VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
• These are killings which have the actus reus and men's rea of murder, but due to
existing circumstances, it should not be called murder. For example, a defendant
who successfully pleads control diminished, or suicide pact to a charge of murder
will be guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
The defendant in this instance must demonstrate both the actus reus and mens rea for
the offence of murder, that is following a simple interpretation of the coke definition, he
intended to kill someone and achieved that aim. However, having done this the defen-
dant successfully employs one of the three special partial defences to murder:
• Diminished responsibility;
• Loss of control or;
• Participation in a suicide pact.
These defences, when successfully argued, do not absolve the defendant completely of
liability in the same way that a plea of automatism would, but instead have the effect of
reducing the charge down to voluntary manslaughter. This offence carries the same
penalty of murder but differs in that it is a discretionary life sentence and not a manda-
tory one, and thus is preferable for a defendant.
DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY :
Set out in S.2 of the Homicide Act 1957 as amended by S.52 of
the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
S.2 (1) of Homicide Act 1957: Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of an-
other, he
shall not be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind
(whether
arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of the mind or any inherent
causes or
induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his
acts and
omissions in doing or being a party to the killing.
S.57 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009: A person who kills or is a party to the
killing of
another is not to be convinced of murder if he was suffering from an abnormality mental
functioning which:
(a) arose from a recognized medical condition,
(b) substantially impaired the defendant’s ability to:
Understand the nature of his conduct; (s2(1A)(a)) or
Form a rational judgment; (s2(1A)(b)) or
Exercise a self-control (s2(1A)(c))
(c) explains the defendant’s acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the
killing. (Abnormality is at least a significant contributory factor in causing D’s acts/omis-
sions.
(R V JOYCE AND KAY 2017)
Explains D's acts/omissions
· Explanation: the recognised medical condition causes or is a significant contributory
factor in causing D's conduct (s2(1B))
1) abnormality of mental functioning
(BYRNE 1960)
1
, "abnormality of mind" was wide enough to cover the mind's activities in all its aspects,
including the ability to exercise willpower to control physical acts by rational judgment.
He was thus allowed the defence to reduce the murder conviction to manslaughter.
2) Recognised medical condition (both physical and psychological)
(AHLUWALIA 1992)
The murder conviction was quashed based on D’s depressive
Condition.
(TANDY 1989)
murder upheld. The appellant had demonstrated in her evidence that she had exercised
control over her drinking. She had chosen to drink a different drink on the day in question
and was unable to recall if she had drunk the day before. She was also able to stop drink-
ing at 6.30 pm on the day of the killing even though the bottle was not yet empty
(DIETSCHMANN 2003)
Where D has a pre-existing mental disorder, intoxication does not
prevent him from using the defence; the abnormality of mental functioning
does not have to be the sole cause of the defendant doing the killing
(DOWDS 2012)
Diminished responsibility does not apply to voluntary intoxication. Voluntary intoxication
does not fall within the scope of a “recognised medical condition” under s2(1) Homicide
Act 1957 as amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
3) Substantially impaired
D’s ability to do one of these 3 things must be substantially impaired:
-to understand the nature of his conduct
-to form a rational judgment
-to exercise self-control
(LLOYD 1967)
Substantial does not mean total, nor does it mean trivial or
minimal. It is something in between and it is for the jury to decide if D’s
mental responsibility is impaired and, if so, whether it is substantially
Impaired.
S.3 HA 1957 :
subjective determination of whether D was provoked
to lose self-control ('whether by things done or by things said or by both together'), and
2. An
objective determination of 'whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable
man do
as [D] did.
- Section 3 does not state the effect of a successful defence - it is by the common law
that the offence is reduced to manslaughter
The jury has to answer two questions: (1) was the defendant provoked to lose his self-
control?
And; (2) was the provocation enough to make a reasonable man do as he did?
