Charles Fried, The Lawyer as a Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 Yale L. J. 1060 (1976)
2
Charles Fried, The Lawyer as a Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 Yale L. J. 1060 (1976) pp
1066
3
MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 82 (2d ed. 2002), pps7, 16-17
4
Daniel Markovits, Legal Ethics from the Lawyer’s Point of View, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 209, 212 (2003)
5
Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] UKSC 12
democracy. Questions on legal ethics have torn scholars and lawyers asunder since time
immemorial. Legal ethics scholars are largely split into two camps: those proscribing to the standard
conception of legal ethics, and those advocating for common morality, or individual moral agency.
Both are useful tools for examining legal ethics.
A good lawyer and a good person would work zealously for their client. In other words, the client-
devoted lawyer would work hard, energetically, and creatively. But, not necessarily to win at all
costs.
Charles Fried boldly and influentially argued that a lawyer should zealously pursue the interests of
his client, as one would do for a friend. Friends help each other completely, have unwavering loyalty
and do not subject each other to moral judgment. For Fried, upholding a client’s legal rights is always
morally laudable. Fried goes so far to argue that the lawyer’s duty to the client goes above the
‘collective interest’.1 Practically and morally for Fried, the lawyer has a duty to secure the client’s
autonomy and to promote the case, even at the expense of the public good. 2 In this argument, it was
the public good for the public to have complete faith in its lawyers. The justice system then ‘would
often target the vulnerable’ in one-sided trials. 3 A strong defence by an overly zealous lawyer
protected the defendant, mitigating social unrest at the time. In the same vein, the hyper-zealous
Markovits radically asserted that client advocacy permits even lying to the court. 4 However, blatant
lying by counsel would undermine a fair trial. Lying contradicts the Solicitors’ Regulation Authority
(SRA) Codes of Conduct (CDC)1.4 to ‘not mislead clients’ or the courts. Indeed, in Brett v SRA, the
courts struck off the dishonest lawyer who mislead the court.
A zealous lawyer might serve his client well through other legal means. Following the SRA CDC2.2 a
lawyer cannot ‘generate false evidence’ and has a duty to disclose relevant documents. A good,
zealous lawyer and a good person could present to opposing counsel the full bank statement of a
client for three months without pointing out the single helpful transaction. Thus, the opponents’
competence as lawyers and standard of argument become important for the outcome of the case.
Guidance from the courts would suggest this is valid. The Supreme Court held in Barton that litigants
are expected to familiarise themselves with the rules of court. The lawyers were not deemed guilty
of ‘playing technical games’ by waiting until the limitation period expired before telling the claimant
his claim form had not been validly served. 5
Although these scholars unlocked questions in legal ethics still relevant today, their solutions are not
as relevant. The justice system now prioritises the need for a fair trial, which invalidates Fried’s logic.
A good person and good lawyer would not be so over-zealous as Fried to pressurise a witness, to
distort documentary evidence or to lie to the court for his client. More recent scholars promote a
tamer version of partisanship, more palatable to modern times and to the SRA’s guidance. Dare
advocates ‘mere zeal’ where lawyers vigorously but less so than in antiquity like under Fried, legally
1
Charles Fried, The Lawyer as a Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 Yale L. J. 1060 (1976)
2
Charles Fried, The Lawyer as a Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 Yale L. J. 1060 (1976) pp
1066
3
MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 82 (2d ed. 2002), pps7, 16-17
4
Daniel Markovits, Legal Ethics from the Lawyer’s Point of View, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 209, 212 (2003)
5
Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] UKSC 12
