PVL3703
Assignment 1 Semester 1 2025
Unique #:
Due Date: 2025
Detailed solutions, explanations, workings
and references.
+27 81 278 3372
, QUESTION 1 (3 ANSWERS PROVIDED)
In the law of delict, conduct is a voluntary human act or omission. For an act to be
legally recognized as conduct, it must be voluntary, meaning that the person must
be able to control their bodily movements through their will. Automatism, as a
defense, negates this requirement by arguing that the conduct was involuntary.
However, the success of this defense depends on whether the defendant
negligently or intentionally placed themselves in a state of automatism.
In Molefe v Mahaeng (431/96) [1998] ZASCA 81, the court established that the
onus is on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted voluntarily. Similarly, in S
v Victor 1970 (1) SA 427 (RA), the court held that a person suffering from
epileptic seizures could be found liable if they had prior knowledge of their
condition and failed to take reasonable precautions to prevent harm.
In Lethabo’s case, he suffers from epileptic fits, a condition that may cause
involuntary conduct. While driving a forklift, he suffered a seizure, resulting in an
accident that injured Zanele. However, it later emerged that Lethabo failed to take
his prescribed medication, which was meant to control his seizures.
This omission is significant because of the principle of actio libera in causa, which
holds that a person cannot rely on automatism if they negligently or intentionally
placed themselves in that state. Since Lethabo was aware of his condition and
the necessity of his medication, a reasonable person in his position would have
foreseen the risk of a seizure and taken precautions to prevent harm. His failure
to take his medication amounts to culpable conduct, as seen in Victor’s case,
where the defendant was held liable despite experiencing an epileptic fit.
Although the immediate act of losing control of the forklift was involuntary, the
voluntary omission—his failure to take medication—led to the harmful
consequence. According to Van der Merwe and Olivier, prior voluntary acts that
contribute to harm may still constitute conduct in delict, even if the final act itself
was involuntary. Thus, Lethabo’s failure to take his medication can be regarded
as the relevant voluntary conduct.
Since automatism does not exclude prior voluntary conduct that led to harm,
Lethabo’s failure to take medication constitutes a voluntary omission.
Varsity Cube 2024 +27 81 278 3372
Assignment 1 Semester 1 2025
Unique #:
Due Date: 2025
Detailed solutions, explanations, workings
and references.
+27 81 278 3372
, QUESTION 1 (3 ANSWERS PROVIDED)
In the law of delict, conduct is a voluntary human act or omission. For an act to be
legally recognized as conduct, it must be voluntary, meaning that the person must
be able to control their bodily movements through their will. Automatism, as a
defense, negates this requirement by arguing that the conduct was involuntary.
However, the success of this defense depends on whether the defendant
negligently or intentionally placed themselves in a state of automatism.
In Molefe v Mahaeng (431/96) [1998] ZASCA 81, the court established that the
onus is on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted voluntarily. Similarly, in S
v Victor 1970 (1) SA 427 (RA), the court held that a person suffering from
epileptic seizures could be found liable if they had prior knowledge of their
condition and failed to take reasonable precautions to prevent harm.
In Lethabo’s case, he suffers from epileptic fits, a condition that may cause
involuntary conduct. While driving a forklift, he suffered a seizure, resulting in an
accident that injured Zanele. However, it later emerged that Lethabo failed to take
his prescribed medication, which was meant to control his seizures.
This omission is significant because of the principle of actio libera in causa, which
holds that a person cannot rely on automatism if they negligently or intentionally
placed themselves in that state. Since Lethabo was aware of his condition and
the necessity of his medication, a reasonable person in his position would have
foreseen the risk of a seizure and taken precautions to prevent harm. His failure
to take his medication amounts to culpable conduct, as seen in Victor’s case,
where the defendant was held liable despite experiencing an epileptic fit.
Although the immediate act of losing control of the forklift was involuntary, the
voluntary omission—his failure to take medication—led to the harmful
consequence. According to Van der Merwe and Olivier, prior voluntary acts that
contribute to harm may still constitute conduct in delict, even if the final act itself
was involuntary. Thus, Lethabo’s failure to take his medication can be regarded
as the relevant voluntary conduct.
Since automatism does not exclude prior voluntary conduct that led to harm,
Lethabo’s failure to take medication constitutes a voluntary omission.
Varsity Cube 2024 +27 81 278 3372
