Chapter 7: Implementation
Who is involved in policy implementation?
Implementation structure
Implementation structure refers to the formal organisational arrangements that have been
set up for implementing a policy. In most polities, policy implementation is carried out by
different levels of state bureaucracy. At the central level, there are the various national
ministries, and (quasi-)autonomous agencies located outside of the ministries that are
charged with implementing public policy. These are set up with specialised expertise for
dealing with complex or new policy areas.
This international trend of delegating implementation – and often also policy formulation –
competencies to these agencies is based on the assumption that:
1. They will improve overall implementation performance and efficiency.
2. The idea of separating politics from public administration and insulating certain
decisions from political considerations, which is expected to minimise deviations from
the original intentions of policy-makers and prevent delays.
Regulatory agencies are a subgroup of such (quasi-)autonomous agencies, and one of their
main tasks is to implement public policy in market-related areas.
A large part of national policies is also implemented by public entities at the local level.
Employment and welfare policy is usually carried out by local employment agencies.
There are also public policies that are implemented by multiple organisations, which might
even be located at different levels of government. A considerable share of legislation
requires multi-organizational structures. In this context, the role of interorganizational
networks has been emphasised, as they can provide an effective means of coordination.
Another scenario is policy implementation by private actors, which can include arrangements
in which policies are delivered by private actors only or by ‘hybrid governance’ in which
private and public actors collaborate.
Decision-making within agencies
Depending on the specific policy to be implemented, agencies can have differing degrees of
decisional discretion. Bureaucracies might have greater leeway in the interpretation of policy
outputs if these are characterised by vague policy contents or goals.
Target group behaviour
The third group that participates in the implementation process is the target group. Only if
the target group changes its behaviour in the intended manner can a policy be said to be
implemented effectively.
,Analytical perspectives in implementation research
To achieve the intended policy outcome, compliance with the relevant policy has to be
monitored and if necessary also enforced, for example by issuing fines.
There is not only one way of implementing policy outputs and often implementation requires
multiple actions, which further complicates analysis.
Top-down models of policy implementation
Deviations in policy goals are likely if action depends upon a number of actors who are
required to cooperate. Hence, the longer the implementation chain and the greater the
number of actors involved in the process, the more difficult implementation becomes.
This corresponds to rational choice theories, as they conceive of implementation as
purposive action by different groups of actors with different preferences. Since the success
of implementation depends on the cooperation of actors, there is a relatively high chance
that problems will occur, which implies a mismatch between intended policy objectives and
actual outcomes. Put this way, implementation can be analysed by means of game theory.
During decision-making and implementation, a greater number of actors can lead to conflict
over policy goals, as well as delays and deviations from what policy-makers originally
intended.
The degree of goal attainment serves as an indicator of implementation success; and
effective implementation corresponds to a match between policy objectives and outcomes.
Implementation will be most successful when the policy output only requires marginal
changes compared with the status quo and when goal consensus amongst the public and
private actors involved is high.
The logic of the top-down perspective is also well illustrated by the four-step model:
1. Address the extent to which the actions of implementing officials and target groups
were consistent with the objectives and procedures outlined in a public policy.
2. Focus on the extent to which the objectives were attained over time.
3. Evaluate the principal factors affecting policy outcomes.
4. Suggest analysing whether and how the policy was reformulated on the basis of
experience.
Criticism of top-down process:
1. This perspective takes policy outputs as the starting point of analysis and disregards
actions taken earlier in the process, especially during policy drafting.
2. Top-down models tend to see implementation as a purely administrative process that
ignores political aspects.
○ However, bureaucratic actors may not be ‘Weberian’ in nature and always
make independent decisions based on technical criteria, but might also
pursue their own interests.
3. Top-down models have been criticised for not taking into account local actors and the
particular conditions for policy implementation at the ‘street level’.
,Bottom-up models of policy implementation
Policy objectives and instruments are no longer defined as benchmarks to be reached;
instead, it is expected that they may undergo modifications during the process of
implementation. Implementers have flexibility and autonomy to adjust policy in the light of
particular local requirements and changes in the perception or constellation of policy
problems, as well as new scientific evidence on the causal relationships between means and
ends.
