When Diversion Fails: Why Tokdemir & Klein’s Model Misguides
Policy in Nigeria’s 2014–2016 Boko Haram Crisis
Crisis and Security Management MSc, Leiden University, Dr. J.M. Hoye
Security:
Actors, Institutions, and Constellations
An Argumentative Paper
S3715930
02-12-2025
1496 Words
, 2
Between 2014 and 2016, Nigeria faced economic collapse and escalating Boko Haram
violence. This paper advises the Nigerian Federal Government and derives policy guidance from
Tokdemir and Klein’s diversionary-conflict model, which predicts that economic decline creates
incentives for governments to intensify counterterrorism because terrorist groups are expected to
reduce violence in anticipation. I argue that following this advice is misguided: Boko Haram did
not behave as a strategic conflict-avoiding actor, causing the model’s predicted interaction
sequence to fail in this context.
Between 2014 and 2016, Nigeria suffered a severe economic shock following a collapse
in global oil prices. As crude oil accounted for over 70% of government revenue (BBC News,
2016, p. 1), the plunge in prices produced a severe fiscal shock, rapid Naira depreciation, rising
inflation, and ultimately a recession by early 2016 (ADB, 2015, p. 3; Saldarriaga et al., 2022, p.
12). Public finances contracted, foreign reserves declined, and unemployment rose, collectively
eroding state capacity and confidence.
During this economic downturn, the terrorist group Boko Haram under Abubakar Shekau
intensified dramatically. Between 2014 and 2015 Boko Haram expanded territorial control in
northeast Nigeria and captured towns and staged high-profile attacks like the widely condemned
2014 abduction of schoolgirls in Chibok (Cold-Ravnkilde & Plambech, 2015, p. 32). While the
Nigerian security forces did not manage to respond effectively at first, they did manage to push
Boko Haram back to Lake Chad (Cold-Ravnkilde & Plambech, 2015, p. 32; ICG, 2019, p. 1).
This confluence of economic crisis, declining state capacity, and escalating insurgent
violence creates a tightly constrained empirical context, ideal for testing whether the
diversionary-conflict logic theory of Tokdemir and Klein plausibly applies to the Nigerian
federal government during 2014-2016
Tokdemir and Klein develop a rational-choice model explaining how economic hardship
reshapes strategic interaction between governments and domestic terrorist groups. Building on
the diversionary conflict tradition, they argue that when economic performance deteriorates,
governments experience declining legitimacy and stronger incentives to use force to divert public
attention and reassert competence (2021, pp. 742-744). Domestic terrorist groups are especially
Policy in Nigeria’s 2014–2016 Boko Haram Crisis
Crisis and Security Management MSc, Leiden University, Dr. J.M. Hoye
Security:
Actors, Institutions, and Constellations
An Argumentative Paper
S3715930
02-12-2025
1496 Words
, 2
Between 2014 and 2016, Nigeria faced economic collapse and escalating Boko Haram
violence. This paper advises the Nigerian Federal Government and derives policy guidance from
Tokdemir and Klein’s diversionary-conflict model, which predicts that economic decline creates
incentives for governments to intensify counterterrorism because terrorist groups are expected to
reduce violence in anticipation. I argue that following this advice is misguided: Boko Haram did
not behave as a strategic conflict-avoiding actor, causing the model’s predicted interaction
sequence to fail in this context.
Between 2014 and 2016, Nigeria suffered a severe economic shock following a collapse
in global oil prices. As crude oil accounted for over 70% of government revenue (BBC News,
2016, p. 1), the plunge in prices produced a severe fiscal shock, rapid Naira depreciation, rising
inflation, and ultimately a recession by early 2016 (ADB, 2015, p. 3; Saldarriaga et al., 2022, p.
12). Public finances contracted, foreign reserves declined, and unemployment rose, collectively
eroding state capacity and confidence.
During this economic downturn, the terrorist group Boko Haram under Abubakar Shekau
intensified dramatically. Between 2014 and 2015 Boko Haram expanded territorial control in
northeast Nigeria and captured towns and staged high-profile attacks like the widely condemned
2014 abduction of schoolgirls in Chibok (Cold-Ravnkilde & Plambech, 2015, p. 32). While the
Nigerian security forces did not manage to respond effectively at first, they did manage to push
Boko Haram back to Lake Chad (Cold-Ravnkilde & Plambech, 2015, p. 32; ICG, 2019, p. 1).
This confluence of economic crisis, declining state capacity, and escalating insurgent
violence creates a tightly constrained empirical context, ideal for testing whether the
diversionary-conflict logic theory of Tokdemir and Klein plausibly applies to the Nigerian
federal government during 2014-2016
Tokdemir and Klein develop a rational-choice model explaining how economic hardship
reshapes strategic interaction between governments and domestic terrorist groups. Building on
the diversionary conflict tradition, they argue that when economic performance deteriorates,
governments experience declining legitimacy and stronger incentives to use force to divert public
attention and reassert competence (2021, pp. 742-744). Domestic terrorist groups are especially
