Hassan [2005] UK HL 22 [2005] The Rationale Facts: A claimed a drug dealer
2 W.L.R. 709 [17] per Lord with a reputation for violence
Bingham had threatened that he and his
family would be harmed if he
did not carry out the burglary.
The dealer was the boyfriend
of his employer, who ran an
escort agency and was
involved in prostitution.
Denied duress - the accused's
voluntary association with
others engaged in criminal
activity he foresaw or ought
reasonably to have foreseen
the risk of being subjected to
any compulsion by threats of
violence.
“there has, since the 14th
century, been a recognised but
limited exception in favour of
those who commit crimes
because they are forced or
compelled to do so against
their will by the threats of
another”. [17]
Graham [1982] 1 WLR 294 Components “Was the defendant, or may he
[300] per Lord Hailsham have been, impelled to act as
he did because, as a result of
what he reasonably believed
[E] had said or done, he had
good cause to fear that if he
did not so act [E] would kill
him ,or … caused serious
physical injury. If so, have the
prosecution made the jury
sure that a sober person of
reasonable firmness, sharing
the characteristics of the
defendant, would not have
responded to whatever he
reasonably believed [E] said or
did by taking part in the
killing? The fact that a
defendant’s will to resist has
been eroded by the voluntary
consumption of drink or drugs
or both is not relevant to this
test.”
Willer Types – duress of Facts: The appellant had been
(1986) 83 Cr. App. R. 225 circumstances convicted of reckless driving.
As he drove up a narrow road
, he was confronted with a gang
of shouting and brawling
youths. He heard one of them
shouting, "I'll kill you Willer"
and another threatening to kill
his passenger. He stopped and
tried to turn the car around.
The youths surrounded him.
They banged on the car. The
appellant mounted the
pavement in order to escape.
Denied duress of
circumstances but later his
conviction was quashed – so
duress can arise out of
circumstances.
Conway [1989] QB 290 [1988] Types – duress of A passenger in D's car, T, had
3 W.L.R. 1238 circumstances previously been the target of
an attack with a shotgun.
When two plainclothes police
officers approached D's car, he
feared that T was about to be
shot at again. He drove off and
the officers gave chase. D
claimed he only discovered
that the chasers were police
officers after T had been
dropped off and the officers
caught up with him. Convicted
of reckless driving. Appeal
allowed – should’ve been
allowed to plead duress of
circumstances.
Howe [1987] A.C. 417 [1987] Elements/Parameters of In the first appeal, A and B
2 W.L.R. 568 Duress – what it doesn’t apply were taken to a desolate place
to by X, together with the victim.
A, B and X assaulted the
victim, and X killed him. On
another occasion, A and B
strangled their victim. On a
further occasion, their victim
escaped. A and B were charged
on two counts of murder and
one count of conspiracy to
murder. Their defence was
duress in that they feared for
their own lives from X. The
judge left that defence on the
first murder, and the
conspiracy, but not on the
second. In the second appeal,
2 W.L.R. 709 [17] per Lord with a reputation for violence
Bingham had threatened that he and his
family would be harmed if he
did not carry out the burglary.
The dealer was the boyfriend
of his employer, who ran an
escort agency and was
involved in prostitution.
Denied duress - the accused's
voluntary association with
others engaged in criminal
activity he foresaw or ought
reasonably to have foreseen
the risk of being subjected to
any compulsion by threats of
violence.
“there has, since the 14th
century, been a recognised but
limited exception in favour of
those who commit crimes
because they are forced or
compelled to do so against
their will by the threats of
another”. [17]
Graham [1982] 1 WLR 294 Components “Was the defendant, or may he
[300] per Lord Hailsham have been, impelled to act as
he did because, as a result of
what he reasonably believed
[E] had said or done, he had
good cause to fear that if he
did not so act [E] would kill
him ,or … caused serious
physical injury. If so, have the
prosecution made the jury
sure that a sober person of
reasonable firmness, sharing
the characteristics of the
defendant, would not have
responded to whatever he
reasonably believed [E] said or
did by taking part in the
killing? The fact that a
defendant’s will to resist has
been eroded by the voluntary
consumption of drink or drugs
or both is not relevant to this
test.”
Willer Types – duress of Facts: The appellant had been
(1986) 83 Cr. App. R. 225 circumstances convicted of reckless driving.
As he drove up a narrow road
, he was confronted with a gang
of shouting and brawling
youths. He heard one of them
shouting, "I'll kill you Willer"
and another threatening to kill
his passenger. He stopped and
tried to turn the car around.
The youths surrounded him.
They banged on the car. The
appellant mounted the
pavement in order to escape.
Denied duress of
circumstances but later his
conviction was quashed – so
duress can arise out of
circumstances.
Conway [1989] QB 290 [1988] Types – duress of A passenger in D's car, T, had
3 W.L.R. 1238 circumstances previously been the target of
an attack with a shotgun.
When two plainclothes police
officers approached D's car, he
feared that T was about to be
shot at again. He drove off and
the officers gave chase. D
claimed he only discovered
that the chasers were police
officers after T had been
dropped off and the officers
caught up with him. Convicted
of reckless driving. Appeal
allowed – should’ve been
allowed to plead duress of
circumstances.
Howe [1987] A.C. 417 [1987] Elements/Parameters of In the first appeal, A and B
2 W.L.R. 568 Duress – what it doesn’t apply were taken to a desolate place
to by X, together with the victim.
A, B and X assaulted the
victim, and X killed him. On
another occasion, A and B
strangled their victim. On a
further occasion, their victim
escaped. A and B were charged
on two counts of murder and
one count of conspiracy to
murder. Their defence was
duress in that they feared for
their own lives from X. The
judge left that defence on the
first murder, and the
conspiracy, but not on the
second. In the second appeal,
