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Direct realism
- Direct realism is a realist theory and thus argues that (1) a mind-independent
external world (and its objects and respective properties) exists
- Direct realism posits that (2) the immediate objects of our perception are
mind-independent physical objects and their properties (inherent or
relational).
- (3) This perception is direct meaning that nothing mediates between the
perceiver and the object of the perceiver’s perception
- Our perception is therefore not mediated by ‘sense-data’ and therefore not
indirect.
- Direct realism claims that my perception is constituted by the physical
processes which take place between the perceiving subject and the
perceived object. Because the physical processes constitute perception they
do not mediate perception (eg by causing sense-data).
- The direct realist claim of directness and immediacy is, however, not a claim
of temporal directness or immediacy, but of metaphysical directness and
immediacy
The argument from illusion
- An illusion is a non-veridical, mind-dependent distortion of the senses such
that what we perceive to be the case does not accurately reflect the
mind-independent external world
- In an illusion, I have a perceptual experience in which an object appears to
possess a property that it does not actually possess (e.g. a straight stick
appears bent in water).
, - The phenomenal principle states that if it appears that there is an object x
with perceptible quality f, then there must be some object x that possesses
perceptible quality f.
- Therefore, if it appears that the stick is bent, then there must be something
that possesses the property of bentness.
- However, the mind-independent stick is not actually bent; therefore, the
thing possessing the property of bentness cannot be the mind-independent
object.
- Therefore, what we directly perceive in an illusion cannot be a
mind-independent physical object.
- Therefore, direct realism is false.
- Illusions and veridical perception are ‘phenomenally indistinguishable’
- The easiest way to explain the phenomenal indistinguishability is by an
ontological similarity between the objects of perception. They must be made
of the same fundamental, common-kind
- Therefore, since the objects we perceive during illusions are most likely
sense-data, it follows that the objects we perceive in any other situation are
also most likely sense-data.
The argument from perceptual variation
- Perceptual variation is the concept that our sensory experience of a
mind-independent object can change depending on the perceptual
conditions, even when the object itself remains completely unchanged
- When I walk around a mind-independent table, what I directly perceive
appears to change colour
- The phenomenal principle states that if it appears that there is an object x
which has the perceptible quality f then there is an object x which possesses
the perceptible quality f
- Therefore, by the phenomenal principle, if it appears that there is something
which changes colour, then there is something which changes colour.
- However, if the table changed colour, the table would have incompatible
properties at the same time
- Therefore, the mind-independent table can’t and didn’t change colour (it
doesn’t change at all) when I walk around it
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Direct realism
- Direct realism is a realist theory and thus argues that (1) a mind-independent
external world (and its objects and respective properties) exists
- Direct realism posits that (2) the immediate objects of our perception are
mind-independent physical objects and their properties (inherent or
relational).
- (3) This perception is direct meaning that nothing mediates between the
perceiver and the object of the perceiver’s perception
- Our perception is therefore not mediated by ‘sense-data’ and therefore not
indirect.
- Direct realism claims that my perception is constituted by the physical
processes which take place between the perceiving subject and the
perceived object. Because the physical processes constitute perception they
do not mediate perception (eg by causing sense-data).
- The direct realist claim of directness and immediacy is, however, not a claim
of temporal directness or immediacy, but of metaphysical directness and
immediacy
The argument from illusion
- An illusion is a non-veridical, mind-dependent distortion of the senses such
that what we perceive to be the case does not accurately reflect the
mind-independent external world
- In an illusion, I have a perceptual experience in which an object appears to
possess a property that it does not actually possess (e.g. a straight stick
appears bent in water).
, - The phenomenal principle states that if it appears that there is an object x
with perceptible quality f, then there must be some object x that possesses
perceptible quality f.
- Therefore, if it appears that the stick is bent, then there must be something
that possesses the property of bentness.
- However, the mind-independent stick is not actually bent; therefore, the
thing possessing the property of bentness cannot be the mind-independent
object.
- Therefore, what we directly perceive in an illusion cannot be a
mind-independent physical object.
- Therefore, direct realism is false.
- Illusions and veridical perception are ‘phenomenally indistinguishable’
- The easiest way to explain the phenomenal indistinguishability is by an
ontological similarity between the objects of perception. They must be made
of the same fundamental, common-kind
- Therefore, since the objects we perceive during illusions are most likely
sense-data, it follows that the objects we perceive in any other situation are
also most likely sense-data.
The argument from perceptual variation
- Perceptual variation is the concept that our sensory experience of a
mind-independent object can change depending on the perceptual
conditions, even when the object itself remains completely unchanged
- When I walk around a mind-independent table, what I directly perceive
appears to change colour
- The phenomenal principle states that if it appears that there is an object x
which has the perceptible quality f then there is an object x which possesses
the perceptible quality f
- Therefore, by the phenomenal principle, if it appears that there is something
which changes colour, then there is something which changes colour.
- However, if the table changed colour, the table would have incompatible
properties at the same time
- Therefore, the mind-independent table can’t and didn’t change colour (it
doesn’t change at all) when I walk around it
