Explain the Relation Between Freedom and Morality for Kant
The relationship between freedom, or autonomy, and morality for Kant is essentially
that freedom is necessary for morality, as he states that if ‘freedom of the will is presupposed,
morality together with its principle follows from it by mere analysis of its concept’ 1. This
means that in order for an agent to perform a moral action, they must do so freely. For Kant,
to act autonomously is to act motivated by reason alone. This is because of his view of
morality as objective, and the importance he ascribes to reason in his moral theory. Hence if
any of these justifications can be seen as flawed, then Kant’s view of the relation between
freedom and morality will encounter problems.
Firstly, Kant’s thinking behind his definition of freedom can be explored. He claims
that to act freely is to act with the motive of reason alone – the importance of which will be
explored later – and so if one acts motivated by anything else, they are acting heteronomously
(not freely). For example if Paula runs into a burning house to save her child because she
loves him, she would be motivated by emotion and hence not be performing a free action.
Whereas if she were to run into the house to save her child because she used reason to
determine that it was her duty to do so, she would be acting freely. For Kant, any action that
we ought to do morally can be referred to as our duty. The relation this has to morality is that
in the first instance where Paula was motivated by emotion, she would not have been acting
morally. It may have been an intrinsically moral action, but she would not have been moral
for choosing it. But in the second instance were she was motivated by reason and motivation
to perform her duty, the action becomes one concerned with morality.
Some would argue that this idea is unjustified, because an action cannot be not-
motivated by emotion. Human beings are essentially emotional creatures, and it is
unreasonable to demand that they detach themselves from this natural inclination. Indeed it
could be argued that it is impossible to ignore our emotions. For instance in performing an
action, even if it is not a choice that has been made emotionally, there is still likely to be
desire involved to do the right thing, or even to avoid punishment. This contributes to the
motive for performing the action, and surely cannot be set aside. Indeed, Hobbes claimed that
rational behaviour always has the motive of self-interest, and hence for Kant this would count
as being heteronomous as it is a motive other than reason.
However, it can be seen as perfectly acceptable to demand that humans act free from
emotion in order to be considered in a moral context. This is because making judgements
based on emotion can potentially be dangerous, and often not sensible. For example, suppose
a situation in which Tim has just caught his wife in bed with another man. In the heat of
anger he shoots the other man and his wife. Here, Tim would have been acting upon emotion
in a way that we would clearly see as immoral and dangerous. Yet had Tim calmly used his
reason to determine the appropriate course of action, his wife and the man she was cheating
on him with would not have lost their lives. Therefore surely it is right for Kant to claim that
emotion has no place in moral decision-making because of the risks of making decisions that
are motivated by emotion. The fact that we are emotional creatures has no bearing on this; it
only means we are to make the effort to put aside our emotion when it comes to moral
dilemmas, and Kant would certainly reject the idea that it is impossible to act autonomously
in the sense that he means it.
1
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. III 4:447
The relationship between freedom, or autonomy, and morality for Kant is essentially
that freedom is necessary for morality, as he states that if ‘freedom of the will is presupposed,
morality together with its principle follows from it by mere analysis of its concept’ 1. This
means that in order for an agent to perform a moral action, they must do so freely. For Kant,
to act autonomously is to act motivated by reason alone. This is because of his view of
morality as objective, and the importance he ascribes to reason in his moral theory. Hence if
any of these justifications can be seen as flawed, then Kant’s view of the relation between
freedom and morality will encounter problems.
Firstly, Kant’s thinking behind his definition of freedom can be explored. He claims
that to act freely is to act with the motive of reason alone – the importance of which will be
explored later – and so if one acts motivated by anything else, they are acting heteronomously
(not freely). For example if Paula runs into a burning house to save her child because she
loves him, she would be motivated by emotion and hence not be performing a free action.
Whereas if she were to run into the house to save her child because she used reason to
determine that it was her duty to do so, she would be acting freely. For Kant, any action that
we ought to do morally can be referred to as our duty. The relation this has to morality is that
in the first instance where Paula was motivated by emotion, she would not have been acting
morally. It may have been an intrinsically moral action, but she would not have been moral
for choosing it. But in the second instance were she was motivated by reason and motivation
to perform her duty, the action becomes one concerned with morality.
Some would argue that this idea is unjustified, because an action cannot be not-
motivated by emotion. Human beings are essentially emotional creatures, and it is
unreasonable to demand that they detach themselves from this natural inclination. Indeed it
could be argued that it is impossible to ignore our emotions. For instance in performing an
action, even if it is not a choice that has been made emotionally, there is still likely to be
desire involved to do the right thing, or even to avoid punishment. This contributes to the
motive for performing the action, and surely cannot be set aside. Indeed, Hobbes claimed that
rational behaviour always has the motive of self-interest, and hence for Kant this would count
as being heteronomous as it is a motive other than reason.
However, it can be seen as perfectly acceptable to demand that humans act free from
emotion in order to be considered in a moral context. This is because making judgements
based on emotion can potentially be dangerous, and often not sensible. For example, suppose
a situation in which Tim has just caught his wife in bed with another man. In the heat of
anger he shoots the other man and his wife. Here, Tim would have been acting upon emotion
in a way that we would clearly see as immoral and dangerous. Yet had Tim calmly used his
reason to determine the appropriate course of action, his wife and the man she was cheating
on him with would not have lost their lives. Therefore surely it is right for Kant to claim that
emotion has no place in moral decision-making because of the risks of making decisions that
are motivated by emotion. The fact that we are emotional creatures has no bearing on this; it
only means we are to make the effort to put aside our emotion when it comes to moral
dilemmas, and Kant would certainly reject the idea that it is impossible to act autonomously
in the sense that he means it.
1
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. III 4:447
