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The distinction between acquaintance knowledge, ability knowledge and
propositional knowledge
- Zagzebski describes acquaintance knowledge as immediate knowledge of
something gained through direct experience. This form of knowledge
includes awareness of people and objects, as well as one’s own mental
states, which are often considered “the most directly knowable portion of
reality.”
- Ability knowledge is knowledge of how to do something (e.g “I know Karate”
or “I know how to cook”). You do not necessarily need to be able to explain
the mechanics of how you do it to possess the ability. For example, a
professional cyclist might not know the exact physics or muscle mechanics of
balance, but they successfully perform the action.
- Propositional knowledge is that “knowledge-that” (e.g “I know that Karate
involves kicking” or “I know that duck needs to be cooked for more than 1
minute”). Propositional knowledge is known due to a proposition about the
world.
The nature of definition (including Linda Zagzebski) and how propositional
knowledge may be analysed/defined
- Zagzebski posits that different views of knowledge arise from different aims
people have for knowledge.
- For example, a practical definition is intended to help us recognise and
obtain specific instances of knowledge.
- However, it does not explain how “knowledge” is connected to truth and
belief.
- Instead, at least to some extent, a practical definition is traditional and
accepted, depending on how a society chooses to define it.
,- However, those who seeks to establish a necessary truth about what
knowledge is, seek a theoretical definition
- To uncover a necessary truth of what knowledge is, philosophers use
truth-condition analysis which involves defining the concept in terms of
necessary and sufficient conditions
- A necessary condition is something which must be met for X to follow, but
does not guarantee X on its own
- Whereas, a sufficient condition is a something which, if met, means that X
must follow
- Truth-condition analysis involves putting forward proposed conditions for
something to count as knowledge and then testing those conditions by
searching for possible counterexamples.
- A type of theoretical definition is a real definition
- Real definitions describe objective features of reality by identifying the
essential nature of things.
- For example, defining water as H₂O expresses a necessary truth, since
anything that is not H₂O cannot be water.
- Such definitions typically refer to natural kinds - categories that exist
mind-independently in the external world which have a real essence.
- John Locke understands real essence as the deep, objective, structural
properties that make a thing exactly what it is (for example, water is
essentially H₂O)
- Whereas, nominal essence refers to the superficial properties we use to
categorize something based on linguistic convenience (for example, defining
a "weed" simply as an unwanted garden plant).
- Zagzebski maintains that knowledge is fundamentally different from natural
substances, even though philosophers frequently pursue a “real definition of
knowledge,” often without making this aim explicit.
- Zagzebski notes that how humans use the word "knowledge" has shifted so
dramatically across history that it might actually be a socially constructed
concept with only a nominal essence.
- She suggests that “perhaps knowledge is not in an ontological category for
which a real definition is possible.”
, - Despite her skepticism, she argues that we should treat knowledge as if it
has a real essence.
- Philosophers should actively search for a "real definition" containing
necessary and sufficient conditions until they are definitively proven wrong
- To capture this true essence, Zagzebski warns that the desiderata of a
successful definition is that it must avoid four major traps:
- Circularity: A definition must not rely on the term “knowledge” itself or any of
its direct synonyms.
- Obscurity: It should avoid using terms that are more unclear or ambiguous
than the concept of knowledge.
- Negativity: The definition ought to explain what knowledge is, rather than
only stating what it is not (for example, saying “knowledge is not mere
belief”).
- Ad Hoc Adjustments: It should not be artificially modified with extra
conditions added purely to solve specific problems (e.g adding a condition to
overcome a Gettier Case)
The tripartite view
- Zagzebski would argue that the tripartite view is an attempt at
truth-condition analysis to uncover a theoretical definition of knowledge in
terms of necessary and sufficient condition
- Plato defines knowledge in the following way: S knows that P iff: (1) P is true,
(2) S believes that P, (3) S’s belief that P is justified
- This means that these 3 conditions are individually necessary: they must be
met for K to follow, but do not guarantee K on their own
- Truth is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for knowledge because
‘knowledge’ is a ‘success term’ and denotes getting something right rather
than getting something wrong.
- Truth is therefore a necessary condition.
- However, merely uttering a true proposition doesn’t mean that you know it
because you might not understand or accept the truth of the proposition you
are uttering.
