Draft copy for American Psychologist, 1996, 51, 496-503.
Psychological Science in Cultural Context*
• Kenneth J. Gergen, Swarthmore College
• Andrew Lock Massey, University
• Aydan Gulerce, Bogazici University
• Gerishwar Misra, University of Delhi
For the psychological sciences cultural processes have traditionally served as but a
single entry into a considerable list of "phenomena under study." Until recent
years, such study has not been richly realized. There are many reasons for the
secondary role of a culturally focused psychology. Most prominently, there are
two chief ways in which culture figures in the logic of psychological science, and
neither of these favors a major professional investment. If one views cultures in
terms of a field of differences, then culture largely serves the same scientific role
as the study of personality, that is, as a moderator or qualifier for theoretical
propositions of a more general scope. Thus, the vigorous scientist will propose a
general theory (potentially true for all human organisms) of learning, motivation,
memory, perception or the like, in which case cultural variations serve only to
qualify the character of the process in varying contexts. Typically, because of the
greater scientific stakes in documenting the general as opposed to the particular,
cultural variations are either de-emphasized or simply bracketed for "later study."
In the second mode of study, culture furnishes the proving ground for the
universality of the general theory. Thus, for example, a host of investigators has
sought to demonstrate the universality of emotional categories. On this model,
culture itself is of secondary interest; cultural distinctiveness is but an impediment
to achieving the broader goal of research.
Although a sturdy and expanding band of psychologists have nevertheless
generated volumes of research on cultural universals and variations (see for
example, Berry et. al, 1992; Triandis and Berry, 1980), others have begun to
explore the limits to the traditional view of psychology and culture. For example,
some are drawn to a vision of a culturally sensitive psychology as a site for the
study of the relationship between universal process and cultural rule systems (see
for example, Eckensberger, 1994). Others see the primary task of the culturally
concerned psychologist as elucidating processes of interculturation - how cultures
conflict and reconfigure through interaction (see, for example, Denoux, 1992).
Still others see the primary challenge as more practical in character. Rather than
working toward abstract theoretical formulations, the culturally engaged
psychologist might help to appraise various problems of health, environment,
industrial development and the like in terms of the values, beliefs and motives
particular to the culture at hand (see, for example, Moghaddam, 1987; Pandey,
1988). Such efforts are useful in exploring the possibilities for a unique role for
cross-cultural psychology, and draw special attention to the needs for more
,interpretive and more practical orientations to the research process.
Interestingly, these deliberations on alternatives have not grown primarily out of
North American soil. As many see it, they reflect the misgivings of myriad
scholars in non-American, non-Western, and/or Third World locales, and
particularly their doubts about the implicit presumption that 1) there is a
universally acceptable conception of psychological science, and/or 2) all cultures
should emulate psychology as practiced in North America. Such discontent has
become increasingly vocal in recent years. For example, Sinha (1990) has
questioned the predominance of "vertical collaboration," that is, of psychologists
from developing countries working on research initiated by investigators in
developed nations; he proposes "horizontal collaboration" among researchers
working on practical problems across various regions of a country or with those in
other developing nations. Moghaddam (1987) has outlined the attempt of many
European psychologists to develop a psychology that is distinctively rooted in
European culture. Kagitcibasi (1986) has pointed to the way in which Western
individualism has important biasing effects on social psychological theory. Misra
and Gergen (1993) have explored important limitations of North American
theories and research practices when imported into the Indian cultural context.
In the expression of such doubts, the profession of psychology is relatively
conservative. As a contrast, in cultural anthropology there is enormous concern
over the tendency of western anthropology to construct other cultures in terms
saturated with western ideals and preconceptions, to exploit other cultures by
using them for ends that are solely tied to local western interests, and colonizing
other cultures through the exportation of western ideas, values and practices (see
for example, Clifford, 1988; Fabian, 1983; Marcus, 1986). Similar discontents are
manifest in various geographical area studies. For example, in his now classic
work, Orientalism, Said (1978) proposes that research in "Oriental Studies"
reflects the presumption of western superiority, and operates as a self-serving
projection of the investigators'conceptions.
There is much to be said for healthy dissent, and reflexive deliberation on the
taken-for-granted assumptions of the profession. However, perhaps the most
important test of the critical impulse is in terms of its capacity to generate
alternative courses of action, to enrich the discipline and the world it serves in
important ways. It is to this end that we direct the remainder of this offering.
For many of us there is no more dramatic form of critical reflection than that
stemming from an inversion of psychology's traditional subject-object dichotomy.
