Global & European
Governance
Block 3.4
Ana Berdzenishvili
All Notes
,Table of Contents
LECTURE 1............................................................................................................................................................................... 2
Game Theory................................................................................................................................................................................3
LECTURE 2............................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Realism.........................................................................................................................................................................................5
United Nations.............................................................................................................................................................................6
LECTURE 3............................................................................................................................................................................... 7
Liberalism.....................................................................................................................................................................................7
Liberalism as theory a theory to explain functioning of international regimes..........................................................................8
Post WWII trade system............................................................................................................................................................10
LECTURE 4............................................................................................................................................................................. 13
Intro to regional integration......................................................................................................................................................13
How to classify Regionalism?....................................................................................................................................................16
Look at differences in levels of formalism and institution-building...........................................................................................16
LECTURE 5............................................................................................................................................................................. 17
What kind of a “beast” is the EU?.............................................................................................................................................17
WEEK 1.................................................................................................................................................................................. 19
FRIEDEN, J. A., LAKE, D. A., & SCHULTZ, K. A. (2012). WORLD POLITICS: INTERESTS, INTERACTIONS, INSTITUTIONS........................................19
SPRUYT, H. (2002). THE ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND POSSIBLE DECLINE OF THE MODERN STATE..................................................................24
DIFFERENTIATING EARLY AND MODERN STATES......................................................................................................................24
THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN STATE.........................................................................25
WEEK 2.................................................................................................................................................................................. 28
BAYLIS, J., SMITH, S., & OWENS, P. (2014). THE GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS...........28
WOOD, M. C. (2007). UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL...................................................................................................................32
WEEK 3.................................................................................................................................................................................. 34
JØRGENSEN, K. E. (2018). THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL THEORY TRADITION. IN K. E. JØRGENSEN (ED.), INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: A
NEW INTRODUCTION (PP. 66-87). BASINGSTOKE: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN...................................................................................................34
Currents of liberal thought........................................................................................................................................................35
GU, J., HUMPHREY, J., & MESSNER, D. (2008). GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RISE OF CHINA.
WORLD DEVELOPMENT, 36(2), 274-292........................................................................................................................................... 38
WEEK 4.................................................................................................................................................................................. 42
MATTLI, W. (1999). THE LOGIC OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION: EUROPE AND BEYOND. CAMBRIDGE: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. [PP.41-57].....42
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: BETWEEN THE OAS AND CELAC......................................................................................................45
AUTHOR(S): DANIELA SEGOVIA.............................................................................................................................................................45
TWO STEPS FORWARD? ASSESSING LATIN AMERICAN REGIONALISM THROUGH CELAC.................................................................................47
DENIS KENNEDY AND BRIAN BEATON.....................................................................................................................................................47
,Lecture 1
.1.1.1 It all started in Westphalia
1648: The birth of international system as we know it
- the end of the 30 years’ war (in Europe) and the 80 years’ war (in holland)
Consequences recognition exclusive sovereignty (states wont meddle won’t get
into each other’s matters)
.1.1.2 Exclusive sovereignty
Internal and external
differences
- Internal state makes the decisions not overlapping sources of authority like
churches
- States are free from external intervention
Internal – back to roman era (state is free to decide the rules in its state, and no
other state can interfere; and other states can’t apply a law to another states; states
provide rule making)
External – geographically limited
- Other states can’t interfere to represent their people even
- The bubble is created around the state, anyone in the bubble can decide what
happens but what happens outside the bubble has little effect
- Outside intervention is possible only if rulers permit it and if they decide to
share
One you have a definition for internal or external and a state you must have a
geographical rule (territory where rule applies)
Consequences:
- Today state is very much present in our lives because of internal and external
sovereignty
o What food you put on the place (food safety rules);
o before the ruler would just be in the capital
.1.1.3 Why states survived?
