UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA (UNISA)
College of Law
⋄
Law of Delict
Assignment 01 — Semester 2, 2026
⋄
Module Code: PVL3703
Module Name: Law of Delict
Assignment No.: 01
Due Date: 1 September 2026
Semester: Semester 2, 2026
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for Law of Delict
at the University of South Africa.
, UNISA | PVL3703 Conduct as an Element of Delict
Question 1: Whether Ricky’s Behaviour Constitutes Conduct for the Purposes of Delict
Conduct is the first of the five general requirements for delictual liability, the others being
wrongfulness, fault, causation and damage.1 The question at this stage is narrow: did Ricky
perform an act, in the wide sense that the law recognises, before any enquiry into whether
that act was wrongful or blameworthy begins. The scenario raises this issue squarely, be-
cause Ricky did nothing physically to the scaffolding at all. He simply left the site knowing
that it had not been fully secured.
1.1 The Legal Meaning of Conduct
Conduct is defined as a voluntary human act or omission.2 Three elements are packed into
this definition, and each must be tested against the facts.
First, conduct must be that of a human being. An animal cannot act for the purposes of the
law of delict, although where a person uses an animal as an instrument, the person’s own act
of directing or inciting the animal is what counts as conduct.3 This element is not in dispute
here. Ricky is a natural person, and it is his own failure to act, not the conduct of a third party
or a thing, that is under scrutiny.
Second, conduct may take the form of a positive act, a commissio, or a failure to act, an omis-
sio.4 The distinction does not turn on which form is more serious. It turns only on whether
the person moved his body to bring something about, or whether he refrained from moving
his body when the law regards that inaction as legally significant. Both forms satisfy the
conduct requirement equally; the omissio is simply subject to a further, later enquiry at the
wrongfulness stage into whether a legal duty to act existed, since liability for an omission is
more restricted than liability for a positive act.5 That later enquiry, however, has no bearing on
whether conduct as such is present.
Third, the act or omission must be voluntary, meaning that it must be susceptible to control
by the actor’s will.6 Voluntariness requires only that the person had the mental and physical
capacity to control the relevant muscular movements. It does not require that the person
1
Neethling J and Potgieter JM, Law of Delict (8th edn, LexisNexis 2020) 4–5.
2
Neethling and Potgieter (n 1) 27.
3
Jooste v Minister of Police 1975 (1) SA 349 (E); Chetty v Minister of Police 1976 (2) SA 450 (N).
4
Neethling and Potgieter (n 1) 30–31.
5
Neethling and Potgieter (n 1) 31–32.
6
Neethling and Potgieter (n 1) 28.
Page 1 of 6
College of Law
⋄
Law of Delict
Assignment 01 — Semester 2, 2026
⋄
Module Code: PVL3703
Module Name: Law of Delict
Assignment No.: 01
Due Date: 1 September 2026
Semester: Semester 2, 2026
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for Law of Delict
at the University of South Africa.
, UNISA | PVL3703 Conduct as an Element of Delict
Question 1: Whether Ricky’s Behaviour Constitutes Conduct for the Purposes of Delict
Conduct is the first of the five general requirements for delictual liability, the others being
wrongfulness, fault, causation and damage.1 The question at this stage is narrow: did Ricky
perform an act, in the wide sense that the law recognises, before any enquiry into whether
that act was wrongful or blameworthy begins. The scenario raises this issue squarely, be-
cause Ricky did nothing physically to the scaffolding at all. He simply left the site knowing
that it had not been fully secured.
1.1 The Legal Meaning of Conduct
Conduct is defined as a voluntary human act or omission.2 Three elements are packed into
this definition, and each must be tested against the facts.
First, conduct must be that of a human being. An animal cannot act for the purposes of the
law of delict, although where a person uses an animal as an instrument, the person’s own act
of directing or inciting the animal is what counts as conduct.3 This element is not in dispute
here. Ricky is a natural person, and it is his own failure to act, not the conduct of a third party
or a thing, that is under scrutiny.
Second, conduct may take the form of a positive act, a commissio, or a failure to act, an omis-
sio.4 The distinction does not turn on which form is more serious. It turns only on whether
the person moved his body to bring something about, or whether he refrained from moving
his body when the law regards that inaction as legally significant. Both forms satisfy the
conduct requirement equally; the omissio is simply subject to a further, later enquiry at the
wrongfulness stage into whether a legal duty to act existed, since liability for an omission is
more restricted than liability for a positive act.5 That later enquiry, however, has no bearing on
whether conduct as such is present.
Third, the act or omission must be voluntary, meaning that it must be susceptible to control
by the actor’s will.6 Voluntariness requires only that the person had the mental and physical
capacity to control the relevant muscular movements. It does not require that the person
1
Neethling J and Potgieter JM, Law of Delict (8th edn, LexisNexis 2020) 4–5.
2
Neethling and Potgieter (n 1) 27.
3
Jooste v Minister of Police 1975 (1) SA 349 (E); Chetty v Minister of Police 1976 (2) SA 450 (N).
4
Neethling and Potgieter (n 1) 30–31.
5
Neethling and Potgieter (n 1) 31–32.
6
Neethling and Potgieter (n 1) 28.
Page 1 of 6