(DOUGHTY 1986)
baby's crying could amount to a provocative act within the meaning of s.3 of the Homi-
cide Act 1957. The appellant's murder conviction was substituted for manslaughter and
his life sentence was reduced to 5 years
(DAVIES 1975)
held that the act of the lover walking to her workplace could amount to a provocative act
and the issue of provocation should have been put before the jury. The provocative act
need not be deliberately aimed at provoking the victim, nor must the provocation come
from the victim
2
• These are killings which have the actus reus and men's rea of murder, but due to
existing circumstances, it should not be called murder. For example, a defendant
who successfully pleads control diminished, or suicide pact to a charge of murder
will be guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
The defendant in this instance must demonstrate both the actus reus and mens rea for
the offence of murder, that is following a simple interpretation of the coke definition, he
intended to kill someone and achieved that aim. However, having done this the defen-
dant successfully employs one of the three special partial defences to murder:
• Diminished responsibility;
• Loss of control or;
• Participation in a suicide pact.
These defences, when successfully argued, do not absolve the defendant completely of
liability in the same way that a plea of automatism would, but instead have the effect of
reducing the charge down to voluntary manslaughter. This offence carries the same
penalty of murder but differs in that it is a discretionary life sentence and not a manda-
tory one, and thus is preferable for a defendant.
DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY :
Set out in S.2 of the Homicide Act 1957 as amended by S.52 of
the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
S.2 (1) of Homicide Act 1957: Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of an-
other, he
shall not be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind
(whether
arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of the mind or any inherent
causes or
induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his
acts and
omissions in doing or being a party to the killing.
S.57 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009: A person who kills or is a party to the
killing of
another is not to be convinced of murder if he was suffering from an abnormality mental
functioning which:
(a) arose from a recognized medical condition,
(b) substantially impaired the defendant’s ability to:
Understand the nature of his conduct; (s2(1A)(a)) or
Form a rational judgment; (s2(1A)(b)) or
Exercise a self-control (s2(1A)(c))
(c) explains the defendant’s acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the
killing. (Abnormality is at least a significant contributory factor in causing D’s acts/omis-
sions.
(R V JOYCE AND KAY 2017)
Explains D's acts/omissions
· Explanation: the recognised medical condition causes or is a significant contributory
factor in causing D's conduct (s2(1B))
1) abnormality of mental functioning
(BYRNE 1960)
1
, "abnormality of mind" was wide enough to cover the mind's activities in all its aspects,
including the ability to exercise willpower to control physical acts by rational judgment.
He was thus allowed the defence to reduce the murder conviction to manslaughter.
2) Recognised medical condition (both physical and psychological)
(AHLUWALIA 1992)
The murder conviction was quashed based on D’s depressive
Condition.
(TANDY 1989)
murder upheld. The appellant had demonstrated in her evidence that she had exercised
control over her drinking. She had chosen to drink a different drink on the day in question
and was unable to recall if she had drunk the day before. She was also able to stop drink-
ing at 6.30 pm on the day of the killing even though the bottle was not yet empty
(DIETSCHMANN 2003)
Where D has a pre-existing mental disorder, intoxication does not
prevent him from using the defence; the abnormality of mental functioning
does not have to be the sole cause of the defendant doing the killing
(DOWDS 2012)
Diminished responsibility does not apply to voluntary intoxication. Voluntary intoxication
does not fall within the scope of a “recognised medical condition” under s2(1) Homicide
Act 1957 as amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
3) Substantially impaired
D’s ability to do one of these 3 things must be substantially impaired:
-to understand the nature of his conduct
-to form a rational judgment
-to exercise self-control
(LLOYD 1967)
Substantial does not mean total, nor does it mean trivial or
minimal. It is something in between and it is for the jury to decide if D’s
mental responsibility is impaired and, if so, whether it is substantially
Impaired.
S.3 HA 1957 :
subjective determination of whether D was provoked
to lose self-control ('whether by things done or by things said or by both together'), and
2. An
objective determination of 'whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable
man do
as [D] did.
- Section 3 does not state the effect of a successful defence - it is by the common law
that the offence is reduced to manslaughter
The jury has to answer two questions: (1) was the defendant provoked to lose his self-
control?
And; (2) was the provocation enough to make a reasonable man do as he did?
(DOUGHTY 1986)
baby's crying could amount to a provocative act within the meaning of s.3 of the Homi-
cide Act 1957. The appellant's murder conviction was substituted for manslaughter and
his life sentence was reduced to 5 years
(DAVIES 1975)
held that the act of the lover walking to her workplace could amount to a provocative act
and the issue of provocation should have been put before the jury. The provocative act
need not be deliberately aimed at provoking the victim, nor must the provocation come
from the victim
2