Advantages of state: written codes (reliability, predictability)
We had two competitors: empires and leagues over state
- Empires lack written codes, customary proceedings, legal climate for trade, high
transaction costs (very uncertain -> high truncation cost: cost during business)
- Leagues lack territorial contiguity (borders aren’t clear), fixed borders, clear
rules, internal hierarchy (some cities more equal than others bad for
functioning of buisnesses
.1.1.4 States in international politics
States as actors
- States as unitary single actor
- Actions of the actors become state preferences
, .1.1.5 Anarchy
If states have external hierarchy no one has higher power no one can interfere
- Anarchy is the main and most basic assumption of the study of international
governance
- Different from domestic society
Anarchy doesn’t equal lack of order
Anarchy = lack of higher authority
- Leads to the 911 problem: if you have an issue in the international politics there
is no one you can call to save you because they have no right
- Consequences
o Uncertainty about the future
o Isle of tales
Game Theory
Game theory:
- We have players (people, companies states)
o Assumption that they are:
Rational: simply they pursue their preferences
Informed: aware what options they and others have
- Strategies (a choice thereof)
- Preferences (exist and are transitive)
o Transitive: You like a more the b the b more than c
- Solution (final point)
2 player models discussed Prisoner’s dilemma
2 robbers arrested (interested in their individual freedom then both of them)
- If you confess, you will be free (best option for A) (worst option for b)
- If they confess, they will be free (worst option) (best option for B)
- If both speak shorter
sentence (bad option for
both)
- Both silent can’t catch
you for robbery (second
best option for both)
Nash equilibrium: no player
can increase their payoff as
long as the other player sticks
to the option
Why the worst fear?
Represents being exploited W below Opera Box
(you stayed silent) Opera 3 4 (best for 2 2 (or they
Exemplifies security dilemma wife both at spend an evening
opera) where is don’t
.1.1.6 Battle of sexes interest them
4>3>2>1 (4 is best) split)
Husband and wife that want Box 1 1 (worse for 4 3
to spend an evening together both because
they both do
something
different)
Governance
Block 3.4
Ana Berdzenishvili
All Notes
,Table of Contents
LECTURE 1............................................................................................................................................................................... 2
Game Theory................................................................................................................................................................................3
LECTURE 2............................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Realism.........................................................................................................................................................................................5
United Nations.............................................................................................................................................................................6
LECTURE 3............................................................................................................................................................................... 7
Liberalism.....................................................................................................................................................................................7
Liberalism as theory a theory to explain functioning of international regimes..........................................................................8
Post WWII trade system............................................................................................................................................................10
LECTURE 4............................................................................................................................................................................. 13
Intro to regional integration......................................................................................................................................................13
How to classify Regionalism?....................................................................................................................................................16
Look at differences in levels of formalism and institution-building...........................................................................................16
LECTURE 5............................................................................................................................................................................. 17
What kind of a “beast” is the EU?.............................................................................................................................................17
WEEK 1.................................................................................................................................................................................. 19
FRIEDEN, J. A., LAKE, D. A., & SCHULTZ, K. A. (2012). WORLD POLITICS: INTERESTS, INTERACTIONS, INSTITUTIONS........................................19
SPRUYT, H. (2002). THE ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND POSSIBLE DECLINE OF THE MODERN STATE..................................................................24
DIFFERENTIATING EARLY AND MODERN STATES......................................................................................................................24
THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN STATE.........................................................................25
WEEK 2.................................................................................................................................................................................. 28
BAYLIS, J., SMITH, S., & OWENS, P. (2014). THE GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS...........28
WOOD, M. C. (2007). UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL...................................................................................................................32
WEEK 3.................................................................................................................................................................................. 34
JØRGENSEN, K. E. (2018). THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL THEORY TRADITION. IN K. E. JØRGENSEN (ED.), INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: A
NEW INTRODUCTION (PP. 66-87). BASINGSTOKE: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN...................................................................................................34
Currents of liberal thought........................................................................................................................................................35
GU, J., HUMPHREY, J., & MESSNER, D. (2008). GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RISE OF CHINA.
