Week 1: The EU in a Critical Juncture
Russian War
The image of the EU as an effective external power was changed by the Russian war. The return of
power politics woke the EU up, they need to do more than just security and defense.
Critical juncture
→ short time when actors can make key decisions that set new trajectories.
● Fundamental factors get transformed (power distribution)
● Changes are triggered by shock, shifting these factors
The EU is at a critical juncture because we live in a period of change. This can be defined by the
theory of historical institutionalism, it's a turning point in EU history.
● A tectonic shift in the defense attitude of the EU because of fewer neutral states and
increased commitment
● Germany’s increasing military spending of>2% reflects a new level of ambition
Areas to strengthen the EU as a geopolitical union
1. Enlargement: expanding the EU
2. Reduce unanimity: foreign policy has a veto right, and more vetoes are necessary to expand
3. Sovereignty of EU: ending of dependencies in raw materials on Russia and China
4. Synergy in defense activities: strengthen defense decision-making on the RRF
5. New solutions to old conflicts: migration, Schengen zone, financial
6. EU’s rule of law: EU funds payments should be compliant with the rule of law, and Article 7
proceedings should not be blocked by veto. Weakness in foreign policy
7. Solidarity: A stable EU needs to pay attention to how citizens undergo the transitions
Strategic Autonomy
→ The capacity of the EU to act autonomously in strategically important areas, evolving over periods
with different goals.
2013-2016: security and defense capabilities
2017-2019: safeguarding EU interest in a challenging global environment, economic competition
China
2019-2022: reducing dependency on China in key supply chains
SA form: act without interference. Reduce US dependence to act without the US in military matters.
SA to act: having the capacity to act in the global arena. Capacity to make decisions to protect the
EU.
EU’s Strategic Autonomy after the Russian invasion
● Achieving Strategic Autonomy is limited by the dependence on the US for security.
● Need for qualified openness to address economic and technological policies.
● Risk of economic interdependence: the EU can use its ability to leverage economic ties for
political goals through sanctions
● No concrete penalties for the Russian invasion shows the need for the EU to enhance its
political and coordinative capacities
Brussels affects
Firms trading internationally find that it is not economically, legally or technically practical to maintain
lower standards in non-EU markets. Non-EU companies exporting globally can find it beneficial to
uniformly adopt standards set in Brussels throughout their business.
● Companies outside the EU need to follow EU legislation, so higher standards become
adopted throughout the world. Makes it a race to the top.
, Strategic Compass
→ Differs from SA, reflection and seeking consensus on a joint threat assessment. It is the way for the
EU to take its fate into their own hands.
● Map of EU as a security provider, implementation of the defense and security dimension of
the EU’s Global Strategy. They are operational guidelines to enable the EU to become a more
full-fledged security provider.
● Compass identified the challenges of security and defense:
○ Authority in security and defense is limited
○ No military spending budget, instead the European Peace Facility
○ New doctrine of economic openness
○ Reassessing economic interdependence
○ Developing EU sanctions policy
○ European support for Green transition and recovery
● Four aspects are discussed within the SC:
1. Crisis Management (Act)
- Agreements on the EU rapid deployment capacity and operational scenarios
- Command structures must be redesigned
- European Peace Facility to finance partners
2. Resilience (Security Union): domestic terrorist threats
- Boost intelligence capacities
- EU hybrid toolbox to prevent foreign manipulation and interference
3. Capability development (Invest): defense on plains and same standards
- Increase spending on capability development and planning
- Use of PESCO and EDF to develop military capabilities
4. International cooperation (Partner): EU’s way of securing itself
- Reinforce strategic partnerships and increase cooperation with regional and
bilateral partners
- Develop EU security and defense partnership
● The compass makes no clear distinction between war and peace, only different domains:
○ Cyber, Weaponizing migration, Technology, and Vaccines
● Two different dynamics:
1. Bipolarity between the US and China affects geopolitics: Competition arises when the
EU wants to be a unanimous actor, need for less dependency on US and China.
2. Multipolarity and strategic competition: the weaponization of interdependence
Critical assessment of the SC:
● Unprecedented to conduct a common threat assessment between the 27 MS
● Preparation was too long which led to the elimination of big ideas
● Problems of intergovernmental decision-making for the CSDP and the Compass
● Lowest common denominator
● Was revised because of the ‘22 war:
○ Greater unity of purpose motivated by the war, reinforced regional focus
○ MS need to defend the European Security Order
○ Intensified the focus on hybrid and cyber threats
1. Capacity to act: Unanimous decision-making on defense limits the flexibility of the EU
coalitions of the willing.
2. Strategic Autonomy: Only vaguely mentioned in the SC, does raise questions about what the
EU should undertake if partners like the US and NARO choose not to engage.
