Is Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory
Convincing?
Statement of Intent: MBTIT is a convincing account of the mind. Firstly, I will show that MBTIT tackles its
most crucial objection of multiple realisability convincingly enough. A stronger argument is that it coheres
much better with what we know empirically especially regarding mental causation. The most crucial
argument is that an identity relationship is the best ad metaphysically lightest explanation of why mental
and physical events correlate.
RICE 1:
R: Convincingly responds to the multiple realizability objection which is the most crucial objection to
MBTIT. Lewis’ variance reply. The only reason why it seems multiple realisable is that for the sake of
linguistic and social conventions we are consistent in how we name mental states across species to the
corresponding change in the relevant brain state. But in reality we implicitly differentiate between e/g
human and dog pain and so there is still a 1:1 identity (dog pain to dog brain and human pain to human
brain). This makes sense because for example, whilst we have shared behaviour of pain, pain in an animal
will obviously be different and that is because of its biology and its dog brain and capacity. The brain state
will impact how the mental state is realised thus showing the differentiation. We see in science where
reduction remains even if there seems to be multiple realisability such as the reduction of
thermodynamics to statistical mechanics despite temperature can be realised in many different
mechanical features depending on the state. Thus temperature is realised depending on the type of
medium likewise pain is realised depending on the type of species.
I: Issue of intra-species variation. Okay we can qualify different types of animal pain to animal brain but
what about individual humans can differ in which brain states correspond to which mental states. Are you
really going to go X persons brain → X persons pain. What if different points in time it is realised in
different brain states as we grow?
C: Intra-Species Variation still survives multiple-realisability. There are still instances of multiple
realizability within a group but the reduction is still valid. Developing the example before, the temperature
of a gas can be multiply realised in terms of the different velocity and momentum of the individual
molecules. What is important here is that it is assumed that in order to be reduced it must be biconditional
that is mental state must entail brain state and that brain state entail that mental state but if it isn’t
biconditional the reduction can still be valid (as seen in multiple instances in science) but the reduction is
still valid)
E: Isn’t the strongest argument but it is defended strongly enough that it isn’t a crucial problem for MBTIT.
Being able to j take its objections isn’t the most crucial - the argumets in favour specifically for MBTIT is
more crucial to the actual claims of MBTIT.
RICE 2:
R: MBTIT is the best explanation of mental causation because it coheres with the principle of causal
closure. All mental properties are identical with brain properties. Mental occurrences are identical with
neurons firing. Mental states that involve behavioural dispositions are neurological. Therefore all mental
causation just becomes a form of physical causation. This coheres perfectly with the principle of causal
closure (every physical event has a sufficient physical cause). This principle is quite fundamental to
science as to deny it is to accept that science cannot and will not find the causes of certain physical
events which is not a good conclusion as science is progressing alot etc. This is much better then dualists
accounts which fails the empirical interaction problem (lack of empirical evidence of mental events
Is Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory Convincing? 1
Convincing?
Statement of Intent: MBTIT is a convincing account of the mind. Firstly, I will show that MBTIT tackles its
most crucial objection of multiple realisability convincingly enough. A stronger argument is that it coheres
much better with what we know empirically especially regarding mental causation. The most crucial
argument is that an identity relationship is the best ad metaphysically lightest explanation of why mental
and physical events correlate.
RICE 1:
R: Convincingly responds to the multiple realizability objection which is the most crucial objection to
MBTIT. Lewis’ variance reply. The only reason why it seems multiple realisable is that for the sake of
linguistic and social conventions we are consistent in how we name mental states across species to the
corresponding change in the relevant brain state. But in reality we implicitly differentiate between e/g
human and dog pain and so there is still a 1:1 identity (dog pain to dog brain and human pain to human
brain). This makes sense because for example, whilst we have shared behaviour of pain, pain in an animal
will obviously be different and that is because of its biology and its dog brain and capacity. The brain state
will impact how the mental state is realised thus showing the differentiation. We see in science where
reduction remains even if there seems to be multiple realisability such as the reduction of
thermodynamics to statistical mechanics despite temperature can be realised in many different
mechanical features depending on the state. Thus temperature is realised depending on the type of
medium likewise pain is realised depending on the type of species.
I: Issue of intra-species variation. Okay we can qualify different types of animal pain to animal brain but
what about individual humans can differ in which brain states correspond to which mental states. Are you
really going to go X persons brain → X persons pain. What if different points in time it is realised in
different brain states as we grow?
C: Intra-Species Variation still survives multiple-realisability. There are still instances of multiple
realizability within a group but the reduction is still valid. Developing the example before, the temperature
of a gas can be multiply realised in terms of the different velocity and momentum of the individual
molecules. What is important here is that it is assumed that in order to be reduced it must be biconditional
that is mental state must entail brain state and that brain state entail that mental state but if it isn’t
biconditional the reduction can still be valid (as seen in multiple instances in science) but the reduction is
still valid)
E: Isn’t the strongest argument but it is defended strongly enough that it isn’t a crucial problem for MBTIT.
Being able to j take its objections isn’t the most crucial - the argumets in favour specifically for MBTIT is
more crucial to the actual claims of MBTIT.
RICE 2:
R: MBTIT is the best explanation of mental causation because it coheres with the principle of causal
closure. All mental properties are identical with brain properties. Mental occurrences are identical with
neurons firing. Mental states that involve behavioural dispositions are neurological. Therefore all mental
causation just becomes a form of physical causation. This coheres perfectly with the principle of causal
closure (every physical event has a sufficient physical cause). This principle is quite fundamental to
science as to deny it is to accept that science cannot and will not find the causes of certain physical
events which is not a good conclusion as science is progressing alot etc. This is much better then dualists
accounts which fails the empirical interaction problem (lack of empirical evidence of mental events
Is Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory Convincing? 1
