How far could the historian make use of Sources 3 and 4 together to investigate the
problems associated with foreign intervention in Russia after the Bolshevik takeover?
When using sources three and four in conjunction, historians are able to gain an effective
view of the problems associated with foreign intervention in Russia during the Russian Civil
War.
Within source three, written by a British Diplomat, historians are able to see the tensions
that existed over foreign intervention, which was highly controversial among both British
politicians and the British public. Even more so than the debate over whether such
intervention should go ahead or not, was the issue of whether or not ‘such assistance
should be open or secret’, this directly links to concerns over the scale of which the
interventionist forces would be launched, with Churchill advocating for large-scale
intervention capable of altering the course of the Civil War; while this was repudiated at
large as being unfeasible due to funds and resources, which were already stretched fighting
World War one, forcing the allies to lead only a small number of interventionist troops into
Russia. The depiction of the current events of Russia as written in the 22 nd of December
1917 report is given credibility due to its form, that being a confidential report to the British
government by a British Diplomat- as a result of this the historian can see that the author of
the source was writing with the intention of providing an accurate, true-to-reality depiction
of the Russian Civil War, rather than writing for personal benefit, such as the memoir of
source four. Despite concerns of its nature, the above point are corroborated in source four,
wherein it is shown that while ‘rumour abounded that the allies had sent up to 100,000
men’, it is shown that ultimately only fewer 1,200 men were sent to Archangel, with later on
their being only 10,000 men sent to the White-sea, 1,000 to the South, and 1,000 to Siberia.
The small-scale size of the interventionist powers forces in Russia following the Bolshevik
takeover, were inevitable, as aforementioned, due to the World War, which demanded the
focus of troops and supplies, and it is the small-scale of the interventionists that was shown
to be one of the key problems of the interventionist forces in Russia as a whole.
As a result of their small-scale approach, the interventionist powers were unable to be
effective in their efforts to aid the anti-Bolshevik forces in the Russian Civil War, this is
shown throughout both sources. Within source four it is posited that ‘in the absence of a
strong lead from the Allies, the various counter-revolutionary groups began to quarrel and
argue among themselves’, this too is reflective of one of the most prominent issues of
interventionist involvement in Russia following the Bolshevik takeover, that being that the
White Army Forces were highly disorganised and corrupt and were unable to cooperate
effectively with Interventionist forces as a consequence of this. The Interventionist forces
aims of removing the Bolsheviks were greatly hindered by the in-fighting and disordered
nature of the Anti-Bolshevik forces, while the Red Army, numbering at five million, was
highly disciplined, the White Army forces existed in fragments across the expanses of Russia,
each with a separate leader vying for their own power, such as Yudenich, Deniken, and
Kolchak- who while having military experience was not suited to leadership and was
incapable of taking criticism or advice. Gradually, the interventionist forces grew frustrated
with the nature of the White Forces, in their corruption and ineffectiveness, resulting in the
problems associated with foreign intervention in Russia after the Bolshevik takeover?
When using sources three and four in conjunction, historians are able to gain an effective
view of the problems associated with foreign intervention in Russia during the Russian Civil
War.
Within source three, written by a British Diplomat, historians are able to see the tensions
that existed over foreign intervention, which was highly controversial among both British
politicians and the British public. Even more so than the debate over whether such
intervention should go ahead or not, was the issue of whether or not ‘such assistance
should be open or secret’, this directly links to concerns over the scale of which the
interventionist forces would be launched, with Churchill advocating for large-scale
intervention capable of altering the course of the Civil War; while this was repudiated at
large as being unfeasible due to funds and resources, which were already stretched fighting
World War one, forcing the allies to lead only a small number of interventionist troops into
Russia. The depiction of the current events of Russia as written in the 22 nd of December
1917 report is given credibility due to its form, that being a confidential report to the British
government by a British Diplomat- as a result of this the historian can see that the author of
the source was writing with the intention of providing an accurate, true-to-reality depiction
of the Russian Civil War, rather than writing for personal benefit, such as the memoir of
source four. Despite concerns of its nature, the above point are corroborated in source four,
wherein it is shown that while ‘rumour abounded that the allies had sent up to 100,000
men’, it is shown that ultimately only fewer 1,200 men were sent to Archangel, with later on
their being only 10,000 men sent to the White-sea, 1,000 to the South, and 1,000 to Siberia.
The small-scale size of the interventionist powers forces in Russia following the Bolshevik
takeover, were inevitable, as aforementioned, due to the World War, which demanded the
focus of troops and supplies, and it is the small-scale of the interventionists that was shown
to be one of the key problems of the interventionist forces in Russia as a whole.
As a result of their small-scale approach, the interventionist powers were unable to be
effective in their efforts to aid the anti-Bolshevik forces in the Russian Civil War, this is
shown throughout both sources. Within source four it is posited that ‘in the absence of a
strong lead from the Allies, the various counter-revolutionary groups began to quarrel and
argue among themselves’, this too is reflective of one of the most prominent issues of
interventionist involvement in Russia following the Bolshevik takeover, that being that the
White Army Forces were highly disorganised and corrupt and were unable to cooperate
effectively with Interventionist forces as a consequence of this. The Interventionist forces
aims of removing the Bolsheviks were greatly hindered by the in-fighting and disordered
nature of the Anti-Bolshevik forces, while the Red Army, numbering at five million, was
highly disciplined, the White Army forces existed in fragments across the expanses of Russia,
each with a separate leader vying for their own power, such as Yudenich, Deniken, and
Kolchak- who while having military experience was not suited to leadership and was
incapable of taking criticism or advice. Gradually, the interventionist forces grew frustrated
with the nature of the White Forces, in their corruption and ineffectiveness, resulting in the
