2. Contrast the Copeland and Galai (1983) model and the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model. Are
insider traders always a bad thing in both models? Why or why not? What are the basic regulations
in the Netherlands concerning insider information and trading?
3. Contrast the view of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980) on the defensibility of perks.
Even if perks are purely detrimental to shareholders, why would they still persist according to the
model of Grossman and Hart (1980)? What types of remedies (e.g. some types of financial
deregulation) do they propose to help reign in management?
5. In the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, what are the preferences of so-called early consumers?
What are the preferences of late-type consumers? What do we mean in this mode by “a preference
for liquidity”? How can the preferences of the late consumers lead to a bankrun? How does deposit
insurance help prevent a bankrun? What are the regulation in the Netherlands for Deposit
insurance?
7. Consider the Minsky Credit Cycle model of financial crises. Briefly explain the stages of the model
(6.5 points), and explain why the two proposed remedies (limiting credit expansion during a run-up
and establishing a Lender of Last Resort) would prevent or reduce the severity of financial crises. (3
points + 3 points)