‘Parliament is able to sufficiently limit the power of the executive’.
How far do you agree with this view about the power of Parliament? (30)
For Parliament to limit the power of the executive, both chambers should be able to apply effective
scrutiny and appropriate checks & balances to ensure that laws and decisions are thoroughly
checked and if necessary, vetoed. This should prevent ill-advised decision-making and poorly
conceived laws being passed, thus holding the executive fully accountable for its policies, spending
and decisions. Whilst it is plausible to argue that the Commons performed a visible and robust
scrutiny role during the May administration, this role is less profound when the executive possesses
a strong working majority. Furthermore, the Lords is able to exert a measure of influence on the
executive, but is ultimately severely stymied in its capacity to control executive actions by its limited
constitutional position. Ultimately the sufficiency of Parliament’s ability to limit the power of the
executive branch depends on the extent of the executive’s working majority in the Commons.
Whilst it is more convincing to argue that Parliament is typically unable to limit the power of the
executive, it is important to acknowledge that the legislative branch exhibited a high degree of
control between 2017-19 during the May administration and the beginning of the Johnson
administration. Perhaps most notably, MPs rejected May’s negotiated Brexit deal three times, the
first occasion with a historic defeat by a margin of 230 votes. This triggered a rare confidence vote in
the government, which despite surviving, severely damaged May’s authority. These events
suggested that the Commons was exerting a clear ability to limit the power of the executive. May
suffered 33 significant legislative losses in 2 years, a trend that continued under Johnson who
suffered 6 losses on key votes in one week. During the Brexit negotiations, backbench MPs also
succeeded in wrestling control of the timetable away from the executive in order to force May to
seek an extension to negotiations and avoid a no-deal Brexit. Whilst these examples suggest a high
degree of control over the executive, it is important to point out that these were during exceptional
circumstances of weak minority government. It is therefore more persuasive to argue that the
executive typically possesses a high degree of control over Parliament and Parliament is unable to
sufficiently limit their power. This is illustrated by the control that Johnson was able to re-exert
following the 2019 GE which delivered an 80-seat working majority to the Conservatives. This is due
to the nature of our electoral system, FPTP, which typically produces vast working majorities for the
winning party, based on the ‘winners’ bonus’ often delivered via the simple plurality constituency
system. Johnson passed a Brexit deal in a matter of weeks in early 2020 and has not suffered a
significant legislative defeat in the Commons during this parliament. He has struggled with party
discipline during the Covid pandemic (with significant backbench rebellions over tiered restrictions),
but these have been absorbed by his large majority and the Commons has been unable to limit the
power of his government. This was also seen during the Blair years. In possession of majorities of
179 and 167 in two successive Parliaments, Blair did not lose a vote for 8 years. This suggests that
Parliament is only able to sufficiently limit the executive in times of weak minority government, and
these are rare and exceptional.
Furthermore, it is persuasive to argue that Parliament does not sufficiently limit the executive with
its tools of regular scrutiny such as Urgent Questions, Select Committee investigations or PMQs.
However, it would be valid to suggest that the use of these tools has become marginally more
effective and prominent since the 2010 Wright Reforms and the election of supportive Speakers.
This can be seen with the notable increase in volume of UQs allowed by Speakers Bercow and Hoyle,
forcing ministers to respond to MPs enquiries in a matter of hours. This has recently forced the
government onto the defensive over the ‘Party-gate’ scandal, following an UQ tabled by Angela
How far do you agree with this view about the power of Parliament? (30)
For Parliament to limit the power of the executive, both chambers should be able to apply effective
scrutiny and appropriate checks & balances to ensure that laws and decisions are thoroughly
checked and if necessary, vetoed. This should prevent ill-advised decision-making and poorly
conceived laws being passed, thus holding the executive fully accountable for its policies, spending
and decisions. Whilst it is plausible to argue that the Commons performed a visible and robust
scrutiny role during the May administration, this role is less profound when the executive possesses
a strong working majority. Furthermore, the Lords is able to exert a measure of influence on the
executive, but is ultimately severely stymied in its capacity to control executive actions by its limited
constitutional position. Ultimately the sufficiency of Parliament’s ability to limit the power of the
executive branch depends on the extent of the executive’s working majority in the Commons.
Whilst it is more convincing to argue that Parliament is typically unable to limit the power of the
executive, it is important to acknowledge that the legislative branch exhibited a high degree of
control between 2017-19 during the May administration and the beginning of the Johnson
administration. Perhaps most notably, MPs rejected May’s negotiated Brexit deal three times, the
first occasion with a historic defeat by a margin of 230 votes. This triggered a rare confidence vote in
the government, which despite surviving, severely damaged May’s authority. These events
suggested that the Commons was exerting a clear ability to limit the power of the executive. May
suffered 33 significant legislative losses in 2 years, a trend that continued under Johnson who
suffered 6 losses on key votes in one week. During the Brexit negotiations, backbench MPs also
succeeded in wrestling control of the timetable away from the executive in order to force May to
seek an extension to negotiations and avoid a no-deal Brexit. Whilst these examples suggest a high
degree of control over the executive, it is important to point out that these were during exceptional
circumstances of weak minority government. It is therefore more persuasive to argue that the
executive typically possesses a high degree of control over Parliament and Parliament is unable to
sufficiently limit their power. This is illustrated by the control that Johnson was able to re-exert
following the 2019 GE which delivered an 80-seat working majority to the Conservatives. This is due
to the nature of our electoral system, FPTP, which typically produces vast working majorities for the
winning party, based on the ‘winners’ bonus’ often delivered via the simple plurality constituency
system. Johnson passed a Brexit deal in a matter of weeks in early 2020 and has not suffered a
significant legislative defeat in the Commons during this parliament. He has struggled with party
discipline during the Covid pandemic (with significant backbench rebellions over tiered restrictions),
but these have been absorbed by his large majority and the Commons has been unable to limit the
power of his government. This was also seen during the Blair years. In possession of majorities of
179 and 167 in two successive Parliaments, Blair did not lose a vote for 8 years. This suggests that
Parliament is only able to sufficiently limit the executive in times of weak minority government, and
these are rare and exceptional.
Furthermore, it is persuasive to argue that Parliament does not sufficiently limit the executive with
its tools of regular scrutiny such as Urgent Questions, Select Committee investigations or PMQs.
However, it would be valid to suggest that the use of these tools has become marginally more
effective and prominent since the 2010 Wright Reforms and the election of supportive Speakers.
This can be seen with the notable increase in volume of UQs allowed by Speakers Bercow and Hoyle,
forcing ministers to respond to MPs enquiries in a matter of hours. This has recently forced the
government onto the defensive over the ‘Party-gate’ scandal, following an UQ tabled by Angela
