Critically evaluate the threat posed by Islamist terrorism in the
Southeast Asian region. (2500 words)
Islamist terrosim has been portrayed by some as a growing threat in Southeast Asia due to
increased Islamist mobilisation, however this essay will argue that the threat posed by
Islamist terrorism is overstated. It will demonstrate that the growing fear of Islamist terroism
is not ideological but largely due to media portrayals and language, as well as a tendency to
conflate political Islam with extremism. It will look at Islamist mobilisation in both Indonesia
and the Philippines and highlight how Islamist mobilisation in Indonesia was strategic and
instrumentalised for elite interests, as well look at episodes of Islamist violence in the
Philippines and debunk the idea that it arises due to ideological radicalisation but rather long
standing marginalisation. Overall, this essay will demonstrate that the threat posed by
Islamist terrosim in Southeast Asia is exaggerated through discourse and remains
empirically localised and constrained highlighting a limited threat.
One of the main reasons why the threat posed by Islamist terrorism in Southeast Asia is
exaggerated is due to the common tendency to conflate political Islam with violent extremism
in media and policy discourse. Hadiz and Khoo (2011) approach this idea from a political
economy perspective, and found that Islamist politics should not be fully understood by
doctrine and ideology, but how it functions politically in the context of societal changes such
as Cold War aftermath and evolution of post colonial states, capitalist transformations, and
economic crises (Hadiz and Khoo, 2011: 463). They move from looking at the religion itself
to structural causes and agendas that lead to the rise of political Islam and reject the idea
that Islamist mobilisation reflects Islamic terrorism. Their idea is supported by Hamilton-Hart
(2005), who states that “fantasy and myopia characterize much of the field” (Hamilton-Hart,
2005: 304), arguing how the threat of Islamist terrorism is largely exaggerated and
overstated due to unreliable depictions of Islam. She looks at how Islam is framed within
expert analysis and literature that use terms such as “radical”, “militant”, and “extremist” to
associate Islam with terrorism (Hamilton-Hart, 2005: 311). This analytical language
characterises Islam as dangerous and obscures politics by providing a distorted framing of
political Islam as inherently violent and extreme, despite the empirical low threat of Islamist
terrorism in Southeast Asia. It deliberately works to combine political Islam with violent
extremism by using these concepts interchangeably to create an atmosphere of danger and
heighten people’s fears by portraying Islam as threatening. Looking through Hadiz and
Khoo’s (2011) political economy perspective, this radical language around political Islam
serves political interests by framing political Islam as a threat and problem because of the
, increased islamist mobilisation, rather than addressing people’s concerns and frustration
about injustice and government failure.
The threat of Islamist terrosim is inflated through language and media framing that looks to
entice fear and portray Islam as inherently violent without using evidence. This is seen in
Indonesia’s 2017 Jakarta election where Basuki Purnama Tjahaja also known as Ahok,
assumed governorship, but faced backlash after being accused of blasphemy in his
campaign leading to large Islamist led protests against him (Hutchison and Ian, 2020: 280).
Portrayals of this election differ across media platforms, meaning that media portrayals of
Islam are not neutral and based on evidence but heavily contingent on the narrative
demands of the story being written. Hamilton-Hart (2005: 312) points out that media also
places Muslims into categories of “moderate” and “radical” which unfairly categorises all
Muslims to be either liberal and moderate, or instead radical and dangerous, framing
anything that is not seen as “moderate” as terrorism and extremism despite there being no
real threat. A major driver of fear surrounding Islam due to the language and literature that
portray Islam as threatening and radical. These representations are not neutral but reflect
strategic choices and political interests about portrayals of Islam. An example of this is seen
in two BBC articles of the 2017 Jakarta election in Indonesia, where one introduces the new
governor Anies Baswedan as a “respected academic” and “moderate Muslim” (BBC News,
2017a), whilst the other written only a month apart writes that Ahok “lost the vote to
conservative Muslim candidate Anies Rasyid Baswedan” (BBC News, 2017b). This
contradiction supports what Hamilton- Hart (2005) is arguing as both articles place
Baswedan in different categories depending on their narrative needs, demonstrating how
this idea of “moderate” and/or “radical” are not strong analytical categories but rather used in
a way to frame someone as more of a threat, or safe based on the categories they are given.
The portrayal of Baswedan as both “moderate” and “conservative” can be used as evidence
to show how media framings can easily exaggerate the threat of Islamist terrorism through
the way events are framed by emphasising religious identity and security concerns rather
than empirical reality. The concepts of “moderate” and “conservative” Muslims are not fixed
categories but externally constructed and imposed by media framing, and cannot be used as
factual evidence of an Islamist threat. The analysis by these scholars helps explain why
people conflate political Islam with Islamic terrorism due to the misinterpretation of Islamist
politics. Rather than viewing Islamist politics as ideological extremism, Hadiz and Khoo
(2011) conceptualise political Islamic through a political economy lens which others ignore,
whilst Hamilton- Hart (2005) highlights the importance of radicalised language in the framing
of Islam.
