Lecture 14: Mirror Neurons and Theory of Mind
Mirror Neurons, Action Understanding & Theory of Mind
Mirror neurons are neurons found in primate brains, as far as we are aware
This topic is no longer in the limbic system or looking at simple emotional states that we can easily
study in rodents
But, this concept as a whole stretches the concept of learning to looking at learning from other
individuals/ conspecifics, which is a large part of primate learning about the world – one of the
reasons why humans are so successful
Looking at how learning can extend to this high cognitive social domain – and some neural
mechanisms that may or may not underlie this
The comparative psychology of Action Understanding and Theory of Mind
• Primate-based studies
Stretches the concept of learning; looking at, particularly in primates, a key aspect of learning in
social relations - one way in which human beings particularly learn about the world (social cognition)
Learning can extend the to the very high social domain
Action (& Goal) Understanding and Imitation
Traditionally, Apes (non-human primates) were classically thought to be able to learn to imitate
goals, but they could not learn to imitate exact actions/ exact series of motor patterns one executes
in order to achieve a goal
The key point is not to just understand the goal, but how the animal is doing it – that is why it makes
sense that humans and apes understand the goals of other conspecifics, but only humans can
actually imitate the exact motor actions
(FALSE, other primates can do action understanding and action imitation [see second example) Commented [IM278]: Example of types of experiments that
were done:
(Nagell, Olguin & Tomasello, 1993) – The comparative psychology of Action Understanding and 1)Chimp in captivity undergoing psychological experiment with
human experimenter
Action Imitation 2)CONTROL – human child with an adult human experimenter
• Only humans can perform the exact motor actions, but all primates can perform the goal AIM – experimenter demonstrates that using this rake tool, you can
o Using rake to obtain food/toy by monkey/human baby in separate area achieve from the tray a reward liked by the chimp (food) or child
(toy)
o Do the monkeys imitate the goal? - by using the rake to obtain the item
o Do the monkeys use the rake in the exact way shown to obtain the item? Rake has a particular configuration that you can use it in two
different rotations – one way is more optimal
RESULT
The key point in the experiment is that – when the experimenter
• Monkey - Experimental demonstration has had no effect, no significant difference between
demonstrates that you can use the rake to get back the toy or food
full/partial/no model reward, they would use it in the efficient or inefficient configuration
• Child - Experimental demonstration effects how rake is used OBSERVE –
o When you provide the full model (demonstrate how to use the rake in a particular 1)Do they imitate the goal? – use the rake to achieve reward;
action understanding
way) you actually bias the way in which the child uses the rake 2)Do they imitate the exact way the rake is used to get the
reward back? – imitating action
, o There is a significant difference between full model and the other types of
demonstration
Conclusion: Both children and chimps can understand that they can use the rake to obtain the item
they want (action understanding) BUT only the children took notice of the exact manner (motor
patterns) used by the examiner in using the tool (action imitation)
LIMITATIONS
However, this is probably not true in the wild; the chimp was kept captive in a room and likely bred
and raised in a research institute. Furthermore, the experiment itself is not something particularly
natural, and not something that we would expect chimpanzees to engage in in a normal natural life
Having said that, can do we expect these results to generalise to all chimpanzees in all circumstances
(i.e. wild environments?)
An elegant attempt to answer this question
(Whiten et al. 2007; cf Whiten et al. 2009) – The ability of wild chimpanzees to learn tool use and
socially pass on tool use within chimpanzee groups
• Studied chimpanzees in wild habitat Commented [IM279]: Leave puzzle box in natural environment
– food inside that can be obtained in two primary ways using
• Social transmission of knowledge in how to access food inside puzzle box provided tools
o First group of chimpanzees learn to use puzzle box in a particular way. This
Same box but two different ways to use it:
knowledge then gets transmitted to other groups of chimpanzees who have never
seen a direct (human?) demonstration, only via other chimps – they learn to use it 1)Can open hatch and stab pointy bit in to stab and retrieve food
2)Can open trap door and use a slider to push food out
overwhelmingly in the way it has been demonstrated
METHOD
o Different social groups of chimps learn to use puzzle box in same way as other Box is set up so first chimps that come across it can only access it
groups one way, but then what you do is change the box so it can be used
both ways – and you see what happens in the social transmission of
Conclusion: Chimps may well be able to learn from, understand and imitate exact actions and how knowledge when other chimps come to use the puzzle box to get
to replicate them to achieve the goal - SO LONG AS they are tested in the correct ethologically the food inside
valid and naturalistic circumstances
Theory of Mind
Theory of mind is a cognitive function, most commonly ascribed to humans, that means the ability
to hypothesise and think about the mental state of another conspecific Commented [IM280]: i.e. we do not see other conspecifics, or
even other animals potentially, as dumb robots playing out a series
• To put yourself in another person’s shoes oif actions to maximise rewards in some kind of algorithmic way –
• Empathise but we actuall see them as human beings like yourself
• ‘This person has a mind like me’
This is a specific cognitive ability – it is not a given that this is the way someone might solve the
problem of understanding what another animal is doing
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978)
These states are not directly observable, and the system can be used to make predictions,
specifically about the behaviour of other organisms
