'Military theory failed to keep up with developments in technology.' How far do you agree with
this view of the period 1792-1945?
Military theory: the analysis of behaviour and trends in military affairs, particularly the relative
strengths of particular tactics and strategies given the technological and political climate.
Some evidence to suggest that military theory failed to keep up with technological developments
● Perhaps most strikingly - Jomini
○ up until his death in 1869 he strongly advised the manoeuvring of armies to launch an
offensive at the enemy's weakest point, failed to appreciate the impact of the minié
bullet, which had been in use since 1849
■ While such tactics had been effective in the French Revolutionary and
Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815) as the smoothbore muskets defenders were
equipped with could not hold back spirited French infantry charges (as seen at
Valmy in 1792 and Friedland in 1807),
■ At Inkerman (1854) in the Crimean War (1853-56)- defending British infantry
with Lee Enfield rifles (containing the powerful and accurate Minié system)
defeated a massed extended Russian assault despite facing numerical odds of
1:9
■ Similarly, at Gettysburg in the American Civil War
● Pickett's charge, ordered by Confederate General Lee, failed to even
reach Union defensive line while taking over 50% casualties from Union
rifled infantry over the 2,000m assault
● On the other hand, Giulio Douhet 1921 overestimated technological developments
○ wrote that there was no effective defence against the bomber and that civilian morale
would be shattered by extensive air raids
○ However WWI had seen the opposite occur, as
■ following the early Zeppelin raids on Britain in 1915 there was intense popular
outcry against Germany with the public demonization of 'the Hun', which had
the knock on effect of legitimising the British Government's precipitation of total
war by transforming the economy into a regulated welfare state.
However, there is stronger evidence to suggest that on the whole, it wasn't military theory that failed
to keep up with technological developments, but rather that military theory failed when outdated
theories were implemented by commanders that were unsuitable to the contemporary technological
environment
● While Clausewitz strongly urged that modern warfare favours the defender since as early as
1532 in his book 'On War', throughout the late 19th and early 20th Centuries commanders
repeated used ineffective frontal assault tactics against well-equipped defenses.
○ American Civil War – eg. Battle of Shiloh 1862
○ WWI – Somme 1916, Passchendaele 1917
○ Russo Japanese War – Battle of Nan Shan 1904
● Similarly WWII - French command did not implement Charles De Gaulle's theory of 1934 that
a smaller mechanised army was more effective than a defense based total war, instead
constructing a long defensive line on the France-Germany border, which was smashed
through by Germany's mechanised force in May 1940, leading to the defeat of France in just 6
weeks.
● By contrast, WWII German command successfully used Liddell Hart's 1929 theory that initial
deep penetration by rapid movement with a modern mechanised force (tanks and armoured
vehicles) would be highly effective, capturing France in just 6 weeks through Blitzkrieg
attacks.
this view of the period 1792-1945?
Military theory: the analysis of behaviour and trends in military affairs, particularly the relative
strengths of particular tactics and strategies given the technological and political climate.
Some evidence to suggest that military theory failed to keep up with technological developments
● Perhaps most strikingly - Jomini
○ up until his death in 1869 he strongly advised the manoeuvring of armies to launch an
offensive at the enemy's weakest point, failed to appreciate the impact of the minié
bullet, which had been in use since 1849
■ While such tactics had been effective in the French Revolutionary and
Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815) as the smoothbore muskets defenders were
equipped with could not hold back spirited French infantry charges (as seen at
Valmy in 1792 and Friedland in 1807),
■ At Inkerman (1854) in the Crimean War (1853-56)- defending British infantry
with Lee Enfield rifles (containing the powerful and accurate Minié system)
defeated a massed extended Russian assault despite facing numerical odds of
1:9
■ Similarly, at Gettysburg in the American Civil War
● Pickett's charge, ordered by Confederate General Lee, failed to even
reach Union defensive line while taking over 50% casualties from Union
rifled infantry over the 2,000m assault
● On the other hand, Giulio Douhet 1921 overestimated technological developments
○ wrote that there was no effective defence against the bomber and that civilian morale
would be shattered by extensive air raids
○ However WWI had seen the opposite occur, as
■ following the early Zeppelin raids on Britain in 1915 there was intense popular
outcry against Germany with the public demonization of 'the Hun', which had
the knock on effect of legitimising the British Government's precipitation of total
war by transforming the economy into a regulated welfare state.
However, there is stronger evidence to suggest that on the whole, it wasn't military theory that failed
to keep up with technological developments, but rather that military theory failed when outdated
theories were implemented by commanders that were unsuitable to the contemporary technological
environment
● While Clausewitz strongly urged that modern warfare favours the defender since as early as
1532 in his book 'On War', throughout the late 19th and early 20th Centuries commanders
repeated used ineffective frontal assault tactics against well-equipped defenses.
○ American Civil War – eg. Battle of Shiloh 1862
○ WWI – Somme 1916, Passchendaele 1917
○ Russo Japanese War – Battle of Nan Shan 1904
● Similarly WWII - French command did not implement Charles De Gaulle's theory of 1934 that
a smaller mechanised army was more effective than a defense based total war, instead
constructing a long defensive line on the France-Germany border, which was smashed
through by Germany's mechanised force in May 1940, leading to the defeat of France in just 6
weeks.
● By contrast, WWII German command successfully used Liddell Hart's 1929 theory that initial
deep penetration by rapid movement with a modern mechanised force (tanks and armoured
vehicles) would be highly effective, capturing France in just 6 weeks through Blitzkrieg
attacks.