That is, rather than privileging the psychologist as the scrutinizing subject for
whom culture serves as the object of study, we find it most fully liberating to
place culture in the vanguard. Let us begin with culture, as variously lived by each
of us, and place psychology under scrutiny. In this case we may ask, in what
degree and with what effects is psychological science itself a cultural
manifestation? Beginning in this way, it is immediately apparent that the science
is largely a byproduct of the western cultural tradition at a particular time in its
, historical development. Suppositions about the nature of knowledge, the character
of objectivity, the place of value in the knowledge generating process, and the
nature of linguistic representation, for example, all carry the stamp of a unique
cultural tradition. Most interestingly, the character of psychological science is
informed by a priori suppositions concerning the nature of human psychology
itself (Gergen, 1994). That is, the science is based on certain assumptions
concerning the psychological functioning of the individual scientist; without these
assumptions the science as we know it would fail to be intelligible. It is presumed,
for example, that the scientist possesses a conscious or observing mind, capable of
reflecting and recording the nature of a world external to it; that the scientist
possesses powers of inductive and deductive logic; and that the scientist also
harbors motives and values that, without safeguards, can obscure observation and
interfere with logical processes. All of these grounding assumptions are
constituents of a western ethnopsychology (see Heelas and Lock, 1981).
In what follows we wish to give fuller voice to specific cultural standpoints.
Speaking from disparate cultural backgrounds and disparate histories of culturally
sensitive study, we explore a range of problems provoked by the presumption of a
universal science of psychology. However, rather than resting secure in critique,
we also begin to explore the benefits for psychology when culture is given
primacy.
Toward Indigenous Indian Psychology (Girishwar Misra)
The discipline of psychology as practiced in India is primarily based on the
knowledge and know-how imported from the Euro-American tradition within the
context of the more general exportation of Western knowledge and education (D.
Sinha, 1986). As such Indian psychology began its journey by imitating the
research problems, concepts, theories and methods borrowed from the research
done in western countries. Being the recipient, it was subordinated to the donor
country. The colonial condition of India led to gross neglect and avoidance of the
Indian intellectual and cultural tradition central to the practices of the Indian
people. The academic world maintained a distance from its cultural heritage and
looked down at it with suspicion. The colonial incursion was so powerful that
while western concepts were accepted and welcomed without scrutiny, indigenous
concepts were denied entry to the academic discourse. Since the discipline was
imitative, its growth remained always one step behind the developments in the
donor country.
Unlike the West, psychology in India did not grow as an integral part of the
evolutionary process. Training by British or American psychologists coupled with
the colonial influence produced a strong tendency in the academy to engage in a
practice of culture blind psychology. Surprisingly enough this did not create
discontent, as researchers were generally confident that they were contributing to
the cumulatively growing pool of universal knowledge. Thus, deviations were
treated as errors and the problems and issues were filtered through the scientific
Psychological Science in Cultural Context*
• Kenneth J. Gergen, Swarthmore College
• Andrew Lock Massey, University
• Aydan Gulerce, Bogazici University
• Gerishwar Misra, University of Delhi
For the psychological sciences cultural processes have traditionally served as but a
single entry into a considerable list of "phenomena under study." Until recent
years, such study has not been richly realized. There are many reasons for the
secondary role of a culturally focused psychology. Most prominently, there are
two chief ways in which culture figures in the logic of psychological science, and
neither of these favors a major professional investment. If one views cultures in
terms of a field of differences, then culture largely serves the same scientific role
as the study of personality, that is, as a moderator or qualifier for theoretical
propositions of a more general scope. Thus, the vigorous scientist will propose a
general theory (potentially true for all human organisms) of learning, motivation,
memory, perception or the like, in which case cultural variations serve only to
qualify the character of the process in varying contexts. Typically, because of the
greater scientific stakes in documenting the general as opposed to the particular,
cultural variations are either de-emphasized or simply bracketed for "later study."
In the second mode of study, culture furnishes the proving ground for the
universality of the general theory. Thus, for example, a host of investigators has
sought to demonstrate the universality of emotional categories. On this model,
culture itself is of secondary interest; cultural distinctiveness is but an impediment
to achieving the broader goal of research.
Although a sturdy and expanding band of psychologists have nevertheless
generated volumes of research on cultural universals and variations (see for
example, Berry et. al, 1992; Triandis and Berry, 1980), others have begun to
explore the limits to the traditional view of psychology and culture. For example,
some are drawn to a vision of a culturally sensitive psychology as a site for the
study of the relationship between universal process and cultural rule systems (see
for example, Eckensberger, 1994). Others see the primary task of the culturally
concerned psychologist as elucidating processes of interculturation - how cultures
conflict and reconfigure through interaction (see, for example, Denoux, 1992).
Still others see the primary challenge as more practical in character. Rather than
working toward abstract theoretical formulations, the culturally engaged
psychologist might help to appraise various problems of health, environment,
industrial development and the like in terms of the values, beliefs and motives
particular to the culture at hand (see, for example, Moghaddam, 1987; Pandey,
1988). Such efforts are useful in exploring the possibilities for a unique role for
cross-cultural psychology, and draw special attention to the needs for more
,interpretive and more practical orientations to the research process.
