A defendant who has undertaken the duty of caring for an infirm person can be properly convicted of their
manslaughter only if he is proved to have been in reckless breach of that duty and not merely inadvertent.
S, a 67-year-old widower who was partially deaf and almost totally blind with no appreciable sense of smell,
lived with D, his mistress, who was ineffectual and inadequate, and his mentally subnormal son. A younger
sister of S came to live with them and occupied a small room with no ventilation, toilet or washing facilities
except a bucket. She was eccentric, suffered from anorexia nervosa and spent days at a time confined to her
room.
The trial judge directed the jury to consider all the circumstances according to the knowledge of the sister's
condition and appreciation of the need to act in relation to each defendant and to determine whether there was
reckless disregard of the sister’s well-being and a breach of their duty of care to act.
Both were convicted and appealed
Held, dismissing the appeals, that (1) the facts justified a finding that S and D had assumed a duty of care and
were obliged either to summon help or to care for the sister themselves when she became infirm; (2) the breach
of duty which had to be established was a reckless disregard of danger to her health and welfare by a lack of
regard towards an obvious risk of injury to health or by actually foreseeing the risk and determining
nevertheless to run it and the jury had been properly directed.
Law reports
. The unique feature in the present case is a finding that a duty of care arises after the victim becomes helpless.
In such a situation there must be not only a very clear direction on the duty arising but also on the specific
circumstances in which such a duty arises.
19:06, 29 October 2020
R. v Stone (John Edward), [1977] Q.B. 354
Star pages *356
No single authority establishes that a duty arises simply because a person becomes helpless in one's home.
to establish a breach of duty, if duty there be, it is necessary to show a recklessness, which means foresight of
the possibility of death or, at least, serious injury to health. The degree of criminal culpability is set by saying
that the accused, having realised that death or *357 serious injury are possible, must then act recklessly in
relation to those consequences.
To found a conviction there has to be a wicked and reckless disregard of the duty, which would inevitably
involve a prediction of some sort (as distinct from intention) of death or some serious harm, of which there is
ample evidence in the present case. The appellants seek to put too high a burden on the Crown. The judge's
direction that, if the appellants did not appreciate that their neglect "would lead to any dire results" they should
be acquitted, cannot be criticised. The judge also gave a full and proper direction that the jury should consider
the case by subjective standards.
The appellant Stone, an ex-miner now aged 67, widowed for 10 years, who is partially deaf, almost totally blind
and has no appreciable sense of smell; The appellant Stone is of low average intelligence; the appellant
Dobinson is described as ineffectual and somewhat inadequate.
The prosecution alleged that in the circumstances the appellants had undertaken the duty of caring for Fanny
who was incapable of looking after herself, that they had, with gross negligence, failed in that duty, that such
failure caused her death and that they were guilty of manslaughter.
There is no dispute, broadly speaking, as to the matters on which the jury must be satisfied before they can
convict of manslaughter in circumstances such as the present. They are (1) that the defendant undertook the care
of a person who by reason of age or infirmity was unable to care for himself; (2) that the defendant was grossly
negligent in regard to his duty of care; (3) that by reason of such negligence the person died. It is submitted on
behalf of the appellants that the judge's direction to the jury with regard to the first two items was incorrect.
manslaughter only if he is proved to have been in reckless breach of that duty and not merely inadvertent.
S, a 67-year-old widower who was partially deaf and almost totally blind with no appreciable sense of smell,
lived with D, his mistress, who was ineffectual and inadequate, and his mentally subnormal son. A younger
sister of S came to live with them and occupied a small room with no ventilation, toilet or washing facilities
except a bucket. She was eccentric, suffered from anorexia nervosa and spent days at a time confined to her
room.
The trial judge directed the jury to consider all the circumstances according to the knowledge of the sister's
condition and appreciation of the need to act in relation to each defendant and to determine whether there was
reckless disregard of the sister’s well-being and a breach of their duty of care to act.
Both were convicted and appealed
Held, dismissing the appeals, that (1) the facts justified a finding that S and D had assumed a duty of care and
were obliged either to summon help or to care for the sister themselves when she became infirm; (2) the breach
of duty which had to be established was a reckless disregard of danger to her health and welfare by a lack of
regard towards an obvious risk of injury to health or by actually foreseeing the risk and determining
nevertheless to run it and the jury had been properly directed.
Law reports
. The unique feature in the present case is a finding that a duty of care arises after the victim becomes helpless.
In such a situation there must be not only a very clear direction on the duty arising but also on the specific
circumstances in which such a duty arises.
19:06, 29 October 2020
R. v Stone (John Edward), [1977] Q.B. 354
Star pages *356
No single authority establishes that a duty arises simply because a person becomes helpless in one's home.
to establish a breach of duty, if duty there be, it is necessary to show a recklessness, which means foresight of
the possibility of death or, at least, serious injury to health. The degree of criminal culpability is set by saying
that the accused, having realised that death or *357 serious injury are possible, must then act recklessly in
relation to those consequences.
To found a conviction there has to be a wicked and reckless disregard of the duty, which would inevitably
involve a prediction of some sort (as distinct from intention) of death or some serious harm, of which there is
ample evidence in the present case. The appellants seek to put too high a burden on the Crown. The judge's
direction that, if the appellants did not appreciate that their neglect "would lead to any dire results" they should
be acquitted, cannot be criticised. The judge also gave a full and proper direction that the jury should consider
the case by subjective standards.
The appellant Stone, an ex-miner now aged 67, widowed for 10 years, who is partially deaf, almost totally blind
and has no appreciable sense of smell; The appellant Stone is of low average intelligence; the appellant
Dobinson is described as ineffectual and somewhat inadequate.
The prosecution alleged that in the circumstances the appellants had undertaken the duty of caring for Fanny
who was incapable of looking after herself, that they had, with gross negligence, failed in that duty, that such
failure caused her death and that they were guilty of manslaughter.
There is no dispute, broadly speaking, as to the matters on which the jury must be satisfied before they can
convict of manslaughter in circumstances such as the present. They are (1) that the defendant undertook the care
of a person who by reason of age or infirmity was unable to care for himself; (2) that the defendant was grossly
negligent in regard to his duty of care; (3) that by reason of such negligence the person died. It is submitted on
behalf of the appellants that the judge's direction to the jury with regard to the first two items was incorrect.
