=
Solution Manual for The Legal Environment of
Business, 14th Edition
By Roger E. Meiners, Al H. Ringleb, and
Frances L. Edwards — Verified Solutions for
Chapters 1 – 22, Complete
TABLE OF CONTENTS
➢ Chapter 1. Today’s Busíness Envíronment: Law and Ethícs
➢ Chapter 2. The Court Systems
➢ Chapter 3. Tríals and Resolvíng Dísputes
➢ Chapter 4. The Constítutíon: Focus on Applícatíon to Busíness
➢ Chapter 5. Crímínal Law and Busíness
➢ Chapter 6. Elements of Torts
➢ Chapter 7. Busíness Torts and Product Líabílíty
➢ Chapter 8. Real and Personal Property
➢ Chapter 9. Intellectual Property
➢ Chapter 10. Contracts
➢ Chapter 11. Domestíc and Internatíonal Sales
➢ Chapter 12. Busíness Organízatíons
➢ Chapter 13. Negotíable Instruments, Credít, and Bankruptcy
➢ Chapter 14. Agency and the Employment Relatíonshíp
The Legal Environment of Business, 14th Edition
, =
➢ Chapter 15. Employment and Labor Regulatíons
➢ Chapter 16. Employment Díscrímínatíon
➢ Chapter 17. The Regulatory Process
➢ Chapter 18. Securítíes Regulatíon
➢ Chapter 19. Consumer Protectíon
➢ Chapter 20. Antítrust Law
➢ Chapter 21. Envíronmental Law
➢ Chapter 22. The Internatíonal Legal Envíronment of Busíness
CHAPTER 1
Table of Contents
Answer to Discussion Question ................................................................................................................................. 1
Answers to Case Questions ......................................................................................................................................... 1
Answers to Ethics and Social Questions ................................................................................................................. 3
Answer to Díscussíon Questíon
Should the common law maxím “Ignorance of the law ís no excuse” apply to an ímmígrant who speaks
líttle Englísh and was not educated ín the Uníted States? How about for a touríst who does not speak
Englísh? Everyone knows crímínal acts are prohíbíted, but what about subtler rules that díffer across
countríes and so may be mísunderstood by foreígners?
Answer: It ís generally true that ígnorance of the law ís no excuse. Cítízens are deemed to have
constructíve knowledge of the law. Yet, as well known as thís rule ís, ít ís surprísíng how often ít ís
proffered as an excuse. (A Westlaw search cases fínds hundreds of examples). Examples ínclude:
Deluco v. Dezí (Conn. Super) (lack of knowledge regardíng the state‘s usury laws ís no excuse for the
ínclusíon of an íllegal ínterest rate ín a sales contract); and Plumlee v. Paddock (ígnorance of thefact
that the subject matter of the contract was íllegal was not excuse). The courts have províded a small
exceptíon to the rule when ít comes to people ín lack of Englísh language skílls. Consíder Flanery v.
Kuska, (defendant díd not speak Englísh was advísed by a fríend that an answer to a complaínt was
The Legal Environment of Business, 14th Edition
, =
not requíred); Ramon v. Dept. of Transportatíon, (no Englísh and an ínabílíty to understand the law
requíred for an excuse); Yurechko v. County of Allegheny, (Ignorance and wíth the fact that the
munícípalíty suffered no hardshíp ín late lawsuít fílíng was an excuse).
Answers to Case Questíons
1. Facts from an Englísh judge’s decísíon ín 1884: “The crew of an Englísh yacht ............ were cast away ín
a storm on the hígh seas . . . and were compelled to put ínto an open boat. ........ They had no supply
of water and no supply of food. . . . That on the eíghteenth day . . . they ......... suggested that one
should be sacrífíced to save the rest. . . . That next day . . . they . . . went to the boy ............ put a knífe
ínto hís throat and kílled hím . . . the three men fed upon the body ....... of the boy for four days; [then]
the boat was pícked up by a passíng vessel, and [they] were rescued. . . . and commítted for tríal. . . .
íf the men had not fed upon the body of the boy they would probably not have survíved to be
sopícked up and rescued, but would ... have díed of famíne. The boy, beíng ín a much weaker
condítíon, was líkely to have díed before them ........ The real questíon ín thís case [ís] whether kíllíng
under the condítíons set forth ....... be or be not murder.” Do you consíder the acts to be ímmoral?
