Definitions of knowledge – concepts, evaluation, potential response and overall
conclusion
Key terms:
Practical Knowing ‘how’
knowledge
Acquaintan Knowing ‘of’
ce
knowledge
Proposition Knowing ‘that’
al
knowledge
Proposition A sentence that makes a claim about the world.
Paradigms The belief that the world and its ideas are constantly fluctuating which
can result in different beliefs at different periods of time.
JTB:
- Context: In Theaetetus, Plato argues that knowledge is “true belief accompanied
by a rational account” -> simplified to = justified, true, belief (aka tripartite
definition of knowledge).
- Necessary and sufficient conditions -> Can argue that ‘justified’, ‘true’ and
‘belief’ are all necessary for knowledge.
- Necessary =
You can’t know something if it isn’t true.
You can’t know something you don’t believe (wouldn’t make sense).
You need to have justification (reason) behind your answer. -> you can’t
claim to ‘know’ something if you just guessed it.
- Sufficient =
If ‘justified true belief’ is a sufficient definition of knowledge, then
everything that is a justified true belief will be knowledge.
Problems of JTB:
1.
Gettier Context: both scenarios describe a belief that fails to count as
cases knowledge because the justified belief is only true as a result of luck.
Gettier case 1: Smith and Jones job
Justified: he hears the interviewer say Jones will get the job and he
sees that Jones has 10 coins in his pocket.
True: the man who gets the job (Smith) does indeed have 10 coins in
his pocket.
But despite being a justified true belief, we do not say that Smith’s
belief counts as knowledge because it’s just luck that lead to him
being correct.
Shows that the tripartite definition of knowledge is not sufficient ->
because you can have a JTB that is not knowledge.
, Gettier case 2: Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona
Context: relies on the logical principle of disjunction introduction
(addition).
So, Smith’s belief that “either jones owns a ford or Brown is in
Barcelona” is:
True: “either Jones owns a ford or Brown is in Barcelona” turns out to
be true. But Smith thought it was true because of the first condition
(Jones owns a ford) whereas it turns out it is true because of the
second condition (Brown is in Barcelona).
Justified: the original belief “Jones owns a ford” is justified, and so
disjunction introduction means that the second belief “either Jones
owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona” is also justified.
Despite being JTB, it is wrong to say that Smith’s belief counts as
knowledge, because it was just luck that led to him being correct ->
again proves that the tripartite definition of knowledge is not
sufficient.
Possible
response
Overall
judgement
2.
Double-luck Virtue epistemology : Linda Zagzebski
Gettier’s Argues that the JTB account of knowledge will always leave a gap
are between the justification and the truth.
inevitable Because of this gap we can always generate Gettier-style cases that
on JTB rely on double luck – the justification being unluckily wrong & the
account belief being luckily true.
Example:
- Doctor believes patient has virus X – as the test shows this is
the only virus consistent with evidence.
- However, symptoms are caused by new and unknown virus Y –
(she was unlucky with her prior justification).
- Turns out patient does in fact have virus X too – (she was
unluckily true).
Classic Gettier example – most would say she didn’t have knowledge
as luck was involved.
So, Zagzebski claims that only by linking the justification to the truth
of the belief we can avoid Gettier style cases like this & only true
beliefs are held because of the justification should we claim
knowledge – this is an approach that virtue epistemology takes.
Possible
response
conclusion
Key terms:
Practical Knowing ‘how’
knowledge
Acquaintan Knowing ‘of’
ce
knowledge
Proposition Knowing ‘that’
al
knowledge
Proposition A sentence that makes a claim about the world.
Paradigms The belief that the world and its ideas are constantly fluctuating which
can result in different beliefs at different periods of time.
JTB:
- Context: In Theaetetus, Plato argues that knowledge is “true belief accompanied
by a rational account” -> simplified to = justified, true, belief (aka tripartite
definition of knowledge).
- Necessary and sufficient conditions -> Can argue that ‘justified’, ‘true’ and
‘belief’ are all necessary for knowledge.
- Necessary =
You can’t know something if it isn’t true.
You can’t know something you don’t believe (wouldn’t make sense).
You need to have justification (reason) behind your answer. -> you can’t
claim to ‘know’ something if you just guessed it.
- Sufficient =
If ‘justified true belief’ is a sufficient definition of knowledge, then
everything that is a justified true belief will be knowledge.
Problems of JTB:
1.
Gettier Context: both scenarios describe a belief that fails to count as
cases knowledge because the justified belief is only true as a result of luck.
Gettier case 1: Smith and Jones job
Justified: he hears the interviewer say Jones will get the job and he
sees that Jones has 10 coins in his pocket.
True: the man who gets the job (Smith) does indeed have 10 coins in
his pocket.
But despite being a justified true belief, we do not say that Smith’s
belief counts as knowledge because it’s just luck that lead to him
being correct.
Shows that the tripartite definition of knowledge is not sufficient ->
because you can have a JTB that is not knowledge.
, Gettier case 2: Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona
Context: relies on the logical principle of disjunction introduction
(addition).
So, Smith’s belief that “either jones owns a ford or Brown is in
Barcelona” is:
True: “either Jones owns a ford or Brown is in Barcelona” turns out to
be true. But Smith thought it was true because of the first condition
(Jones owns a ford) whereas it turns out it is true because of the
second condition (Brown is in Barcelona).
Justified: the original belief “Jones owns a ford” is justified, and so
disjunction introduction means that the second belief “either Jones
owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona” is also justified.
Despite being JTB, it is wrong to say that Smith’s belief counts as
knowledge, because it was just luck that led to him being correct ->
again proves that the tripartite definition of knowledge is not
sufficient.
Possible
response
Overall
judgement
2.
Double-luck Virtue epistemology : Linda Zagzebski
Gettier’s Argues that the JTB account of knowledge will always leave a gap
are between the justification and the truth.
inevitable Because of this gap we can always generate Gettier-style cases that
on JTB rely on double luck – the justification being unluckily wrong & the
account belief being luckily true.
Example:
- Doctor believes patient has virus X – as the test shows this is
the only virus consistent with evidence.
- However, symptoms are caused by new and unknown virus Y –
(she was unlucky with her prior justification).
- Turns out patient does in fact have virus X too – (she was
unluckily true).
Classic Gettier example – most would say she didn’t have knowledge
as luck was involved.
So, Zagzebski claims that only by linking the justification to the truth
of the belief we can avoid Gettier style cases like this & only true
beliefs are held because of the justification should we claim
knowledge – this is an approach that virtue epistemology takes.
Possible
response
