Nayim Mohammed
‘A series of missed opportunities’. Assess the validity of this statement in
relation to US-Soviet relations from 1969-1980.
It can be argued that the years 1969-1980 was a period when the Cold War was ‘most hot’, with
conflicts taking place throughout the Middle East, Latin America and Africa. However, it was also the
period which saw the greatest opportunity for peace to be reached. The USA and USSR realised that
the nuclear arms race were becoming increasingly costly, and straining the economy of both
superpowers. This gave arise to the opening of talks, and the agreements reached at SALT I (1972)
and the Helsinki Accords (1975), are clear examples of were both superpowers sought to utilise
areas of mutual interest where cooperation were reached. However, to deem the period ‘a series of
missed opportunities’ would imply that both the USSR and USA’s aims were specifically to reach
peace, and this would be incorrect. Détente came to an end after the conflicts in Afghanistan and
Iran in 1979, and the ratification of the SALT II Treaty. Therefore, to deem détente as a ‘missed
opportunity’ would be inaccurate due to the continuation of disagreements, secrecy and conflict in
‘Third World’ proxy wars. These wars amongst ‘smaller countries’ had always been present from the
start of the Cold War, intensified during détente, and continued after détente. Consequently, making
the statement that the period was a ‘series of missed opportunities’ invalid, as both the USA and
USSR had alternative aims and perspectives towards détente, which would have never solved the
intense disagreements of the Cold War.
The obvious argument in favour of the proposition would be to suggest that there were many clear-
cut opportunities for cooperation that arose during détente, but were left incomplete. The Cuban
Missile Crisis (1962) demonstrated that an alternative to brinkmanship was required with the world
on the brink of thermonuclear war. The issue of Arms Control – ‘nuclear non-proliferation – and
communication between the USA and USSR also came to the forefront as a result. The creation of
the ‘hot-line’ (June 1963), Moscow Test Ban Treaty (August 1963), Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(July 1968) and the increase in US-Soviet trade, were all clear instances of the recognition to limit
nuclear weapons, increased communication and a move towards coexistence. SALT I marked the
high point in co-operation, with Nixon visiting Moscow in 1972 and 1974, and Brezhnev visiting
Washington in 1973. A less hostile rhetoric between Moscow and Washington was upheld, and the
docking of Soyuz and Apollo spacecraft (July 1975) symbolised this. Willy Brandt’s proposal of
Ostpolitik (looking to stabilise tensions between the East and West Germany) also marked an
opportunity for détente as it encouraged the easing of tension across Europe, with the French
pushed to seek dialogue with countries like Romania. One of the most key prominent opportunities
in cooperation was the Helsinki Accords (1972-75) and led to agreements on security in Europe,
cooperation on economics and technology and humanitarian agreements. 35 nations, from both
sides of the Iron Curtain, signed the treaty. The Accords also had the objective of increasing the flow
of information and even personal contacts across the East-West divide. These developments are
illustrative of the fact that both the USA and USSR were seeking an easing of tensions. However,
they can only be perceived as laying the framework for coexistence, as the end goal of cooperation
was never fulfilled.
Although the argument in favour of the proposition holds credibility, it can just as easily be argued
that the 1969-80 period was not a ‘series of missed opportunities’. This can be evidenced as détente
never gave a clear opportunity to achieve peace, despite the numerous talks held, and this was due
to the continuation of conflict through the ‘Third World’. Historian Odd Arne Westad stated that the
‘Cold War was a continuation of colonialism through slightly different means. Superpower
interventions… helped put a number of Third World countries in a state of semi-permanent civil
‘A series of missed opportunities’. Assess the validity of this statement in
relation to US-Soviet relations from 1969-1980.
It can be argued that the years 1969-1980 was a period when the Cold War was ‘most hot’, with
conflicts taking place throughout the Middle East, Latin America and Africa. However, it was also the
period which saw the greatest opportunity for peace to be reached. The USA and USSR realised that
the nuclear arms race were becoming increasingly costly, and straining the economy of both
superpowers. This gave arise to the opening of talks, and the agreements reached at SALT I (1972)
and the Helsinki Accords (1975), are clear examples of were both superpowers sought to utilise
areas of mutual interest where cooperation were reached. However, to deem the period ‘a series of
missed opportunities’ would imply that both the USSR and USA’s aims were specifically to reach
peace, and this would be incorrect. Détente came to an end after the conflicts in Afghanistan and
Iran in 1979, and the ratification of the SALT II Treaty. Therefore, to deem détente as a ‘missed
opportunity’ would be inaccurate due to the continuation of disagreements, secrecy and conflict in
‘Third World’ proxy wars. These wars amongst ‘smaller countries’ had always been present from the
start of the Cold War, intensified during détente, and continued after détente. Consequently, making
the statement that the period was a ‘series of missed opportunities’ invalid, as both the USA and
USSR had alternative aims and perspectives towards détente, which would have never solved the
intense disagreements of the Cold War.
The obvious argument in favour of the proposition would be to suggest that there were many clear-
cut opportunities for cooperation that arose during détente, but were left incomplete. The Cuban
Missile Crisis (1962) demonstrated that an alternative to brinkmanship was required with the world
on the brink of thermonuclear war. The issue of Arms Control – ‘nuclear non-proliferation – and
communication between the USA and USSR also came to the forefront as a result. The creation of
the ‘hot-line’ (June 1963), Moscow Test Ban Treaty (August 1963), Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(July 1968) and the increase in US-Soviet trade, were all clear instances of the recognition to limit
nuclear weapons, increased communication and a move towards coexistence. SALT I marked the
high point in co-operation, with Nixon visiting Moscow in 1972 and 1974, and Brezhnev visiting
Washington in 1973. A less hostile rhetoric between Moscow and Washington was upheld, and the
docking of Soyuz and Apollo spacecraft (July 1975) symbolised this. Willy Brandt’s proposal of
Ostpolitik (looking to stabilise tensions between the East and West Germany) also marked an
opportunity for détente as it encouraged the easing of tension across Europe, with the French
pushed to seek dialogue with countries like Romania. One of the most key prominent opportunities
in cooperation was the Helsinki Accords (1972-75) and led to agreements on security in Europe,
cooperation on economics and technology and humanitarian agreements. 35 nations, from both
sides of the Iron Curtain, signed the treaty. The Accords also had the objective of increasing the flow
of information and even personal contacts across the East-West divide. These developments are
illustrative of the fact that both the USA and USSR were seeking an easing of tensions. However,
they can only be perceived as laying the framework for coexistence, as the end goal of cooperation
was never fulfilled.
Although the argument in favour of the proposition holds credibility, it can just as easily be argued
that the 1969-80 period was not a ‘series of missed opportunities’. This can be evidenced as détente
never gave a clear opportunity to achieve peace, despite the numerous talks held, and this was due
to the continuation of conflict through the ‘Third World’. Historian Odd Arne Westad stated that the
‘Cold War was a continuation of colonialism through slightly different means. Superpower
interventions… helped put a number of Third World countries in a state of semi-permanent civil
