Russia in revolution: How far was the Provisional Government responsible for its own downfall? A* full marks essay

How far was the provisional government responsible for its own downfall in 1917?

The provisional government was not ever destined to succeed. In fact, looking at the
political climate in Russia at the time it is highly unlikely that any other body would have.
Thus, one can argue that the pre-existing circumstances, and the situation the provisional
government inherited, were impossible, and these factors cannot be ignored when looking
at the provisional government’s downfall. However, it can be said that the provisional
government’s self-proclaimed rule and its bourgeois nature due to its right-wing, middle-
class politicians were significant contributors to its own downfall.

The provisional government was never set up for success when considering its in-built
weaknesses and faults. Firstly, it wasn’t a legitimate body, it wasn’t elected by the people
and thereby it had no real power, it simply didn’t have the means to enforce its will. There
was perhaps never any real possibility of the people's aspirations being satisfied by the
variety of different views that made up the provisional government. Its majority were
middle class duma politicians, who were right wing men, they were not revolutionaries; they
too were there to prevent revolution. Thus, from the very start, the objectives of the
provisional government were very different from those of the ordinary people. There is
much sense in Lenin's take on provisional government policy: 'wait until the constituent
assembly for land. Wait until the end of the war for the constituent assembly. Wait until
total victory for the end of the war' as it simply saw itself as a temporary body to ‘hold the
fort’ until the constituent assembly elections. Furthermore, it supposedly shared power with
the Petrograd soviet, however, this was actually an uneven distribution of power. The soviet
were the ones in real authority since the provisional government were effectively
illegitimate, because the duma wasn’t a democratically elected body, its right to take charge
was therefore open to question, and the Petrograd garrison was unwilling to recognise its
authority. Furthermore, the authority of the soviet also made it virtually impossible for the
provisional government to thrive and continue, especially after the Petrograd soviet’s
release of soviet order number 1 in march 1917, in which it agreed to follow the provisional
government “only in such cases as they do not conflict with the orders and resolutions of
the soviet.” Therefore, when looking at the provisional government from this angle, it isn’t
surprising that it failed to succeed, however, one can argue that it wasn’t responsible for its
own downfall in this respect because of the impossible conditions it inherited and the
political complications it had as a body that were out of its control, as mentioned above. The
point is that too much was expected of the provisional government in too short a window.
Soldiers wanted an end to the war; peasants wanted the land; workers wanted better
conditions; the political population wanted freedom of association and freedom of press;
different nationalities wanted independence; the allies wanted an offensive against the
Germans. Any government would have found all these aspirations difficult to fulfil in
peacetime let alone during a difficult war. Moreover, the government was only provisional,
and its power was undermined by the soviets. Thus, it can be argued that it faced an
impossible task.

The provisional government undoubtedly faced extreme problems, including; war, a failing
economy, the land question, and the national minorities. However, one can argue that it
was responsible for its own downfall when looking at how it dealt with these problems, and
it appears that they were made worse. It was conscious of its status as an ‘provisional’