ASSESS PROPERTY DUALISM
INTRO: Outline Property dualism + Phenomenal properties (Qualia)
Property dualism fails as a theory of the mind as its supporting theories, the philosophical
zombies argument and the knowledge argument fail to respond e ectively to critiques.
However, the defeating issue is that it epiphenomenalism cannot account for our
subjective experience of free will and autonomy.
JACKSON: Mary’s room
Minor
CHURCHLAND: ’ability knowledge’ response
Propositional knowledge also comes with this
Convincing
➢ Gains proportional of what that experience is like in others that she didn’t know before.
New knowledge / old fact
CHALMERS: Philosophical zombies
DENNET: not conceivable
Strong
➢ We cannot conceive of a fully functioning body without health - consciousness is the same.
Only conceivable if we see qualia as non-physical, but qualia is a physical thing and thus it’s
inconceivable for two physically identical things to not have identical qualia.
CHALMERS: not thinking hard enough
Stronger
KRIPKE: Not metaphysically possible
➢ We could conceive a possible world where water could be H30 but such substance wouldn’t
be water it would be something else. H20 = inseparable part of what water is and so water is
H20 in all possible universes.
Epiphenomenalism
Signi cant
Natural selection/evolution
➢ If mental states have no impact on the physical and so whether they survive and reproduce.
How and why did they evolve?
JACKSON: Consciousness is a bi-product
➢ Claiming all mental states are simply a bi-product seems reductionist.
No free will / responsibility
Defeating
➢ This is highly counter intuitive to our experience of the world, if my mental states have no
e ect on my physical states I wouldn’t have free will. This would suggest my actions /
choices aren’t necessarily my own. This could also have potential ethical implications as we
can’t hold people responsible to their actions, leading to issues with our criminal justice
system etc. Therefore to take an epiphenomenalist stance we must take a highly reductionist
stance.
The defeating issue for property dualism is that in attempt to explain our phenomenal and subjective
experience of the world, through qualia, epiphenomenalism simultaneously removes our autonomy.
Therefore contradicting our other forms subjective experience.
ff
fi ff
INTRO: Outline Property dualism + Phenomenal properties (Qualia)
Property dualism fails as a theory of the mind as its supporting theories, the philosophical
zombies argument and the knowledge argument fail to respond e ectively to critiques.
However, the defeating issue is that it epiphenomenalism cannot account for our
subjective experience of free will and autonomy.
JACKSON: Mary’s room
Minor
CHURCHLAND: ’ability knowledge’ response
Propositional knowledge also comes with this
Convincing
➢ Gains proportional of what that experience is like in others that she didn’t know before.
New knowledge / old fact
CHALMERS: Philosophical zombies
DENNET: not conceivable
Strong
➢ We cannot conceive of a fully functioning body without health - consciousness is the same.
Only conceivable if we see qualia as non-physical, but qualia is a physical thing and thus it’s
inconceivable for two physically identical things to not have identical qualia.
CHALMERS: not thinking hard enough
Stronger
KRIPKE: Not metaphysically possible
➢ We could conceive a possible world where water could be H30 but such substance wouldn’t
be water it would be something else. H20 = inseparable part of what water is and so water is
H20 in all possible universes.
Epiphenomenalism
Signi cant
Natural selection/evolution
➢ If mental states have no impact on the physical and so whether they survive and reproduce.
How and why did they evolve?
JACKSON: Consciousness is a bi-product
➢ Claiming all mental states are simply a bi-product seems reductionist.
No free will / responsibility
Defeating
➢ This is highly counter intuitive to our experience of the world, if my mental states have no
e ect on my physical states I wouldn’t have free will. This would suggest my actions /
choices aren’t necessarily my own. This could also have potential ethical implications as we
can’t hold people responsible to their actions, leading to issues with our criminal justice
system etc. Therefore to take an epiphenomenalist stance we must take a highly reductionist
stance.
The defeating issue for property dualism is that in attempt to explain our phenomenal and subjective
experience of the world, through qualia, epiphenomenalism simultaneously removes our autonomy.
Therefore contradicting our other forms subjective experience.
ff
fi ff
