Foreign policy sources
With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical
context, assess the value of these three sources to an historian studying
the improved relations between the USA and China in the years 1971/72.
Source A
Source A is a speech delivered by US president Richard Nixon to the
Congress in February 1971, and it was the policy of the United States at
the beginning of the détente with China. The address is important
because it explains the reasons for the US stance against the People's
Republic of China after twenty years of confrontation. Nixon’s focus on the
environment of the Cold War is especially interesting as he points out the
“intense and dangerous conflict” which exists between China and the
Soviet Union, which the United States aimed to capitalize through its
policy of containment of Soviet expansion. Nixon makes clear that Russia’s
role in the Cold War is less prominent than the others by insisting that the
US cannot afford to neglect the possibilities of potential Sino-American
relations. Also, his sophistic statement shows the strategy of the United
States trying to be diplomatically careful where it wanted to seek China’s
cooperation but not accept its hegemony or subservience. It is this
complicated situation that shows diplomacy during the cold war and the
rational motives behind the American policy towards China.
I can see you’re trying to say this shows the USA’s geopolitical
motivations but you have not expressed yourself very clearly.
Nonetheless, as a speech directed at Congress and the American people,
it is fairly self-limiting and makes a weak case. The focus is proudly to sell
Americans on Nixon’s foreign policies rather than to give a precise or
detailed history of the relations between the United States and China. As a
result, it might downplay some of the more practical or self-interested
reasons for the US outreach, such as the need to counter the Soviet Union
or the attempt to maximize US position during Vietnam talks. In addition,
the source is biased and does not incorporate the views of China, nor the
measures that Beijing undertook at the beginning of the détente. Also, the
total absence of any mention of the diplomatic moves or concessions
being contemplated by the Nixon administration decreases has no further
analytical value for the understanding the practical side of the US-China
negotiations.
With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical
context, assess the value of these three sources to an historian studying
the improved relations between the USA and China in the years 1971/72.
Source A
Source A is a speech delivered by US president Richard Nixon to the
Congress in February 1971, and it was the policy of the United States at
the beginning of the détente with China. The address is important
because it explains the reasons for the US stance against the People's
Republic of China after twenty years of confrontation. Nixon’s focus on the
environment of the Cold War is especially interesting as he points out the
“intense and dangerous conflict” which exists between China and the
Soviet Union, which the United States aimed to capitalize through its
policy of containment of Soviet expansion. Nixon makes clear that Russia’s
role in the Cold War is less prominent than the others by insisting that the
US cannot afford to neglect the possibilities of potential Sino-American
relations. Also, his sophistic statement shows the strategy of the United
States trying to be diplomatically careful where it wanted to seek China’s
cooperation but not accept its hegemony or subservience. It is this
complicated situation that shows diplomacy during the cold war and the
rational motives behind the American policy towards China.
I can see you’re trying to say this shows the USA’s geopolitical
motivations but you have not expressed yourself very clearly.
Nonetheless, as a speech directed at Congress and the American people,
it is fairly self-limiting and makes a weak case. The focus is proudly to sell
Americans on Nixon’s foreign policies rather than to give a precise or
detailed history of the relations between the United States and China. As a
result, it might downplay some of the more practical or self-interested
reasons for the US outreach, such as the need to counter the Soviet Union
or the attempt to maximize US position during Vietnam talks. In addition,
the source is biased and does not incorporate the views of China, nor the
measures that Beijing undertook at the beginning of the détente. Also, the
total absence of any mention of the diplomatic moves or concessions
being contemplated by the Nixon administration decreases has no further
analytical value for the understanding the practical side of the US-China
negotiations.