3. Coordinated Spending: Concerns about uncoordinated increases in spending.
Russian War
The image of the EU as an effective external power was changed by the Russian war. The return of
power politics woke the EU up, they need to do more than just security and defense.
Critical juncture
→ short time when actors can make key decisions that set new trajectories.
● Fundamental factors get transformed (power distribution)
● Changes are triggered by shock, shifting these factors
The EU is at a critical juncture because we live in a period of change. This can be defined by the
theory of historical institutionalism, it's a turning point in EU history.
● A tectonic shift in the defense attitude of the EU because of fewer neutral states and
increased commitment
● Germany’s increasing military spending of>2% reflects a new level of ambition
Areas to strengthen the EU as a geopolitical union
1. Enlargement: expanding the EU
2. Reduce unanimity: foreign policy has a veto right, and more vetoes are necessary to expand
3. Sovereignty of EU: ending of dependencies in raw materials on Russia and China
4. Synergy in defense activities: strengthen defense decision-making on the RRF
5. New solutions to old conflicts: migration, Schengen zone, financial
6. EU’s rule of law: EU funds payments should be compliant with the rule of law, and Article 7
proceedings should not be blocked by veto. Weakness in foreign policy
7. Solidarity: A stable EU needs to pay attention to how citizens undergo the transitions
Strategic Autonomy
→ The capacity of the EU to act autonomously in strategically important areas, evolving over periods
with different goals.
2013-2016: security and defense capabilities
2017-2019: safeguarding EU interest in a challenging global environment, economic competition
China
2019-2022: reducing dependency on China in key supply chains
SA form: act without interference. Reduce US dependence to act without the US in military matters.
SA to act: having the capacity to act in the global arena. Capacity to make decisions to protect the
EU.
EU’s Strategic Autonomy after the Russian invasion
● Achieving Strategic Autonomy is limited by the dependence on the US for security.
● Need for qualified openness to address economic and technological policies.
● Risk of economic interdependence: the EU can use its ability to leverage economic ties for
political goals through sanctions
● No concrete penalties for the Russian invasion shows the need for the EU to enhance its
political and coordinative capacities
Brussels affects
Firms trading internationally find that it is not economically, legally or technically practical to maintain
lower standards in non-EU markets. Non-EU companies exporting globally can find it beneficial to
uniformly adopt standards set in Brussels throughout their business.
● Companies outside the EU need to follow EU legislation, so higher standards become
adopted throughout the world. Makes it a race to the top.
, Strategic Compass
→ Differs from SA, reflection and seeking consensus on a joint threat assessment. It is the way for the
EU to take its fate into their own hands.
● Map of EU as a security provider, implementation of the defense and security dimension of
the EU’s Global Strategy. They are operational guidelines to enable the EU to become a more
full-fledged security provider.
● Compass identified the challenges of security and defense:
○ Authority in security and defense is limited
○ No military spending budget, instead the European Peace Facility
○ New doctrine of economic openness
○ Reassessing economic interdependence
○ Developing EU sanctions policy
○ European support for Green transition and recovery
● Four aspects are discussed within the SC:
1. Crisis Management (Act)
- Agreements on the EU rapid deployment capacity and operational scenarios
- Command structures must be redesigned
- European Peace Facility to finance partners
2. Resilience (Security Union): domestic terrorist threats
- Boost intelligence capacities
- EU hybrid toolbox to prevent foreign manipulation and interference
3. Capability development (Invest): defense on plains and same standards
- Increase spending on capability development and planning
- Use of PESCO and EDF to develop military capabilities
4. International cooperation (Partner): EU’s way of securing itself
- Reinforce strategic partnerships and increase cooperation with regional and
bilateral partners
- Develop EU security and defense partnership
● The compass makes no clear distinction between war and peace, only different domains:
○ Cyber, Weaponizing migration, Technology, and Vaccines
● Two different dynamics:
1. Bipolarity between the US and China affects geopolitics: Competition arises when the
EU wants to be a unanimous actor, need for less dependency on US and China.
2. Multipolarity and strategic competition: the weaponization of interdependence
Critical assessment of the SC:
● Unprecedented to conduct a common threat assessment between the 27 MS
● Preparation was too long which led to the elimination of big ideas
● Problems of intergovernmental decision-making for the CSDP and the Compass
● Lowest common denominator
● Was revised because of the ‘22 war:
○ Greater unity of purpose motivated by the war, reinforced regional focus
○ MS need to defend the European Security Order
○ Intensified the focus on hybrid and cyber threats
1. Capacity to act: Unanimous decision-making on defense limits the flexibility of the EU
coalitions of the willing.
2. Strategic Autonomy: Only vaguely mentioned in the SC, does raise questions about what the
EU should undertake if partners like the US and NARO choose not to engage.
3. Coordinated Spending: Concerns about uncoordinated increases in spending.
