Maoism
1921 Founding of CCP; 1927 Shanghai Massacre (start of Nanjing Decade); 1934 Long
March; 1935 Zunyi Conference; 1937 2nd Sino-Japanese War; 1942-44 Yan’an Rectification;
1945 CCP 7th Party Congress; 1949 End of Civil War & Establishment of PRC; 1950 Korea
War begins; 1950-53 Land Reform and Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries; 1953 First
Five Year Plan; 1956-57 Hundred Flowers’ Campaign (followed by anti-rightist campaign);
1958-62 GLF; 1959-61 Great Famine; 1959 Lushan Conference; 1963-5 Socialist Education
Movement; 1971 Lin Biao Incident; 1966-76 CR; 1976 Death of Mao, Arrest of Gang of 4
Mobilisation of the peasant population (1921/7-1949), but disagree on why - externalist
vs. internalist
Chalmers Johnson (1962): The 2nd Sino-Japanese War (1937) created the conditions for rural
politicisation, and the CCP capitalised on the peasantry’s growing anti-Japanese sentiment to
establish legitimacy; focus on the peasant nationalism thesis; E 1: a) Japanese occupation in
north China (1937-45) - CCP filled the vacuum left by the retreating GMD (to defend their
major cities and relocate its central gov to Chongqing, so withdrew from the countryside).
CCP moved into these vacated regions and established base areas in enemy-occupied zone,
such as Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region and other parts of northern China. They offered services
and security/protection to abandoned rural populations through militias and guerrilla units
(also gave rural people a stake in the revolution in protecting villages from Japanese and
bandit attacks), implemented rudimentary administrative structures, conducted land reforms,
and provided basic social services; b) E 2: GMD’s state-building efforts during the Nanjing
Decade (1927-37) was urban (centred around the Yangtze River Delta and other urban hubs);
reliant on a stable tax base: 1937 Japan invasion, GMD lost most of its tax-generating
territory, vulnerable to war disruption; CCP: self-contained rural bases; Zunyi Conference
(1935) consolidated Mao’s leadership; Mao’s peasant focused strategy; overwhelmingly
agrarian society (80% of population being peasants, so a revolution for and led by the
peasantry → opposing the Soviet model; EV: only explains how conditions enabled CCP
growth, but not how the Party sustained support or transformed it into legitimacy. Underplays
CCP strategic planning & importance of political education and institution-building →
seeking this opportunity itself is a strategic success.
Mark Selden (1971): CCP’s institution-building efforts, especially in Yenan, where Maoism
was seen as a model of “people’s war” and participatory governance; E 1: a) Land reform -
redistribution of land to peasantry and mass involvement from bottom-up provided a sense of
justice and reinforcing support; b) an increased involvement of peasants in politics: literacy
campaigns and political education + “mass line” mythodology: CCP cadres were trained to
consult peasants in policy making, enhancing responsive governance, resonating increasingly
more with the Party’s visions; c) Village-level democracy; limited but fostered inclusion and
ownership+ vs. GMD (bureaucrats and police repression) d) All elements incorporated in the
Yan’An Rectification E 2: Socialist Education Movement (1963-5) revived Yan’An
principles, important; CCP’s methods were both strategic and ideological: land reform served
both as policy&propaganda; EV: CCP created legitimacy not just by offering material
benefits but by structuring everyday life in ideological terms; may romanticise the “mass
line” and underplay the use of coercion and surveillance in ensuring compliance, still the
strongest argument.
Christopher Lew (2009): popular support meant little without the ability to win the war.
CCP’s military strategy and superiority allowed it to prove its credibility and defeat the
GMD; focus on adaptability: military capability as a source of revolutionary legitimacy; E 1:
a) military successes: Liaoshen Campaign (1948): PLA defeated GMD in manchuria/ Pingjin
1921 Founding of CCP; 1927 Shanghai Massacre (start of Nanjing Decade); 1934 Long
March; 1935 Zunyi Conference; 1937 2nd Sino-Japanese War; 1942-44 Yan’an Rectification;
1945 CCP 7th Party Congress; 1949 End of Civil War & Establishment of PRC; 1950 Korea
War begins; 1950-53 Land Reform and Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries; 1953 First
Five Year Plan; 1956-57 Hundred Flowers’ Campaign (followed by anti-rightist campaign);
1958-62 GLF; 1959-61 Great Famine; 1959 Lushan Conference; 1963-5 Socialist Education
Movement; 1971 Lin Biao Incident; 1966-76 CR; 1976 Death of Mao, Arrest of Gang of 4
Mobilisation of the peasant population (1921/7-1949), but disagree on why - externalist
vs. internalist
Chalmers Johnson (1962): The 2nd Sino-Japanese War (1937) created the conditions for rural
politicisation, and the CCP capitalised on the peasantry’s growing anti-Japanese sentiment to
establish legitimacy; focus on the peasant nationalism thesis; E 1: a) Japanese occupation in
north China (1937-45) - CCP filled the vacuum left by the retreating GMD (to defend their
major cities and relocate its central gov to Chongqing, so withdrew from the countryside).
CCP moved into these vacated regions and established base areas in enemy-occupied zone,
such as Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region and other parts of northern China. They offered services
and security/protection to abandoned rural populations through militias and guerrilla units
(also gave rural people a stake in the revolution in protecting villages from Japanese and
bandit attacks), implemented rudimentary administrative structures, conducted land reforms,
and provided basic social services; b) E 2: GMD’s state-building efforts during the Nanjing
Decade (1927-37) was urban (centred around the Yangtze River Delta and other urban hubs);
reliant on a stable tax base: 1937 Japan invasion, GMD lost most of its tax-generating
territory, vulnerable to war disruption; CCP: self-contained rural bases; Zunyi Conference
(1935) consolidated Mao’s leadership; Mao’s peasant focused strategy; overwhelmingly
agrarian society (80% of population being peasants, so a revolution for and led by the
peasantry → opposing the Soviet model; EV: only explains how conditions enabled CCP
growth, but not how the Party sustained support or transformed it into legitimacy. Underplays
CCP strategic planning & importance of political education and institution-building →
seeking this opportunity itself is a strategic success.
Mark Selden (1971): CCP’s institution-building efforts, especially in Yenan, where Maoism
was seen as a model of “people’s war” and participatory governance; E 1: a) Land reform -
redistribution of land to peasantry and mass involvement from bottom-up provided a sense of
justice and reinforcing support; b) an increased involvement of peasants in politics: literacy
campaigns and political education + “mass line” mythodology: CCP cadres were trained to
consult peasants in policy making, enhancing responsive governance, resonating increasingly
more with the Party’s visions; c) Village-level democracy; limited but fostered inclusion and
ownership+ vs. GMD (bureaucrats and police repression) d) All elements incorporated in the
Yan’An Rectification E 2: Socialist Education Movement (1963-5) revived Yan’An
principles, important; CCP’s methods were both strategic and ideological: land reform served
both as policy&propaganda; EV: CCP created legitimacy not just by offering material
benefits but by structuring everyday life in ideological terms; may romanticise the “mass
line” and underplay the use of coercion and surveillance in ensuring compliance, still the
strongest argument.
Christopher Lew (2009): popular support meant little without the ability to win the war.
CCP’s military strategy and superiority allowed it to prove its credibility and defeat the
GMD; focus on adaptability: military capability as a source of revolutionary legitimacy; E 1:
a) military successes: Liaoshen Campaign (1948): PLA defeated GMD in manchuria/ Pingjin
