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Lecture Notes Games and Strategic Interactions | Psychology 590032-B-6 | Tilburg |

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Voorbeeld 4 van de 60 pagina's

Lecture notes from Psychology course 590032-B-6 at Tilburg University . Full lecture notes for Economic Psychology Major course 'Games and Strategic Interactions'

Voorbeeld van de inhoud

LECTURE 1
What is interdependence?
●​ People are interdependent when their actions influence not just their own welfare, but
also the welfare of others
●​ Interdependence: situations where people’s actions influence own welfare and
welfare of others
●​ Control over own and others outcomes
●​ Consequences for others → own actions and decisions affect others
●​ Consequences of others → others actions and decisions affect us
○​ Working in a team, group project – if everyone puts effort it makes the job
easier for everyone, if someone doesn’t put effort it makes it harder for
everyone
○​ In relationships – each partners behavior influences the other and vice versa
●​ Outcome is not only monetary, also → health, happiness, quality of life, grade
●​ Interdependence occurs almost always in social situations
●​ Very low or no interdependence in individual settings
○​ when reading a book, low interdependence
Analysis of a Situation
1.​ Who does the dishes in a household, how it affects the welfare of each other
2.​ Situations where people have to cooperate to achieve a greater goal
3.​ Penalty kick, how people guess the correct kick
4.​ In risky situations, how people choose risk or compromise

1. Who is doing the dishes?
Welfare of roomates
●​ Two people choose to wash or not wash dishes
●​ Welfare represented as thumbs up or down




●​ If they do dishes together → cooperate, share load → moderately happy
○​ one big thumbs up
●​ If one does it and the second doesn’t → first not happy did everything, second very
happy got results without doing anything
○​ double thumbs down or up
●​ If none of them do it → moderately sad, bothered
Games
●​ Transfer abstract situations to payoffs (value)
●​ Values represent any welfare outcome: happiness, points, money, time
●​ Converting welfare to numbers allows us to model social situations as ‘games’

,Why ‘games’?
●​ Game theory → simple social and strategic interactions are formalized
●​ Using concepts like ‘players’, ‘strategies’, ‘payoff’ to analyze them
●​ Social situations = playing games
●​ In lab outcomes transformed into financial payoffs based on parameters
●​ How?
1.​ Identify the actors
2.​ Identify the actions of each actor
3.​ Identify the outcome for each actions and action combination
More complex ‘games’
●​ More complex interactions
○​ more actors
○​ more payoffs
○​ more players
Prisoner’s Dilemma – models cooperation
●​ How people make decisions when their outcomes depend on what someone else
does
●​ Two people are arrested for a crime and questioned separately
●​ Each have two choices
○​ Stay silent (cooperate with the other person)
○​ Betray the other (confess)
●​ If both stay silent → both get a light sentence
●​ If one betray, other stays silent → one goes free, other gets heavy sentence
○​ vice versa
●​ If both betray → both get medium sentence
●​ In this context – higher scores relate to worse outcomes
Intuition on cooperation captured by Prisoners Dilemma (Dishes dilemma)
1.​ Cooperation is mutually beneficial
- we are both better off if we choose ‘wash’
2.​ Exploiting cooperation can be rewarding
- if I choose ‘no’ and you choose ‘wash’ I am better off
3.​ Cooperative relationship is risky
- risk of being exploited when i choose ‘wash’ and you choose ‘no’

●​ Dilemma captures costly cooperation: to benefit the other person i need to sacrifice
something
●​ Cooperation (wash)
○​ sacrifice 1 utility point (go from 3 to 2)
○​ so other person can get 2 utility points (from 0 to 2)
●​ Defection (do not wash) → tempting
○​ highest reward for self and no benefit for other person

●​ By changing the parameters (but keeping structure the same) cooperation can be
more or less appealing
○​ if i have to give up more it becomes less appealing to cooperate
Models Cooperation
●​ Nuclear disarmament
●​ Working on group projects

, ●​ Doping in sports


LECTURE 2
Interdependence
●​ People are interdependent when their actions influence their welfare, and that of
others
●​ Outcome/ welfare: money, happiness, health, quality of life, grade, etc.
Analysis of Social Situations as ‘Games’
●​ Take complex situations and model into relatively simple games
●​ Identify actors
●​ Identify actions of each actor
●​ Identify the outcome for each action
●​ Analyze what the ‘rational’ thing to do for each actor
●​ Identify unique states (equilibrium, pareto principle)
Stag Hunt Game – Conflict between Safety and Cooperation
●​ Me and friend go hunting
○​ go for stag - big . requires both, needs cooperation
○​ go for hare - small - enough to hunt by oneself, no need for cooperation
●​ During the game cannot reach friend, so which one do we go for?
○​ Cooperation gets better outcome (2)
○​ Individual is the safe option (1)
○​ if both go for reward, both get reward but not as big
●​ If there is no trust in partner → no cooperation, choosing individual option




Intuition on Safety vs Cooperation captured by Stag Hunt
1.​ Cooperation is mutually beneficial – both get more if we both hunt the stag
2.​ Cooperation is risky – if i commit to the stag and you don’t, i get nothing
3.​ Not cooperating is safe, but modest outcome – if i’m not sure you will cooperate, i
can always catch a Hare
Models
●​ Adopting new technologies or standards
●​ Starting a new start-up
●​ Protests
→ situations where people want to deviate and take risk but need other people to
also cooperate got i to be successful, worth it
Where there is no temptation to defect, will people still cooperate?
●​ In prisoners dilemma – might defect even if you trust the other person to cooperate
○​ defect because of high monetary value (3 instead of 2)
●​ In stag hunt – only defect if you do not trust the other person to cooperate
○​ no reason to defect if you trust other person, because you get high outcome
by cooperating

, Prisoner’s Dilemma Defecting
●​ Defecting always better than cooperating, no matter what the other does
●​ Mutual defection is worse than mutual cooperation
Stag Hunt Defection
●​ Cooperating is better if the other cooperates
●​ Defecting is better if the other defects
●​ There is no temptation, only uncertainty about what the other will do




Would people ‘not trust’ in Stag Hunt Game?
Loss of avoidance in selection principle: Evidence from simple stag-hunt games
●​ Participants played different versions of stag games
●​ In the original game almost 80% participants choose Cooperation
●​ Other games show similar levels of cooperation
Prisoner’s Dilemma vs Stag Hunt
●​ Compare games:
●​ Not cooperating in PD gives higher rewards
○​ the payoff of 7 to defect in ‘strong PD’ vs 3 in ‘SH’ is what explains the
difference between the games
○​ temptation to defect vs lack of trust
●​ Not cooperating in Stug gives less rewards
○​ the payoff of 7 to defect in ‘strong PD’ vs 5 in ‘weak PD’ is what explains the
difference between these games
○​ more vs less temptation to defect




●​
●​ In stag hunt – high levels of cooperation
●​ In weak PD – middle levels of cooperation
●​ In strong PD – little levels of cooperation
Human: played with one randomly matched person in the room
Phantom: played with one randomly matched choice from the past data in the human
condition
→ No difference for human or phantom
●​ When there is temptation to not cooperate → temptation wins
Chicken game – models conflict vs compromise
●​ In conflicts, who makes the compromise?
●​ Models a conflict or compromise dilemma
●​ Two parties: which one compromises and what is the result?
○​ The chicken and the winner
Chicken Game:

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