Property dualism
Theory outlined:
💡 Property dualism is the view that, although there is just one kind of substance,
physical substance, at least some mental properties are not physical properties
(as fully physicalist theories like type identity theory claims) or functional (as
functionalism claims) or behavioural dispositions. While mental properties are
possessed by physical substances, they are a fundamentally different kind of property
from physical properties.
There are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon
physical properties.
Most property dualists agree that not all properties that are thought of as “mental” are in fact
fundamentally non-physical. The most common candidate for fundamentally non-physical
properties are phenomenal properties or qualia.
Most property dualists agree that not all properties that are thought of as “mental” are in fact
fundamentally non-physical. The most common candidate for fundamentally non-physical
properties are phenomenal properties or qualia.
Property dualism 1