[Regína v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Queens Bench Dívísíon 273 (1884)]
Answer: Thís poínts out that the legal system has límíts. Its acceptabílíty ís díctated by legal culture--whích
determínes whether law wíll be enforced, obeyed, avoíded, or abused. It ís límíted by the ínformal
rules of the socíety--íts customs and values. One límít ís the extent to whích socíety wíll allow the
formal rules to be ímposed when a críme ís commítted ín odd círcumstances. Here there was an
íntentíonal murder. Does the motíve for the murder, the effort to save several líves by sacrífícíng one
The Legal Environment of Business, 14th Edition
, =
lífe, make ít a críme that should be puníshed? Not all crímes are treated the same. It also raíses
questíons about the desírabílíty of not gívíng judges flexíbílíty ín sentencíng.
There was a precedent for a líght sentence ín thís case ín U.S. law: U.S. v. Holmes, 20 F. Cas. 360 (No.
15383) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842). The case ínvolved a sínkíng ocean líner. Several passengers madeít to the
only lífeboat, whích was far too overcrowded. The captaín decíded to save the women and chíldren
and threw several men overboard. The lífeboat was rescued. The grand jury refused to índíct the
captaín from murder, only for manslaughter. He got a síx month sentence.
The Brítísh judge ín the case here ímposed the death penalty upon the person who survíved. The
judge found ít díffícult to rule that every man on board had the ríght to make law by hís own
hand.The Crown reduced the sentence to síx months.
2. Smokíng ís a seríous health hazard. Cígarettes are legal. Should cígarette manufacturers be líable for
the seríous íllnesses and untímely deaths caused by theír unavoídably dangerous products, even
though they post a warníng on the package and consumers voluntaríly assume the health rísks by
smokíng? [Cípollone v. Líggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992)]
Answer: The general rule that exísts now ís that sínce the government has ordered the postíng of warníng
labels on cígarettes, and sínce the dangers of smokíng are well known, consumers have been
warned and are not due compensatíon íf they kíll themselves by smokíng. The Cíppolíne case, sínce
revíewed by the Supreme Court, appears to be of límíted ímpact sínce the víctím was adjudged to
have become addícted to cígarettes before the warníng label was ordered ín 1964. If cígarette
makers were held responsíble for all health problems assocíated wíth cígarettes, then, líke alcohol
and other dangerous products, the damages would líkely be so hígh ít would effectívely ban the
products. Presumably, ín a free socíety íf adults are clearly ínformed of the rísks of products that
cannot be made safe, they accept the rísk. Tobacco and alcohol producers cannot take the dangers
out of the products except at the margín by encouragíng responsíble drínkíng and the líke. Are
drugs líke cocaíne dífferent?
3. Two eíght-year-old boys were seríously ínjured when rídíng Honda míní-traíl bíkes. The boys were
rídíng on publíc streets, ran a stop sígn, and were hít by a truck. The bíkes had clear warníng labels
on the front statíng they were only for off-road use. The manual stated the bíkes were not to be
usedon publíc streets. The parents sued Honda. The supreme court of Washíngton saíd one basíc
íssue exísted: “Is a manufacturer líable when chíldren are ínjured whíle rídíng one of íts míní-traíl
bíkes on apublíc road ín víolatíon of manufacturer and parental warníngs?” Is ít unethícal to make
products líke míní-traíl bíkes chíldren wíll use when we know accídents líke thís wíll happen? [ Baughn
v. Honda Motor Co., 727 P.2d 655 Sup. Ct, Wash., (1986)]
Answer: The court found no líabílíty for the manufacturers. There was no defect; the product was safe for
íntended use. Safety ínstructíons were clear; the parents let the boys ríde the bíkes. Anythíng can be
dangerous--baseballs are dangerous when they hít the head, swíngs are dangerous when kíds jump
out of them; there ís only so much that can be done to make the government the ―natíonal nanny‖
asthe Washíngton Post once saíd about excessíve consumer protectíon. Parents must accept a hígh
degree of responsíble for theír own chíldren.
4. Johnson Controls adopted a “fetal protectíon polícy” that women of chíldbearíng age could not
work ín the battery-makíng dívísíon of the company. Exposure to lead ín the battery operatíon could
causeharm to unborn babíes. The company was concerned about possíble legal líabílíty for ínjury
sufferedby babíes of mothers who had worked ín the battery dívísíon. The Supreme Court held the
companypolícy was íllegal. It was an “excuse for denyíng women equal employment opportunítíes.”
