1111901
Does McDowell’s Discussion of the Idea of ‘Conversion’
Offer a Satisfactory Response to Williams’ Explanation Challenge?
Table of contents:
1. Introduction page 3
2. Section 1: Williams’ explanation challenge 3
3. Section 2: McDowell’s discussion of conversion 6
4. Section 3: A satisfactory response? 8
5. Conclusion 12
Bibliography 12
Word count (excluding bibliography): 2,638 words
1
,1111901
Does McDowell’s Discussion of the Idea of ‘Conversion’ Offer a Satisfactory
Response to Williams’ Explanation Challenge?
In order to determine whether McDowell’s discussion of the idea of
‘conversion’ offers a satisfactory response to Williams’ explanation challenge, the
challenge itself must be set in context. Williams’ challenge is designed to refute
reason-externalism, the claim that ‘A has a reason to x’ is not related to A’s
motives1. It does this on the grounds that externalism cannot adequately explain
reasons for action2. McDowell’s discussion of the idea of ‘conversion’ is a response
to this argument, which defends reason-externalism but ultimately has its own
failings. Overall it will be seen that McDowell misses the point of Williams’
challenge, by failing to take the connection between reasons and explanation
seriously, so cannot offer a satisfactory response.
Section 1: Williams’ explanation challenge
Williams’ explanation challenge is designed to support reason-internalism by
showing that reason-externalism cannot plausibly account for reasons for action.
Reason-internalism is the claim that whenever ‘A has a reason to x’ entails that A
has a motive to x3. This contrasts reason-externalism, according to which the claim
1
McDowell, J (1995) pg 70-72
2
Williams, B (1981) pg 102
3
McDowell, J (1995) pg 70-72
2
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whenever ‘A has a reason to x’ is not related to A’s motives.4 For example, a reason-
internalist would say that ‘Tallulah has a reason to write her essay’ entails that
Tallulah has a motive to write her essay, whereas a reason-externalist would make
no such claim. Williams elaborates on reason-internalism by claiming that A can
only have a reason to x if ‘doing x’ can be reached by deliberative reasoning from
elements of A’s subjective motivation set.5 This set consists of desires; ‘dispositions
of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties’ and other such
internal features of A.6 So to say that Tallulah has a reason to write her essay is to
say that Tallulah is motivated to write her essay based on the fact that her subjective
motivational set contains a relevant element, perhaps the desire to do well in her
degree, and she reasons that writing her essay will enable her to achieve this desire.
If she did not have the relevant desire, she would not be motivated to write her essay
and so would not have a reason to. This is what it means for a reason statement to be
internal, and Williams claims that these can be the only kinds of reason statements
concerning action.
The challenge Williams poses to reason-externalism is that external reasons
cannot possibly explain action. Reasons for action intuitively have an explanatory
role; ‘if there are reasons for action, it must be that people sometimes act for those
reasons, and if they do, their reasons must figure in some correct explanation of their
action’.7 For example if Tallulah has a reason to write her essay, this reason must be
able to explain the fact that she goes on to write her essay. Reason-internalism, as
demonstrated, explains this by Tallulah’s deliberation from something in her
4
ibid
5
Williams, B (1995) pg 187
6
Williams, B (1981) pg 105
7
ibid pg 102
3
Does McDowell’s Discussion of the Idea of ‘Conversion’
Offer a Satisfactory Response to Williams’ Explanation Challenge?
Table of contents:
1. Introduction page 3
2. Section 1: Williams’ explanation challenge 3
3. Section 2: McDowell’s discussion of conversion 6
4. Section 3: A satisfactory response? 8
5. Conclusion 12
Bibliography 12
Word count (excluding bibliography): 2,638 words
1
,1111901
Does McDowell’s Discussion of the Idea of ‘Conversion’ Offer a Satisfactory
Response to Williams’ Explanation Challenge?
In order to determine whether McDowell’s discussion of the idea of
‘conversion’ offers a satisfactory response to Williams’ explanation challenge, the
challenge itself must be set in context. Williams’ challenge is designed to refute
reason-externalism, the claim that ‘A has a reason to x’ is not related to A’s
motives1. It does this on the grounds that externalism cannot adequately explain
reasons for action2. McDowell’s discussion of the idea of ‘conversion’ is a response
to this argument, which defends reason-externalism but ultimately has its own
failings. Overall it will be seen that McDowell misses the point of Williams’
challenge, by failing to take the connection between reasons and explanation
seriously, so cannot offer a satisfactory response.
Section 1: Williams’ explanation challenge
Williams’ explanation challenge is designed to support reason-internalism by
showing that reason-externalism cannot plausibly account for reasons for action.
Reason-internalism is the claim that whenever ‘A has a reason to x’ entails that A
has a motive to x3. This contrasts reason-externalism, according to which the claim
1
McDowell, J (1995) pg 70-72
2
Williams, B (1981) pg 102
3
McDowell, J (1995) pg 70-72
2
, 1111901
whenever ‘A has a reason to x’ is not related to A’s motives.4 For example, a reason-
internalist would say that ‘Tallulah has a reason to write her essay’ entails that
Tallulah has a motive to write her essay, whereas a reason-externalist would make
no such claim. Williams elaborates on reason-internalism by claiming that A can
only have a reason to x if ‘doing x’ can be reached by deliberative reasoning from
elements of A’s subjective motivation set.5 This set consists of desires; ‘dispositions
of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties’ and other such
internal features of A.6 So to say that Tallulah has a reason to write her essay is to
say that Tallulah is motivated to write her essay based on the fact that her subjective
motivational set contains a relevant element, perhaps the desire to do well in her
degree, and she reasons that writing her essay will enable her to achieve this desire.
If she did not have the relevant desire, she would not be motivated to write her essay
and so would not have a reason to. This is what it means for a reason statement to be
internal, and Williams claims that these can be the only kinds of reason statements
concerning action.
The challenge Williams poses to reason-externalism is that external reasons
cannot possibly explain action. Reasons for action intuitively have an explanatory
role; ‘if there are reasons for action, it must be that people sometimes act for those
reasons, and if they do, their reasons must figure in some correct explanation of their
action’.7 For example if Tallulah has a reason to write her essay, this reason must be
able to explain the fact that she goes on to write her essay. Reason-internalism, as
demonstrated, explains this by Tallulah’s deliberation from something in her
4
ibid
5
Williams, B (1995) pg 187
6
Williams, B (1981) pg 105
7
ibid pg 102
3
