PART 1:
The protection of Power: How power is more important than people.
At first glance, criminal law focuses on detecting and punishing people who break
the law, but behind the shadows often lurks a darker reality: state negligence,
corporate decision-making and systemic inequalities. Because criminal law places a
strong emphasis on personal responsibility, some harmful acts or omissions are not
punished. Consequently, this helps to safeguard the interests of influential state,
social, and corporate entities.
Three major module themes: state, power and crime, are used in this essay to
examine these relationships. Using instances from Grenfell Tower (Block 1) and
Hillsborough (Block 3), as well as the discussion of criminal definitions and the
concept of social murder developed in Block 2.
Block 2 critically questions how crime is defined and, as Tombs and Whyte (2009)
argue, crime is not simply a reflection of moral wrongdoing or social harm, but rather
a social construct shaped by dominant groups. A perfect example of this is the
marginal treatment of corporate crime that often uses administrative law rather than
criminal courts. As Tombs and Whyte explain:
"The way in which the law constructs those harms further discourages us from
considering them as 'crimes' when compared, for example, to interpersonal crimes"
(Tombs and Whyte, 2009, p. 151).
This distinction shows that white-collar and state-related crimes are deprioritised.
Furthermore, the concept of social murder, derived from Engels and elaborated by
Tombs, reframes certain deaths not as unfortunate accidents but as predictable
results of systemic negligence (Tombs, 2023). Social murder refers to preventable
deaths caused by social arrangements of power, working conditions or insecurity.
These harms are often not criminalised because the institutions responsible wield
considerable power and influence over the lives of mundane.
A good example of how criminal law fails to blame for structural damage is the
Grenfell Tower fire in 2017, in which 72 people lost their lives due to the installation
of flammable cladding by the local authorities, whose intention was to make the
(social housing) building more pleasant for the residents of the affluent
neighbourhood in which it was located by prioritising the cost of the materials over
1
, the quality of the materials (DD105, Block 1). The fact that despite the documented
reluctance of residents to use such materials, these complaints were dismissed
reveals a blatant disregard for the lives of social housing tenants.
Tombs and Whyte (2009) point out that corporate crime is often prosecuted outside
the judicial system and even when investigated these crimes are rarely prosecuted.
In the Grenfell case, that despite clear evidence of avoidable damage, the judicial
processes have struggled to deliver justice and even the language used to describe
the event as ‘tragedy’ and ‘accident’, further distances it from criminality. As Tombs
and Whyte argued (2009, p. 153), ‘corporate harm is sanitised in public discourse’.
Another example that illustrates how the state and its agents evade criminal
responsibility is the 1989 Hillsborough stadium disaster where 97 people were killed
by a crushing avalanche of people. An initial investigation attributed the disaster to
police mismanagement but for decades no prosecutions were brought. Early
accounts also blamed fans, and a later investigation (in 1991) returned a verdict of
accidental death. It was not until more than a decade later, in 2012 with a report by
the Hillsborough Independent Panel and a subsequent enquiry in 2016, that the
systematic failures of police and state agencies were officially acknowledged
(DD105, Block 3).
This consistent and prolonged denial highlights how power operates in the criminal
justice system. The Director of Public Prosecutions refused to press charges in 1990
and political decisions prevented further investigation in subsequent years. Again,
the power of the state to define and control crime by supporting interests regardless
of the lives of individuals and the families of the deceased is exposed. Victims and
their families had to move heaven and earth for decades to get the truth
acknowledged, illustrating how the criminal justice process may not serve those
without power (Scraton, 2016).
Furthermore, the idea that victims are often not recognised as such because of their
social position or the idea of ‘deserving victims’ plays a role in this case: working-
class football fans did not fit the idealised image of the innocent victim (Downes et
al., 2023). Also in the case of Grenfell, the non-criminalisation of the institutions
responsible reflects the way in which the state protects its own interests.
2
The protection of Power: How power is more important than people.
At first glance, criminal law focuses on detecting and punishing people who break
the law, but behind the shadows often lurks a darker reality: state negligence,
corporate decision-making and systemic inequalities. Because criminal law places a
strong emphasis on personal responsibility, some harmful acts or omissions are not
punished. Consequently, this helps to safeguard the interests of influential state,
social, and corporate entities.
Three major module themes: state, power and crime, are used in this essay to
examine these relationships. Using instances from Grenfell Tower (Block 1) and
Hillsborough (Block 3), as well as the discussion of criminal definitions and the
concept of social murder developed in Block 2.
Block 2 critically questions how crime is defined and, as Tombs and Whyte (2009)
argue, crime is not simply a reflection of moral wrongdoing or social harm, but rather
a social construct shaped by dominant groups. A perfect example of this is the
marginal treatment of corporate crime that often uses administrative law rather than
criminal courts. As Tombs and Whyte explain:
"The way in which the law constructs those harms further discourages us from
considering them as 'crimes' when compared, for example, to interpersonal crimes"
(Tombs and Whyte, 2009, p. 151).
This distinction shows that white-collar and state-related crimes are deprioritised.
Furthermore, the concept of social murder, derived from Engels and elaborated by
Tombs, reframes certain deaths not as unfortunate accidents but as predictable
results of systemic negligence (Tombs, 2023). Social murder refers to preventable
deaths caused by social arrangements of power, working conditions or insecurity.
These harms are often not criminalised because the institutions responsible wield
considerable power and influence over the lives of mundane.
A good example of how criminal law fails to blame for structural damage is the
Grenfell Tower fire in 2017, in which 72 people lost their lives due to the installation
of flammable cladding by the local authorities, whose intention was to make the
(social housing) building more pleasant for the residents of the affluent
neighbourhood in which it was located by prioritising the cost of the materials over
1
, the quality of the materials (DD105, Block 1). The fact that despite the documented
reluctance of residents to use such materials, these complaints were dismissed
reveals a blatant disregard for the lives of social housing tenants.
Tombs and Whyte (2009) point out that corporate crime is often prosecuted outside
the judicial system and even when investigated these crimes are rarely prosecuted.
In the Grenfell case, that despite clear evidence of avoidable damage, the judicial
processes have struggled to deliver justice and even the language used to describe
the event as ‘tragedy’ and ‘accident’, further distances it from criminality. As Tombs
and Whyte argued (2009, p. 153), ‘corporate harm is sanitised in public discourse’.
Another example that illustrates how the state and its agents evade criminal
responsibility is the 1989 Hillsborough stadium disaster where 97 people were killed
by a crushing avalanche of people. An initial investigation attributed the disaster to
police mismanagement but for decades no prosecutions were brought. Early
accounts also blamed fans, and a later investigation (in 1991) returned a verdict of
accidental death. It was not until more than a decade later, in 2012 with a report by
the Hillsborough Independent Panel and a subsequent enquiry in 2016, that the
systematic failures of police and state agencies were officially acknowledged
(DD105, Block 3).
This consistent and prolonged denial highlights how power operates in the criminal
justice system. The Director of Public Prosecutions refused to press charges in 1990
and political decisions prevented further investigation in subsequent years. Again,
the power of the state to define and control crime by supporting interests regardless
of the lives of individuals and the families of the deceased is exposed. Victims and
their families had to move heaven and earth for decades to get the truth
acknowledged, illustrating how the criminal justice process may not serve those
without power (Scraton, 2016).
Furthermore, the idea that victims are often not recognised as such because of their
social position or the idea of ‘deserving victims’ plays a role in this case: working-
class football fans did not fit the idealised image of the innocent victim (Downes et
al., 2023). Also in the case of Grenfell, the non-criminalisation of the institutions
responsible reflects the way in which the state protects its own interests.
2