Effective implementation is not measured by the attainment of a certain centrally defined
objective, but judged by the extent to which the perceived outcomes correspond with the
preferences of the actors involved.
Policy implementation occurs at two levels:
1. There is the macro level comprising central actors that devise a policy output.
2. Local actors at the microlevel react to macro level policies, develop their own
programmes and implement them.
Implementation problems stem from the fact that macrolevel implementation cannot
influence microlevel implementers, leading to a variation in how the same national policy is
implemented at the local level. This corresponds to the logic of the principal–agent problem:
the agent (here, the local implementers) can be inclined to deviate from the principal (here,
the centrally located actors).
The likelihood of local implementers or street-level bureaucrats’ deviating from centrally
defined policy objectives stems from pressures imposed on them and how they cope with
them. They develop methods of providing a service in a relatively routine way. These local
implementers are oppressed by the bureaucracy within which they work, and yet they
possess discretionary freedom and autonomy.
Against this background, street-level bureaucrats make choices about the use of scarce
resources under pressure. So increasing the monitoring of local implementers would not
reduce the odds of imperfect implementation, but increase the tendency to provide routine
services and variations at the local level, as routines might vary from one local unit to
another.
The formulation of clear-cut objectives often contrasts with:
1. The interests of politicians, who have a preference for vague and ambiguous
objectives in order to facilitate a positive evaluation later and to make detection of
potential failures more difficult.
2. The bottom-up perspective accounts for the fact that implementation processes are
rarely characterised by a clear delineation of competencies between the political and
administrative actors involved at different institutional levels.
○ Implementation is based less on hierarchically defined and controlled
requirements, and instead can be understood as bargaining between a great
number of public and private actors as well as administrative agencies
participating in the implementation process.
The bottom-up approach introduces problems when it comes to measuring success:
1. Effective implementation is not measured on the basis of a comparison between
initial objectives and actual achievements, but on the extent to which goals have
, been reached by taking into account the specific conditions ‘on the ground’. This
makes general and comparative assessments of effectiveness difficult.
2. The normative criticism that in democratic polities local implementers should be
subject to central control.
3. Bottom-up models tend to overemphasise the level of local autonomy, as often it is
the policy itself that defines how it should be implemented.
Hybrid models of policy implementation
Policy ambiguity refers to a lack of clarity of goals and/or means of achieving them. Policy
conflict is the difference between the most preferred outcome of an implementation agency
and the output that the agency has to implement. The conception of these two dimensions
as being high or low gives way to four ideal-typical implementation processes:
1. Administrative implementation involves low policy ambiguity and low policy conflict.
Policy outcomes are determined by resources, and the process is compared to a
machine, which is the central policy-making authority.
○ Administrative implementation fits with the top-down model.
2. Political implementation involves low policy ambiguity and high policy conflict. Actors
have clearly defined goals, though there is dissent when those goals are
incompatible or a conflict occurs over the means of achieving them.
○ Policy outcomes are determined by power or bargaining, which clearly
indicates the top-down logic underlying this implementation process.
3. Experimental implementation involves a situation of high policy ambiguity and low
policy conflict. Policy outcomes depend on the resources and actors present in
microlevel implementation, which are likely to vary from context to context.
○ As this implementation process emphasises the relevance of contextual
conditions and the role of chance, it parallels the garbage can model and the
multiple streams approach. From this it follows that policy outcomes are hard
to predict.
4. Symbolic implementation involves a situation in which there is high policy ambiguity
and high policy conflict. Coalitions of actors at the local level exist who control the
available resources. However, the power of the various actor coalitions is again
determined by contextual conditions.
○ The preferences of actors’ groups are based on their professional training.
Amongst groups trained in different ways, there will be disagreement over
proposals for policy implementation, leading to long battles and significant
delays in attaining outcomes.
Implementation success: criteria and determinants
Criteria for implementation success
Based on the logic of top-down models, we distinguish between formal transposition and
practical application:
1. Formal transposition focuses on the entirety of the specific provisions of a given
public policy and their incorporation into the existing legal and administrative system.
In so doing, bureaucrats in ministries or (quasi-)autonomous agencies have to
Who is involved in policy implementation?