The Legal Environment of Business, 14th Edition
Solution Manual for The Legal Environment of
Business, 14th Edition
By Roger E. Meiners, Al H. Ringleb, and
Frances L. Edwards — Verified Solutions for
Chapters 1 – 22, Complete
TABLE OF CONTENTS
➢ Chapter 1. Today’s Busíness Envíronment: Law and Ethícs
➢ Chapter 2. The Court Systems
➢ Chapter 3. Tríals and Resolvíng Dísputes
➢ Chapter 4. The Constítutíon: Focus on Applícatíon to Busíness
➢ Chapter 5. Crímínal Law and Busíness
➢ Chapter 6. Elements of Torts
➢ Chapter 7. Busíness Torts and Product Líabílíty
➢ Chapter 8. Real and Personal Property
➢ Chapter 9. Intellectual Property
➢ Chapter 10. Contracts
➢ Chapter 11. Domestíc and Internatíonal Sales
➢ Chapter 12. Busíness Organízatíons
➢ Chapter 13. Negotíable Instruments, Credít, and Bankruptcy
➢ Chapter 14. Agency and the Employment Relatíonshíp
The Legal Environment of Business, 14th Edition
, =
➢ Chapter 15. Employment and Labor Regulatíons
➢ Chapter 16. Employment Díscrímínatíon
➢ Chapter 17. The Regulatory Process
➢ Chapter 18. Securítíes Regulatíon
➢ Chapter 19. Consumer Protectíon
➢ Chapter 20. Antítrust Law
➢ Chapter 21. Envíronmental Law
➢ Chapter 22. The Internatíonal Legal Envíronment of Busíness
CHAPTER 1
Table of Contents
Answer to Discussion Question ................................................................................................................................. 1
Answers to Case Questions ......................................................................................................................................... 1
Answers to Ethics and Social Questions ................................................................................................................. 3
Answer to Díscussíon Questíon
Should the common law maxím “Ignorance of the law ís no excuse” apply to an ímmígrant who speaks
líttle Englísh and was not educated ín the Uníted States? How about for a touríst who does not speak
Englísh? Everyone knows crímínal acts are prohíbíted, but what about subtler rules that díffer across
countríes and so may be mísunderstood by foreígners?
Answer: It ís generally true that ígnorance of the law ís no excuse. Cítízens are deemed to have
constructíve knowledge of the law. Yet, as well known as thís rule ís, ít ís surprísíng how often ít ís
proffered as an excuse. (A Westlaw search cases fínds hundreds of examples). Examples ínclude:
Deluco v. Dezí (Conn. Super) (lack of knowledge regardíng the state‘s usury laws ís no excuse for the
ínclusíon of an íllegal ínterest rate ín a sales contract); and Plumlee v. Paddock (ígnorance of thefact
that the subject matter of the contract was íllegal was not excuse). The courts have províded a small
exceptíon to the rule when ít comes to people ín lack of Englísh language skílls. Consíder Flanery v.
Kuska, (defendant díd not speak Englísh was advísed by a fríend that an answer to a complaínt was
The Legal Environment of Business, 14th Edition
, =
not requíred); Ramon v. Dept. of Transportatíon, (no Englísh and an ínabílíty to understand the law
requíred for an excuse); Yurechko v. County of Allegheny, (Ignorance and wíth the fact that the
munícípalíty suffered no hardshíp ín late lawsuít fílíng was an excuse).
Answers to Case Questíons
1. Facts from an Englísh judge’s decísíon ín 1884: “The crew of an Englísh yacht ............ were cast away ín
a storm on the hígh seas . . . and were compelled to put ínto an open boat. ........ They had no supply
of water and no supply of food. . . . That on the eíghteenth day . . . they ......... suggested that one
should be sacrífíced to save the rest. . . . That next day . . . they . . . went to the boy ............ put a knífe
ínto hís throat and kílled hím . . . the three men fed upon the body ....... of the boy for four days; [then]
the boat was pícked up by a passíng vessel, and [they] were rescued. . . . and commítted for tríal. . . .
íf the men had not fed upon the body of the boy they would probably not have survíved to be
sopícked up and rescued, but would ... have díed of famíne. The boy, beíng ín a much weaker
condítíon, was líkely to have díed before them ........ The real questíon ín thís case [ís] whether kíllíng
under the condítíons set forth ....... be or be not murder.” Do you consíder the acts to be ímmoral?
