CLASS 2 – ACTUS REUS (ACTS AND OMISSIONS)
Fagan v Commissioner of Metropolitan Police [1969] 1 QB 439
1) The legal basis of which Fagan appealed against his conviction (that he did not
assault the police officer with intention so not against the Police Act 1964 s.51
(1)) was that the initial mounting of the wheel could not be an assault; that the
act of mounting the foot came to an end without any mens rea and that,
accordingly, there was no act done by the defendant which could constitute an
actus reus. (THE PROBLEM OF TEMPORAL COINCIDENCE)
2) It was contended for the appellant that David Morris was uncertain that the
appellant deliberately mounted the wheel of his vehicle on to his foot. To
establish the charge of assault the prosecution must prove that it was deliberate
on the appellant's part. The incident might have been accidental. The sole
question is whether the prosecution proved facts which in law amounted to an
assault.
3) James J. argues alongside other lawyers that where an assault involves a battery,
it matters not, in our judgment, whether the battery is inflicted directly by the
body of the offender or through the medium of some weapon or instrument
controlled by the action of the offender. An assault may be committed by the
laying of a hand upon another, and the action does not cease to be an assault if it
is a stick held in the hand and not the hand itself which is laid on the person of
the victim. So for our part we see no difference in principle between the action of
stepping on to a person's toe and maintaining that position and the action of
driving a car on to a person's foot and sitting in the car whilst its position on the
foot is maintained.
In opposition, Bridge J. argues ‘It is in the application of these principles to the
highly unusual facts of this case that I have, with regret, reached a different
conclusion from the majority of the court.’ After the wheel of the appellant's car
had accidentally come to rest on the constable's foot, what was it that the
appellant did which constituted the act of assault? However the question is
approached, the answer I feel obliged to give is: precisely nothing. The car rested
on the foot by its own weight and, remained stationary by its own inertia. The
appellant's fault was that he omitted to manipulate the controls to set it in
motion again.
4) Personally the majority view is more convincing because it simply was not an
accident. The car and wheel remained stationery thanks to Fagan and his
‘disgraceful behaviour’. Actus reus AND Mens rea came together to show that he
intended to commit the act that would directly injure the policeman, with further
evidence when considering how he told him to ‘fuck off’ and can ‘stay there’. The
policeman tried to tell him to get off yet Fagan did not until afterward.
DPP v Santana-Bermudez [2003] EWHC 2908
1) Held, allowing the appeal, that where someone, by act or word or a combination of
the two, created a danger and thereby exposed another to a reasonably foreseeable
risk of injury that materialised, there was an evidential basis for the actus reus of an
Fagan v Commissioner of Metropolitan Police [1969] 1 QB 439
1) The legal basis of which Fagan appealed against his conviction (that he did not
assault the police officer with intention so not against the Police Act 1964 s.51
(1)) was that the initial mounting of the wheel could not be an assault; that the
act of mounting the foot came to an end without any mens rea and that,
accordingly, there was no act done by the defendant which could constitute an
actus reus. (THE PROBLEM OF TEMPORAL COINCIDENCE)
2) It was contended for the appellant that David Morris was uncertain that the
appellant deliberately mounted the wheel of his vehicle on to his foot. To
establish the charge of assault the prosecution must prove that it was deliberate
on the appellant's part. The incident might have been accidental. The sole
question is whether the prosecution proved facts which in law amounted to an
assault.
3) James J. argues alongside other lawyers that where an assault involves a battery,
it matters not, in our judgment, whether the battery is inflicted directly by the
body of the offender or through the medium of some weapon or instrument
controlled by the action of the offender. An assault may be committed by the
laying of a hand upon another, and the action does not cease to be an assault if it
is a stick held in the hand and not the hand itself which is laid on the person of
the victim. So for our part we see no difference in principle between the action of
stepping on to a person's toe and maintaining that position and the action of
driving a car on to a person's foot and sitting in the car whilst its position on the
foot is maintained.
In opposition, Bridge J. argues ‘It is in the application of these principles to the
highly unusual facts of this case that I have, with regret, reached a different
conclusion from the majority of the court.’ After the wheel of the appellant's car
had accidentally come to rest on the constable's foot, what was it that the
appellant did which constituted the act of assault? However the question is
approached, the answer I feel obliged to give is: precisely nothing. The car rested
on the foot by its own weight and, remained stationary by its own inertia. The
appellant's fault was that he omitted to manipulate the controls to set it in
motion again.
4) Personally the majority view is more convincing because it simply was not an
accident. The car and wheel remained stationery thanks to Fagan and his
‘disgraceful behaviour’. Actus reus AND Mens rea came together to show that he
intended to commit the act that would directly injure the policeman, with further
evidence when considering how he told him to ‘fuck off’ and can ‘stay there’. The
policeman tried to tell him to get off yet Fagan did not until afterward.
DPP v Santana-Bermudez [2003] EWHC 2908
1) Held, allowing the appeal, that where someone, by act or word or a combination of
the two, created a danger and thereby exposed another to a reasonably foreseeable
risk of injury that materialised, there was an evidential basis for the actus reus of an