- The mere fact that p is true does not entail that S knows it. There must be
some connection (mental relation) between S and p. This relation cannot be
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The distinction between acquaintance knowledge, ability knowledge and
propositional knowledge
- Zagzebski describes acquaintance knowledge as immediate knowledge of
something gained through direct experience. This form of knowledge
includes awareness of people and objects, as well as one’s own mental
states, which are often considered “the most directly knowable portion of
reality.”
- Ability knowledge is knowledge of how to do something (e.g “I know Karate”
or “I know how to cook”). You do not necessarily need to be able to explain
the mechanics of how you do it to possess the ability. For example, a
professional cyclist might not know the exact physics or muscle mechanics of
balance, but they successfully perform the action.
- Propositional knowledge is that “knowledge-that” (e.g “I know that Karate
involves kicking” or “I know that duck needs to be cooked for more than 1
minute”). Propositional knowledge is known due to a proposition about the
world.
The nature of definition (including Linda Zagzebski) and how propositional
knowledge may be analysed/defined
- Zagzebski posits that different views of knowledge arise from different aims
people have for knowledge.
- For example, a practical definition is intended to help us recognise and
obtain specific instances of knowledge.
- However, it does not explain how “knowledge” is connected to truth and
belief.
- Instead, at least to some extent, a practical definition is traditional and
accepted, depending on how a society chooses to define it.
,- However, those who seeks to establish a necessary truth about what
knowledge is, seek a theoretical definition
- To uncover a necessary truth of what knowledge is, philosophers use
truth-condition analysis which involves defining the concept in terms of
necessary and sufficient conditions
- A necessary condition is something which must be met for X to follow, but
does not guarantee X on its own
- Whereas, a sufficient condition is a something which, if met, means that X
must follow
- Truth-condition analysis involves putting forward proposed conditions for
something to count as knowledge and then testing those conditions by
searching for possible counterexamples.
- A type of theoretical definition is a real definition
- Real definitions describe objective features of reality by identifying the
essential nature of things.
- For example, defining water as H₂O expresses a necessary truth, since
anything that is not H₂O cannot be water.
- Such definitions typically refer to natural kinds - categories that exist
mind-independently in the external world which have a real essence.
- John Locke understands real essence as the deep, objective, structural
properties that make a thing exactly what it is (for example, water is
essentially H₂O)
- Whereas, nominal essence refers to the superficial properties we use to
categorize something based on linguistic convenience (for example, defining
a "weed" simply as an unwanted garden plant).
- Zagzebski maintains that knowledge is fundamentally different from natural
substances, even though philosophers frequently pursue a “real definition of
knowledge,” often without making this aim explicit.
- Zagzebski notes that how humans use the word "knowledge" has shifted so
dramatically across history that it might actually be a socially constructed
concept with only a nominal essence.
- She suggests that “perhaps knowledge is not in an ontological category for
which a real definition is possible.”
, - Despite her skepticism, she argues that we should treat knowledge as if it
has a real essence.
- Philosophers should actively search for a "real definition" containing
necessary and sufficient conditions until they are definitively proven wrong
- To capture this true essence, Zagzebski warns that the desiderata of a
successful definition is that it must avoid four major traps:
- Circularity: A definition must not rely on the term “knowledge” itself or any of
its direct synonyms.
- Obscurity: It should avoid using terms that are more unclear or ambiguous
than the concept of knowledge.
- Negativity: The definition ought to explain what knowledge is, rather than
only stating what it is not (for example, saying “knowledge is not mere
belief”).
- Ad Hoc Adjustments: It should not be artificially modified with extra
conditions added purely to solve specific problems (e.g adding a condition to
overcome a Gettier Case)
The tripartite view
- Zagzebski would argue that the tripartite view is an attempt at
truth-condition analysis to uncover a theoretical definition of knowledge in
terms of necessary and sufficient condition
- Plato defines knowledge in the following way: S knows that P iff: (1) P is true,
(2) S believes that P, (3) S’s belief that P is justified
- This means that these 3 conditions are individually necessary: they must be
met for K to follow, but do not guarantee K on their own
- Truth is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for knowledge because
‘knowledge’ is a ‘success term’ and denotes getting something right rather
than getting something wrong.
- Truth is therefore a necessary condition.
- However, merely uttering a true proposition doesn’t mean that you know it
because you might not understand or accept the truth of the proposition you
are uttering.
- The mere fact that p is true does not entail that S knows it. There must be
some connection (mental relation) between S and p. This relation cannot be