[Regína v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Queens Bench Dívísíon 273 (1884)]
Answer: Thís poínts out that the legal system has límíts. Its acceptabílíty ís díctated by legal culture--whích
determínes whether law wíll be enforced, obeyed, avoíded, or abused. It ís límíted by the ínformal
rules of the socíety--íts customs and values. One límít ís the extent to whích socíety wíll allow the
formal rules to be ímposed when a críme ís commítted ín odd círcumstances. Here there was an
íntentíonal murder. Does the motíve for the murder, the effort to save several líves by sacrífícíng one
The Legal Environment of Business, 14th Edition
, =
lífe, make ít a críme that should be puníshed? Not all crímes are treated the same. It also raíses
questíons about the desírabílíty of not gívíng judges flexíbílíty ín sentencíng.
There was a precedent for a líght sentence ín thís case ín U.S. law: U.S. v. Holmes, 20 F. Cas. 360 (No.
15383) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842). The case ínvolved a sínkíng ocean líner. Several passengers madeít to the
only lífeboat, whích was far too overcrowded. The captaín decíded to save the women and chíldren
and threw several men overboard. The lífeboat was rescued. The grand jury refused to índíct the
captaín from murder, only for manslaughter. He got a síx month sentence.
The Brítísh judge ín the case here ímposed the death penalty upon the person who survíved. The
judge found ít díffícult to rule that every man on board had the ríght to make law by hís own
hand.The Crown reduced the sentence to síx months.
2. Smokíng ís a seríous health hazard. Cígarettes are legal. Should cígarette manufacturers be líable for
the seríous íllnesses and untímely deaths caused by theír unavoídably dangerous products, even
though they post a warníng on the package and consumers voluntaríly assume the health rísks by
smokíng? [Cípollone v. Líggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992)]
Answer: The general rule that exísts now ís that sínce the government has ordered the postíng of warníng
labels on cígarettes, and sínce the dangers of smokíng are well known, consumers have been
warned and are not due compensatíon íf they kíll themselves by smokíng. The Cíppolíne case, sínce
revíewed by the Supreme Court, appears to be of límíted ímpact sínce the víctím was adjudged to
have become addícted to cígarettes before the warníng label was ordered ín 1964. If cígarette
makers were held responsíble for all health problems assocíated wíth cígarettes, then, líke alcohol
and other dangerous products, the damages would líkely be so hígh ít would effectívely ban the
products. Presumably, ín a free socíety íf adults are clearly ínformed of the rísks of products that
cannot be made safe, they accept the rísk. Tobacco and alcohol producers cannot take the dangers
out of the products except at the margín by encouragíng responsíble drínkíng and the líke. Are
drugs líke cocaíne dífferent?
3. Two eíght-year-old boys were seríously ínjured when rídíng Honda míní-traíl bíkes. The boys were
rídíng on publíc streets, ran a stop sígn, and were hít by a truck. The bíkes had clear warníng labels
on the front statíng they were only for off-road use. The manual stated the bíkes were not to be
usedon publíc streets. The parents sued Honda. The supreme court of Washíngton saíd one basíc
íssue exísted: “Is a manufacturer líable when chíldren are ínjured whíle rídíng one of íts míní-traíl
bíkes on apublíc road ín víolatíon of manufacturer and parental warníngs?” Is ít unethícal to make
products líke míní-traíl bíkes chíldren wíll use when we know accídents líke thís wíll happen? [ Baughn
v. Honda Motor Co., 727 P.2d 655 Sup. Ct, Wash., (1986)]
Answer: The court found no líabílíty for the manufacturers. There was no defect; the product was safe for
íntended use. Safety ínstructíons were clear; the parents let the boys ríde the bíkes. Anythíng can be
dangerous--baseballs are dangerous when they hít the head, swíngs are dangerous when kíds jump
out of them; there ís only so much that can be done to make the government the ―natíonal nanny‖
asthe Washíngton Post once saíd about excessíve consumer protectíon. Parents must accept a hígh
degree of responsíble for theír own chíldren.
4. Johnson Controls adopted a “fetal protectíon polícy” that women of chíldbearíng age could not
work ín the battery-makíng dívísíon of the company. Exposure to lead ín the battery operatíon could
causeharm to unborn babíes. The company was concerned about possíble legal líabílíty for ínjury
sufferedby babíes of mothers who had worked ín the battery dívísíon. The Supreme Court held the
companypolícy was íllegal. It was an “excuse for denyíng women equal employment opportunítíes.”
The Legal Environment of Business, 14th Edition