Interestingly, these deliberations on alternatives have not grown primarily out of
North American soil. As many see it, they reflect the misgivings of myriad
scholars in non-American, non-Western, and/or Third World locales, and
particularly their doubts about the implicit presumption that 1) there is a
universally acceptable conception of psychological science, and/or 2) all cultures
should emulate psychology as practiced in North America. Such discontent has
become increasingly vocal in recent years. For example, Sinha (1990) has
questioned the predominance of "vertical collaboration," that is, of psychologists
from developing countries working on research initiated by investigators in
developed nations; he proposes "horizontal collaboration" among researchers
working on practical problems across various regions of a country or with those in
other developing nations. Moghaddam (1987) has outlined the attempt of many
European psychologists to develop a psychology that is distinctively rooted in
European culture. Kagitcibasi (1986) has pointed to the way in which Western
individualism has important biasing effects on social psychological theory. Misra
and Gergen (1993) have explored important limitations of North American
theories and research practices when imported into the Indian cultural context.
In the expression of such doubts, the profession of psychology is relatively
conservative. As a contrast, in cultural anthropology there is enormous concern
over the tendency of western anthropology to construct other cultures in terms
saturated with western ideals and preconceptions, to exploit other cultures by
using them for ends that are solely tied to local western interests, and colonizing
other cultures through the exportation of western ideas, values and practices (see
for example, Clifford, 1988; Fabian, 1983; Marcus, 1986). Similar discontents are
manifest in various geographical area studies. For example, in his now classic
work, Orientalism, Said (1978) proposes that research in "Oriental Studies"
reflects the presumption of western superiority, and operates as a self-serving
projection of the investigators'conceptions.
There is much to be said for healthy dissent, and reflexive deliberation on the
taken-for-granted assumptions of the profession. However, perhaps the most
important test of the critical impulse is in terms of its capacity to generate
alternative courses of action, to enrich the discipline and the world it serves in
important ways. It is to this end that we direct the remainder of this offering.
For many of us there is no more dramatic form of critical reflection than that
stemming from an inversion of psychology's traditional subject-object dichotomy.
That is, rather than privileging the psychologist as the scrutinizing subject for
whom culture serves as the object of study, we find it most fully liberating to
place culture in the vanguard. Let us begin with culture, as variously lived by each
of us, and place psychology under scrutiny. In this case we may ask, in what
degree and with what effects is psychological science itself a cultural
manifestation? Beginning in this way, it is immediately apparent that the science
is largely a byproduct of the western cultural tradition at a particular time in its
, historical development. Suppositions about the nature of knowledge, the character
of objectivity, the place of value in the knowledge generating process, and the
nature of linguistic representation, for example, all carry the stamp of a unique
cultural tradition. Most interestingly, the character of psychological science is
informed by a priori suppositions concerning the nature of human psychology
itself (Gergen, 1994). That is, the science is based on certain assumptions
concerning the psychological functioning of the individual scientist; without these
assumptions the science as we know it would fail to be intelligible. It is presumed,
for example, that the scientist possesses a conscious or observing mind, capable of
reflecting and recording the nature of a world external to it; that the scientist
possesses powers of inductive and deductive logic; and that the scientist also
harbors motives and values that, without safeguards, can obscure observation and
interfere with logical processes. All of these grounding assumptions are
constituents of a western ethnopsychology (see Heelas and Lock, 1981).
In what follows we wish to give fuller voice to specific cultural standpoints.
Speaking from disparate cultural backgrounds and disparate histories of culturally
sensitive study, we explore a range of problems provoked by the presumption of a
universal science of psychology. However, rather than resting secure in critique,
we also begin to explore the benefits for psychology when culture is given
primacy.
Toward Indigenous Indian Psychology (Girishwar Misra)
The discipline of psychology as practiced in India is primarily based on the
knowledge and know-how imported from the Euro-American tradition within the
context of the more general exportation of Western knowledge and education (D.
Sinha, 1986). As such Indian psychology began its journey by imitating the
research problems, concepts, theories and methods borrowed from the research
done in western countries. Being the recipient, it was subordinated to the donor
country. The colonial condition of India led to gross neglect and avoidance of the
Indian intellectual and cultural tradition central to the practices of the Indian
people. The academic world maintained a distance from its cultural heritage and
looked down at it with suspicion. The colonial incursion was so powerful that
while western concepts were accepted and welcomed without scrutiny, indigenous
concepts were denied entry to the academic discourse. Since the discipline was
imitative, its growth remained always one step behind the developments in the
donor country.
Unlike the West, psychology in India did not grow as an integral part of the
evolutionary process. Training by British or American psychologists coupled with
the colonial influence produced a strong tendency in the academy to engage in a
practice of culture blind psychology. Surprisingly enough this did not create
discontent, as researchers were generally confident that they were contributing to
the cumulatively growing pool of universal knowledge. Thus, deviations were
treated as errors and the problems and issues were filtered through the scientific
