Emile Durkheim - The Division of Labour in Society
Book One
Chapter Two: Mechanical Solidarity Through Likeness
1.
● There must be a common element in ‘crime’, across time and space (communities)
○ crime causes punishment, and ‘the unity of effect shows the unity of the
cause’
■ (maybe if we accept both as social constructs, but even
then, many auxiliary causes must surely be added to crime to be a sufficient
cause of punishment)
○ the common element isn’t harm to society, cause not all crimes are
harmful, and some things (e.g. economic crises) are harmful without being criminal
○ not that they seem harmful to society, because this is obvious and
tautological
○ ‘the only common characteristic of all crimes is that they consist...in acts
universally disapproved of by members of each society’
■ the rules of society are ‘graven in all consciences’, and
where they aren’t, it is ‘an undeniable sign of pathological perversion’
● ‘Every written law’ (except penal law, whatever that can mean) has two objects: to
prescribe obligations and to define sanctions
○ penal law just sets out sanctions, so prescriptions are implicit
● In primitive societies, repressive justice doesn’t function through ‘special magistracy’,
but is diffuse
○ this is because its object is the enactment of a conscience common to all
○ but even where judicial power is wielded by a privileged class/group,
they still represent the common conscience
● Some acts e.g. incest(!!!) are the ‘object of quite general aversion’, but are immoral rather
than criminal
○ so we can see that the collective sentiments to which crime corresponds
must have ‘a certain average intensity’ - they must be strongly engraven in all
consciences
■ but they must also be precise - ‘relative to a very definite
practice’, rather than aspirational to some vague object such as filial love
● The common conscience is ‘independent of the particular conditions in which individuals
are placed; they pass it on and it remains’
○ it is the same in north/south, cities/country
■ (what on earth could have this universal regularity? what
is not caused by particular conditions?)
● An action is criminal because it shocks the common conscience; it does not shock the
common conscience because it is criminal
● What about cases which are repressed, but aren’t strongly disapproved of by the
collective conscience?
○ e.g. encroachment of judiciary on executive, religion on the state etc
(bureaucratic/technocratic issues)
○ governments are capable of attaching sanction to certain conduct
spontaneously
Book One
Chapter Two: Mechanical Solidarity Through Likeness
1.
● There must be a common element in ‘crime’, across time and space (communities)
○ crime causes punishment, and ‘the unity of effect shows the unity of the
cause’
■ (maybe if we accept both as social constructs, but even
then, many auxiliary causes must surely be added to crime to be a sufficient
cause of punishment)
○ the common element isn’t harm to society, cause not all crimes are
harmful, and some things (e.g. economic crises) are harmful without being criminal
○ not that they seem harmful to society, because this is obvious and
tautological
○ ‘the only common characteristic of all crimes is that they consist...in acts
universally disapproved of by members of each society’
■ the rules of society are ‘graven in all consciences’, and
where they aren’t, it is ‘an undeniable sign of pathological perversion’
● ‘Every written law’ (except penal law, whatever that can mean) has two objects: to
prescribe obligations and to define sanctions
○ penal law just sets out sanctions, so prescriptions are implicit
● In primitive societies, repressive justice doesn’t function through ‘special magistracy’,
but is diffuse
○ this is because its object is the enactment of a conscience common to all
○ but even where judicial power is wielded by a privileged class/group,
they still represent the common conscience
● Some acts e.g. incest(!!!) are the ‘object of quite general aversion’, but are immoral rather
than criminal
○ so we can see that the collective sentiments to which crime corresponds
must have ‘a certain average intensity’ - they must be strongly engraven in all
consciences
■ but they must also be precise - ‘relative to a very definite
practice’, rather than aspirational to some vague object such as filial love
● The common conscience is ‘independent of the particular conditions in which individuals
are placed; they pass it on and it remains’
○ it is the same in north/south, cities/country
■ (what on earth could have this universal regularity? what
is not caused by particular conditions?)
● An action is criminal because it shocks the common conscience; it does not shock the
common conscience because it is criminal
● What about cases which are repressed, but aren’t strongly disapproved of by the
collective conscience?
○ e.g. encroachment of judiciary on executive, religion on the state etc
(bureaucratic/technocratic issues)
○ governments are capable of attaching sanction to certain conduct
spontaneously