Implementation structure
Implementation structure refers to the formal organisational arrangements that have been
set up for implementing a policy. In most polities, policy implementation is carried out by
different levels of state bureaucracy. At the central level, there are the various national
ministries, and (quasi-)autonomous agencies located outside of the ministries that are
charged with implementing public policy. These are set up with specialised expertise for
dealing with complex or new policy areas.
This international trend of delegating implementation – and often also policy formulation –
competencies to these agencies is based on the assumption that:
1. They will improve overall implementation performance and efficiency.
2. The idea of separating politics from public administration and insulating certain
decisions from political considerations, which is expected to minimise deviations from
the original intentions of policy-makers and prevent delays.
Regulatory agencies are a subgroup of such (quasi-)autonomous agencies, and one of their
main tasks is to implement public policy in market-related areas.
A large part of national policies is also implemented by public entities at the local level.
Employment and welfare policy is usually carried out by local employment agencies.
There are also public policies that are implemented by multiple organisations, which might
even be located at different levels of government. A considerable share of legislation
requires multi-organizational structures. In this context, the role of interorganizational
networks has been emphasised, as they can provide an effective means of coordination.
Another scenario is policy implementation by private actors, which can include arrangements
in which policies are delivered by private actors only or by ‘hybrid governance’ in which
private and public actors collaborate.
Decision-making within agencies
Depending on the specific policy to be implemented, agencies can have differing degrees of
decisional discretion. Bureaucracies might have greater leeway in the interpretation of policy
outputs if these are characterised by vague policy contents or goals.
Target group behaviour
The third group that participates in the implementation process is the target group. Only if
the target group changes its behaviour in the intended manner can a policy be said to be
implemented effectively.
,Analytical perspectives in implementation research
To achieve the intended policy outcome, compliance with the relevant policy has to be
monitored and if necessary also enforced, for example by issuing fines.
There is not only one way of implementing policy outputs and often implementation requires
multiple actions, which further complicates analysis.
Top-down models of policy implementation
Deviations in policy goals are likely if action depends upon a number of actors who are
required to cooperate. Hence, the longer the implementation chain and the greater the
number of actors involved in the process, the more difficult implementation becomes.
This corresponds to rational choice theories, as they conceive of implementation as
purposive action by different groups of actors with different preferences. Since the success
of implementation depends on the cooperation of actors, there is a relatively high chance
that problems will occur, which implies a mismatch between intended policy objectives and
actual outcomes. Put this way, implementation can be analysed by means of game theory.
During decision-making and implementation, a greater number of actors can lead to conflict
over policy goals, as well as delays and deviations from what policy-makers originally
intended.
The degree of goal attainment serves as an indicator of implementation success; and
effective implementation corresponds to a match between policy objectives and outcomes.
Implementation will be most successful when the policy output only requires marginal
changes compared with the status quo and when goal consensus amongst the public and
private actors involved is high.
The logic of the top-down perspective is also well illustrated by the four-step model:
1. Address the extent to which the actions of implementing officials and target groups
were consistent with the objectives and procedures outlined in a public policy.
2. Focus on the extent to which the objectives were attained over time.
3. Evaluate the principal factors affecting policy outcomes.
4. Suggest analysing whether and how the policy was reformulated on the basis of
experience.
Criticism of top-down process:
1. This perspective takes policy outputs as the starting point of analysis and disregards
actions taken earlier in the process, especially during policy drafting.
2. Top-down models tend to see implementation as a purely administrative process that
ignores political aspects.
○ However, bureaucratic actors may not be ‘Weberian’ in nature and always
make independent decisions based on technical criteria, but might also
pursue their own interests.
3. Top-down models have been criticised for not taking into account local actors and the
particular conditions for policy implementation at the ‘street level’.
,Bottom-up models of policy implementation
Policy objectives and instruments are no longer defined as benchmarks to be reached;
instead, it is expected that they may undergo modifications during the process of
implementation. Implementers have flexibility and autonomy to adjust policy in the light of
particular local requirements and changes in the perception or constellation of policy
problems, as well as new scientific evidence on the causal relationships between means and
ends.
