PARTIES TO CRIME
‘Secondary parties are those persons whose role in giving assistance or encouragement to P is sufficient to
make them participants in and guilty of the crime committed by P (principal), notwithstanding that they do
not themselves satisfy the AR and MR elements of the crime’ (Simester and Sullivan)
If P commits murder, his accomplice S will also be labelled and punished (same maximum
sentence) as P, even if he was factually incapable of committing the substantive crime
The rationale from Jogee and Ruddock [2016] follows that there is no moral distinction between
providing P with a gun and P shooting V
Similarly, ‘numbers often matter. Most people are often bolder when supported or fortified
by others than they are when alone. And something done by a group is often a good deal
more effective than the same thing done by an individual alone’
Accessories and Abettors Act 1861
Sets out a procedural rule, rather than a substantive offence in its own right
The terms ‘aid, abet, counsel or procure’ are never defined and there is no mens rea
Accomplice liability takes a different form
For principals, the actus reus and mens rea are specific to each offence (in an exam, first identify
the substantive offence)
For secondary parties, the actus reus and mens rea are the same, whatever the offence
, The result which D causes is not the death (principal crime), but rather the result element of
complicity as either (1) aiding, abetting or counselling or (2) procuring
Requires a voluntary act causing the result, which is intentional and not too different from the
substantive offence
‘Principals cause, accomplices encourage or help... it was because the instigator was not regarded
as causing the crime that the notion of accessories had to be developed... Accessorial liability is, in
the traditional theory, ‘derivative’ from that perpetrator’ (Williams)
D’s role in an offence
D as a principal- D commits the actus reus of the offence with the mens rea
D as a joint-principal- D1 and D2 commit the actus reus of the offence together with the required
mens rea (complicity does not apply)
D as a principal via innocent agency- D uses an innocent party (X) to commit an offence, where X
lacks the mens rea
D as an accomplice- D assists, encourages or procures P to commit an offence and P does so
Joint enterprise
Gnango [2012]- issue of (now abolished) joint enterprise (parasitic accessorial liability)
D engaged in a shootout with ‘Bandana Man’ (P), whose bullet inadvertently strikes and kills
V
D found guilty of murder in the first instance on the basis that D and Pcou were ‘jointly
concerned with an affray and foresaw the chance of murder being committed’
However, the Court of Appeal found that, by shooting at each other, D and P rather had
completely opposite purposes and were thus not engaged in a joint enterprise
‘Secondary parties are those persons whose role in giving assistance or encouragement to P is sufficient to
make them participants in and guilty of the crime committed by P (principal), notwithstanding that they do
not themselves satisfy the AR and MR elements of the crime’ (Simester and Sullivan)
If P commits murder, his accomplice S will also be labelled and punished (same maximum
sentence) as P, even if he was factually incapable of committing the substantive crime
The rationale from Jogee and Ruddock [2016] follows that there is no moral distinction between
providing P with a gun and P shooting V
Similarly, ‘numbers often matter. Most people are often bolder when supported or fortified
by others than they are when alone. And something done by a group is often a good deal
more effective than the same thing done by an individual alone’
Accessories and Abettors Act 1861
Sets out a procedural rule, rather than a substantive offence in its own right
The terms ‘aid, abet, counsel or procure’ are never defined and there is no mens rea
Accomplice liability takes a different form
For principals, the actus reus and mens rea are specific to each offence (in an exam, first identify
the substantive offence)
For secondary parties, the actus reus and mens rea are the same, whatever the offence
, The result which D causes is not the death (principal crime), but rather the result element of
complicity as either (1) aiding, abetting or counselling or (2) procuring
Requires a voluntary act causing the result, which is intentional and not too different from the
substantive offence
‘Principals cause, accomplices encourage or help... it was because the instigator was not regarded
as causing the crime that the notion of accessories had to be developed... Accessorial liability is, in
the traditional theory, ‘derivative’ from that perpetrator’ (Williams)
D’s role in an offence
D as a principal- D commits the actus reus of the offence with the mens rea
D as a joint-principal- D1 and D2 commit the actus reus of the offence together with the required
mens rea (complicity does not apply)
D as a principal via innocent agency- D uses an innocent party (X) to commit an offence, where X
lacks the mens rea
D as an accomplice- D assists, encourages or procures P to commit an offence and P does so
Joint enterprise
Gnango [2012]- issue of (now abolished) joint enterprise (parasitic accessorial liability)
D engaged in a shootout with ‘Bandana Man’ (P), whose bullet inadvertently strikes and kills
V
D found guilty of murder in the first instance on the basis that D and Pcou were ‘jointly
concerned with an affray and foresaw the chance of murder being committed’
However, the Court of Appeal found that, by shooting at each other, D and P rather had
completely opposite purposes and were thus not engaged in a joint enterprise