WORLD DEVELOPMENT, 36(2), 274-292........................................................................................................................................... 38
WEEK 4.................................................................................................................................................................................. 42
MATTLI, W. (1999). THE LOGIC OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION: EUROPE AND BEYOND. CAMBRIDGE: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. [PP.41-57].....42
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: BETWEEN THE OAS AND CELAC......................................................................................................45
AUTHOR(S): DANIELA SEGOVIA.............................................................................................................................................................45
TWO STEPS FORWARD? ASSESSING LATIN AMERICAN REGIONALISM THROUGH CELAC.................................................................................47
DENIS KENNEDY AND BRIAN BEATON.....................................................................................................................................................47
,Lecture 1
.1.1.1 It all started in Westphalia
1648: The birth of international system as we know it
- the end of the 30 years’ war (in Europe) and the 80 years’ war (in holland)
Consequences recognition exclusive sovereignty (states wont meddle won’t get
into each other’s matters)
.1.1.2 Exclusive sovereignty
Internal and external
differences
- Internal state makes the decisions not overlapping sources of authority like
churches
- States are free from external intervention
Internal – back to roman era (state is free to decide the rules in its state, and no
other state can interfere; and other states can’t apply a law to another states; states
provide rule making)
External – geographically limited
- Other states can’t interfere to represent their people even
- The bubble is created around the state, anyone in the bubble can decide what
happens but what happens outside the bubble has little effect
- Outside intervention is possible only if rulers permit it and if they decide to
share
One you have a definition for internal or external and a state you must have a
geographical rule (territory where rule applies)
Consequences:
- Today state is very much present in our lives because of internal and external
sovereignty
o What food you put on the place (food safety rules);
o before the ruler would just be in the capital
.1.1.3 Why states survived?
Advantages of state: written codes (reliability, predictability)
We had two competitors: empires and leagues over state
- Empires lack written codes, customary proceedings, legal climate for trade, high
transaction costs (very uncertain -> high truncation cost: cost during business)
- Leagues lack territorial contiguity (borders aren’t clear), fixed borders, clear
rules, internal hierarchy (some cities more equal than others bad for
functioning of buisnesses
.1.1.4 States in international politics
States as actors
- States as unitary single actor
- Actions of the actors become state preferences
, .1.1.5 Anarchy
If states have external hierarchy no one has higher power no one can interfere
- Anarchy is the main and most basic assumption of the study of international
governance
- Different from domestic society
Anarchy doesn’t equal lack of order
Anarchy = lack of higher authority
- Leads to the 911 problem: if you have an issue in the international politics there
is no one you can call to save you because they have no right
- Consequences
o Uncertainty about the future
o Isle of tales
Game Theory
Game theory:
- We have players (people, companies states)
o Assumption that they are:
Rational: simply they pursue their preferences
Informed: aware what options they and others have
- Strategies (a choice thereof)
- Preferences (exist and are transitive)
o Transitive: You like a more the b the b more than c
- Solution (final point)
2 player models discussed Prisoner’s dilemma
2 robbers arrested (interested in their individual freedom then both of them)
- If you confess, you will be free (best option for A) (worst option for b)
- If they confess, they will be free (worst option) (best option for B)
- If both speak shorter
sentence (bad option for
both)
- Both silent can’t catch
you for robbery (second
best option for both)
Nash equilibrium: no player
can increase their payoff as
long as the other player sticks
to the option
Why the worst fear?
Represents being exploited W below Opera Box
(you stayed silent) Opera 3 4 (best for 2 2 (or they
Exemplifies security dilemma wife both at spend an evening
opera) where is don’t
.1.1.6 Battle of sexes interest them
4>3>2>1 (4 is best) split)
Husband and wife that want Box 1 1 (worse for 4 3
to spend an evening together both because
they both do
something
different)