Effective implementation is not measured by the attainment of a certain centrally defined
objective, but judged by the extent to which the perceived outcomes correspond with the
preferences of the actors involved.
Policy implementation occurs at two levels:
1. There is the macro level comprising central actors that devise a policy output.
2. Local actors at the microlevel react to macro level policies, develop their own
programmes and implement them.
Implementation problems stem from the fact that macrolevel implementation cannot
influence microlevel implementers, leading to a variation in how the same national policy is
implemented at the local level. This corresponds to the logic of the principal–agent problem:
the agent (here, the local implementers) can be inclined to deviate from the principal (here,
the centrally located actors).
The likelihood of local implementers or street-level bureaucrats’ deviating from centrally
defined policy objectives stems from pressures imposed on them and how they cope with
them. They develop methods of providing a service in a relatively routine way. These local
implementers are oppressed by the bureaucracy within which they work, and yet they
possess discretionary freedom and autonomy.
Against this background, street-level bureaucrats make choices about the use of scarce
resources under pressure. So increasing the monitoring of local implementers would not
reduce the odds of imperfect implementation, but increase the tendency to provide routine
services and variations at the local level, as routines might vary from one local unit to
another.
The formulation of clear-cut objectives often contrasts with:
1. The interests of politicians, who have a preference for vague and ambiguous
objectives in order to facilitate a positive evaluation later and to make detection of
potential failures more difficult.
2. The bottom-up perspective accounts for the fact that implementation processes are
rarely characterised by a clear delineation of competencies between the political and
administrative actors involved at different institutional levels.
○ Implementation is based less on hierarchically defined and controlled
requirements, and instead can be understood as bargaining between a great
number of public and private actors as well as administrative agencies
participating in the implementation process.
The bottom-up approach introduces problems when it comes to measuring success:
1. Effective implementation is not measured on the basis of a comparison between
initial objectives and actual achievements, but on the extent to which goals have
, been reached by taking into account the specific conditions ‘on the ground’. This
makes general and comparative assessments of effectiveness difficult.
2. The normative criticism that in democratic polities local implementers should be
subject to central control.
3. Bottom-up models tend to overemphasise the level of local autonomy, as often it is
the policy itself that defines how it should be implemented.
Hybrid models of policy implementation
Policy ambiguity refers to a lack of clarity of goals and/or means of achieving them. Policy
conflict is the difference between the most preferred outcome of an implementation agency
and the output that the agency has to implement. The conception of these two dimensions
as being high or low gives way to four ideal-typical implementation processes:
1. Administrative implementation involves low policy ambiguity and low policy conflict.
Policy outcomes are determined by resources, and the process is compared to a
machine, which is the central policy-making authority.
○ Administrative implementation fits with the top-down model.
2. Political implementation involves low policy ambiguity and high policy conflict. Actors
have clearly defined goals, though there is dissent when those goals are
incompatible or a conflict occurs over the means of achieving them.
○ Policy outcomes are determined by power or bargaining, which clearly
indicates the top-down logic underlying this implementation process.
3. Experimental implementation involves a situation of high policy ambiguity and low
policy conflict. Policy outcomes depend on the resources and actors present in
microlevel implementation, which are likely to vary from context to context.
○ As this implementation process emphasises the relevance of contextual
conditions and the role of chance, it parallels the garbage can model and the
multiple streams approach. From this it follows that policy outcomes are hard
to predict.
4. Symbolic implementation involves a situation in which there is high policy ambiguity
and high policy conflict. Coalitions of actors at the local level exist who control the
available resources. However, the power of the various actor coalitions is again
determined by contextual conditions.
○ The preferences of actors’ groups are based on their professional training.
Amongst groups trained in different ways, there will be disagreement over
proposals for policy implementation, leading to long battles and significant
delays in attaining outcomes.
Implementation success: criteria and determinants
Criteria for implementation success
Based on the logic of top-down models, we distinguish between formal transposition and
practical application:
1. Formal transposition focuses on the entirety of the specific provisions of a given
public policy and their incorporation into the existing legal and administrative system.
In so doing, bureaucrats in ministries or (quasi-)autonomous agencies have to