Southeast Asian region. (2500 words)
Islamist terrosim has been portrayed by some as a growing threat in Southeast Asia due to
increased Islamist mobilisation, however this essay will argue that the threat posed by
Islamist terrorism is overstated. It will demonstrate that the growing fear of Islamist terroism
is not ideological but largely due to media portrayals and language, as well as a tendency to
conflate political Islam with extremism. It will look at Islamist mobilisation in both Indonesia
and the Philippines and highlight how Islamist mobilisation in Indonesia was strategic and
instrumentalised for elite interests, as well look at episodes of Islamist violence in the
Philippines and debunk the idea that it arises due to ideological radicalisation but rather long
standing marginalisation. Overall, this essay will demonstrate that the threat posed by
Islamist terrosim in Southeast Asia is exaggerated through discourse and remains
empirically localised and constrained highlighting a limited threat.
One of the main reasons why the threat posed by Islamist terrorism in Southeast Asia is
exaggerated is due to the common tendency to conflate political Islam with violent extremism
in media and policy discourse. Hadiz and Khoo (2011) approach this idea from a political
economy perspective, and found that Islamist politics should not be fully understood by
doctrine and ideology, but how it functions politically in the context of societal changes such
as Cold War aftermath and evolution of post colonial states, capitalist transformations, and
economic crises (Hadiz and Khoo, 2011: 463). They move from looking at the religion itself
to structural causes and agendas that lead to the rise of political Islam and reject the idea
that Islamist mobilisation reflects Islamic terrorism. Their idea is supported by Hamilton-Hart
(2005), who states that “fantasy and myopia characterize much of the field” (Hamilton-Hart,
2005: 304), arguing how the threat of Islamist terrorism is largely exaggerated and
overstated due to unreliable depictions of Islam. She looks at how Islam is framed within
expert analysis and literature that use terms such as “radical”, “militant”, and “extremist” to
associate Islam with terrorism (Hamilton-Hart, 2005: 311). This analytical language
characterises Islam as dangerous and obscures politics by providing a distorted framing of
political Islam as inherently violent and extreme, despite the empirical low threat of Islamist
terrorism in Southeast Asia. It deliberately works to combine political Islam with violent
extremism by using these concepts interchangeably to create an atmosphere of danger and
heighten people’s fears by portraying Islam as threatening. Looking through Hadiz and
Khoo’s (2011) political economy perspective, this radical language around political Islam
serves political interests by framing political Islam as a threat and problem because of the
, increased islamist mobilisation, rather than addressing people’s concerns and frustration
about injustice and government failure.
The threat of Islamist terrosim is inflated through language and media framing that looks to
entice fear and portray Islam as inherently violent without using evidence. This is seen in
Indonesia’s 2017 Jakarta election where Basuki Purnama Tjahaja also known as Ahok,
assumed governorship, but faced backlash after being accused of blasphemy in his
campaign leading to large Islamist led protests against him (Hutchison and Ian, 2020: 280).
Portrayals of this election differ across media platforms, meaning that media portrayals of
Islam are not neutral and based on evidence but heavily contingent on the narrative
demands of the story being written. Hamilton-Hart (2005: 312) points out that media also
places Muslims into categories of “moderate” and “radical” which unfairly categorises all
Muslims to be either liberal and moderate, or instead radical and dangerous, framing
anything that is not seen as “moderate” as terrorism and extremism despite there being no
real threat. A major driver of fear surrounding Islam due to the language and literature that
portray Islam as threatening and radical. These representations are not neutral but reflect
strategic choices and political interests about portrayals of Islam. An example of this is seen
in two BBC articles of the 2017 Jakarta election in Indonesia, where one introduces the new
governor Anies Baswedan as a “respected academic” and “moderate Muslim” (BBC News,
2017a), whilst the other written only a month apart writes that Ahok “lost the vote to
conservative Muslim candidate Anies Rasyid Baswedan” (BBC News, 2017b). This
contradiction supports what Hamilton- Hart (2005) is arguing as both articles place
Baswedan in different categories depending on their narrative needs, demonstrating how
this idea of “moderate” and/or “radical” are not strong analytical categories but rather used in
a way to frame someone as more of a threat, or safe based on the categories they are given.
The portrayal of Baswedan as both “moderate” and “conservative” can be used as evidence
to show how media framings can easily exaggerate the threat of Islamist terrorism through
the way events are framed by emphasising religious identity and security concerns rather
than empirical reality. The concepts of “moderate” and “conservative” Muslims are not fixed
categories but externally constructed and imposed by media framing, and cannot be used as
factual evidence of an Islamist threat. The analysis by these scholars helps explain why
people conflate political Islam with Islamic terrorism due to the misinterpretation of Islamist
politics. Rather than viewing Islamist politics as ideological extremism, Hadiz and Khoo
(2011) conceptualise political Islamic through a political economy lens which others ignore,
whilst Hamilton- Hart (2005) highlights the importance of radicalised language in the framing
of Islam.