Mirror Neurons, Action Understanding & Theory of Mind
Mirror neurons are neurons found in primate brains, as far as we are aware
This topic is no longer in the limbic system or looking at simple emotional states that we can easily
study in rodents
But, this concept as a whole stretches the concept of learning to looking at learning from other
individuals/ conspecifics, which is a large part of primate learning about the world – one of the
reasons why humans are so successful
Looking at how learning can extend to this high cognitive social domain – and some neural
mechanisms that may or may not underlie this
The comparative psychology of Action Understanding and Theory of Mind
• Primate-based studies
Stretches the concept of learning; looking at, particularly in primates, a key aspect of learning in
social relations - one way in which human beings particularly learn about the world (social cognition)
Learning can extend the to the very high social domain
Action (& Goal) Understanding and Imitation
Traditionally, Apes (non-human primates) were classically thought to be able to learn to imitate
goals, but they could not learn to imitate exact actions/ exact series of motor patterns one executes
in order to achieve a goal
The key point is not to just understand the goal, but how the animal is doing it – that is why it makes
sense that humans and apes understand the goals of other conspecifics, but only humans can
actually imitate the exact motor actions
(FALSE, other primates can do action understanding and action imitation [see second example) Commented [IM278]: Example of types of experiments that
were done:
(Nagell, Olguin & Tomasello, 1993) – The comparative psychology of Action Understanding and 1)Chimp in captivity undergoing psychological experiment with
human experimenter
Action Imitation 2)CONTROL – human child with an adult human experimenter
• Only humans can perform the exact motor actions, but all primates can perform the goal AIM – experimenter demonstrates that using this rake tool, you can
o Using rake to obtain food/toy by monkey/human baby in separate area achieve from the tray a reward liked by the chimp (food) or child
(toy)
o Do the monkeys imitate the goal? - by using the rake to obtain the item
o Do the monkeys use the rake in the exact way shown to obtain the item? Rake has a particular configuration that you can use it in two
different rotations – one way is more optimal
RESULT
The key point in the experiment is that – when the experimenter
• Monkey - Experimental demonstration has had no effect, no significant difference between
demonstrates that you can use the rake to get back the toy or food
full/partial/no model reward, they would use it in the efficient or inefficient configuration
• Child - Experimental demonstration effects how rake is used OBSERVE –
o When you provide the full model (demonstrate how to use the rake in a particular 1)Do they imitate the goal? – use the rake to achieve reward;
action understanding
way) you actually bias the way in which the child uses the rake 2)Do they imitate the exact way the rake is used to get the
reward back? – imitating action
, o There is a significant difference between full model and the other types of
demonstration
Conclusion: Both children and chimps can understand that they can use the rake to obtain the item
they want (action understanding) BUT only the children took notice of the exact manner (motor
patterns) used by the examiner in using the tool (action imitation)
LIMITATIONS
However, this is probably not true in the wild; the chimp was kept captive in a room and likely bred
and raised in a research institute. Furthermore, the experiment itself is not something particularly
natural, and not something that we would expect chimpanzees to engage in in a normal natural life
Having said that, can do we expect these results to generalise to all chimpanzees in all circumstances
(i.e. wild environments?)
An elegant attempt to answer this question
(Whiten et al. 2007; cf Whiten et al. 2009) – The ability of wild chimpanzees to learn tool use and
socially pass on tool use within chimpanzee groups
• Studied chimpanzees in wild habitat Commented [IM279]: Leave puzzle box in natural environment
– food inside that can be obtained in two primary ways using
• Social transmission of knowledge in how to access food inside puzzle box provided tools
o First group of chimpanzees learn to use puzzle box in a particular way. This
Same box but two different ways to use it:
knowledge then gets transmitted to other groups of chimpanzees who have never
seen a direct (human?) demonstration, only via other chimps – they learn to use it 1)Can open hatch and stab pointy bit in to stab and retrieve food
2)Can open trap door and use a slider to push food out
overwhelmingly in the way it has been demonstrated
METHOD
o Different social groups of chimps learn to use puzzle box in same way as other Box is set up so first chimps that come across it can only access it
groups one way, but then what you do is change the box so it can be used
both ways – and you see what happens in the social transmission of
Conclusion: Chimps may well be able to learn from, understand and imitate exact actions and how knowledge when other chimps come to use the puzzle box to get
to replicate them to achieve the goal - SO LONG AS they are tested in the correct ethologically the food inside
valid and naturalistic circumstances
Theory of Mind
Theory of mind is a cognitive function, most commonly ascribed to humans, that means the ability
to hypothesise and think about the mental state of another conspecific Commented [IM280]: i.e. we do not see other conspecifics, or
even other animals potentially, as dumb robots playing out a series
• To put yourself in another person’s shoes oif actions to maximise rewards in some kind of algorithmic way –
• Empathise but we actuall see them as human beings like yourself
• ‘This person has a mind like me’
This is a specific cognitive ability – it is not a given that this is the way someone might solve the
problem of understanding what another animal is doing
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978)
These states are not directly observable, and the system can be used to make predictions,
specifically about the behaviour of other organisms
