SECTION A
1) Nigeria: Military socialisation and “democratic infractions”
Claim: Onwutuebe argues that many of Nigeria’s recurrent “democratic infractions”
stem from the persistence of a military political culture within civilian rule. Taking
Nigeria’s Fourth Republic (from 1999) as the canvas, this assertion is strongly
persuasive—but only partly sufficient—because military legacies interact with party
institutions, electoral incentives, and a rentier political economy.
What “military culture” means in this context. In Nigeria, repeated coups (1966–
1999) left a repertoire of commandism (rule by decree), personalism over institutions,
securitised responses to dissent, and weak habits of horizontal accountability. The
transition in 1999 did not automatically ‘re-socialise’ elites schooled in barracks
hierarchy (Onwutuebe, 2022). That legacy was reinforced by the return of ex-military
heads of state as elected presidents—Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007) and
Muhammadu Buhari (2015–2023)—who brought governing styles marked by
centralised authority, intolerance of intra-party dissent, and a preference for security-first
approaches to protest and conflict (Onwutuebe, 2022).
Illustrative “infractions.”
Executive overreach & rule-of-law slippage: Recurring executive interference
in anti-corruption prosecutions, budget implementation stand-offs, and disregard
of court orders—patterns consistent with commandist habits (Onwutuebe, 2022;
Freedom House, 2024a).
Securitised civil order: Crackdowns on protest (e.g., episodes around
#EndSARS) and the heavy use of the military in internal policing reflect a blurred
civil-military boundary inherited from junta eras (Freedom House, 2024a).
Party discipline via hierarchy rather than rules: Godfatherism, winner-takes-
all cabinet formation, and top-down candidate imposition mirror barracks logics of
, obedience and patronage chains (Oni et al., 2013, cited in Religions special
issue summary; see also Freedom House, 2024a).
How far does military culture explain today’s problems?
Strong explanatory power: The biographies and socialisation of post-1999
presidents and many governors help to explain the persistence of centralised
executive power and securitised policy reflexes (Onwutuebe, 2022).
But not self-sufficient:
o Electoral rules and party finance incentivise zero-sum competition and
monetisation independent of military legacies.
o Federal rentierism (oil revenue centralisation) sustains patronage
presidentialism that would test any democracy.
o Societal security shocks (e.g., Boko Haram, banditry) invite militarised
responses even by civilianised elites.
o Institutional counter-trends exist: courts, civil society, media, and
subnational alternation sometimes constrain overreach (Freedom House,
2024a).
Judgement. Onwutuebe’s core insight—that military political culture continues to shape
decision-making styles and tolerances for illiberal shortcuts—holds significant
explanatory weight for Nigeria’s democratic infractions. Yet, full causality must include
party system weakness, rentier political economy, and security crises. Democratic
deepening therefore requires both de-securitising governance (clearer civil-military
separation, policing reform, human-rights-based crowd control) and institutional/party
reforms (intra-party democracy, campaign finance transparency, judicial
independence).
Key evidence: Onwutuebe’s study directly links the civilian tenures of Obasanjo and
Buhari to military legacies and documents associated infractions; Freedom House’s
2024 profile flags continuing constraints on civil liberties and accountability in Nigeria.
Taylor & Francis OnlineResearchGateFreedom House
, 2) Ghana: Do strong civil society organisations (CSOs) best tame state excess?
Sefa-Nyarko’s thesis. In Ghana’s Fourth Republic, formal checks (parliament,
judiciary, constitutional bodies) are necessary but insufficient, given executive
dominance and winner-takes-all dynamics. Sefa-Nyarko (2022) contends that an
organised, assertive civil society—think tanks, faith groups, media coalitions, social
movements—has often provided the most effective, timely check on state excess by
shaping agenda-setting, monitoring, and norm enforcement. Taylor & Francis
Onlineideas.repec.org
Evidence that CSOs restrain the state in practice.
Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2019 (Act 989): After two decades of advocacy
by coalitions like the RTI Coalition, Media Foundation for West Africa, and
OccupyGhana, Ghana finally enacted access-to-information legislation,
expanding transparency and enabling investigative accountability (Open
Government Partnership report; academic analyses). Open Government
Partnershipajic.wits.ac.zair.parliament.ghscielo.org.zaoccupyghana.com
Curbing political vigilantism: Persistent civil society pressure culminated in the
Vigilantism and Related Offences Act, 2019 (Act 999), criminalising party
militia groups; CSOs now monitor enforcement and push parties to comply with
codes of conduct (Parliament text; GhaLII; National Peace Council).
ir.parliament.ghghalii.orgpeacecouncil.gov.gh
Election integrity & governance monitoring: Independent think tanks (e.g.,
CDD-Ghana, IMANI) routinely audit public policy, track campaign promises, and
provide election observation and manifestos scrutiny—functions that create
reputational and political costs for abuse (Botchway, 2018; Freedom House,
2024 Ghana). ResearchGateFreedom House
Limits and caveats.
1) Nigeria: Military socialisation and “democratic infractions”
Claim: Onwutuebe argues that many of Nigeria’s recurrent “democratic infractions”
stem from the persistence of a military political culture within civilian rule. Taking
Nigeria’s Fourth Republic (from 1999) as the canvas, this assertion is strongly
persuasive—but only partly sufficient—because military legacies interact with party
institutions, electoral incentives, and a rentier political economy.
What “military culture” means in this context. In Nigeria, repeated coups (1966–
1999) left a repertoire of commandism (rule by decree), personalism over institutions,
securitised responses to dissent, and weak habits of horizontal accountability. The
transition in 1999 did not automatically ‘re-socialise’ elites schooled in barracks
hierarchy (Onwutuebe, 2022). That legacy was reinforced by the return of ex-military
heads of state as elected presidents—Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007) and
Muhammadu Buhari (2015–2023)—who brought governing styles marked by
centralised authority, intolerance of intra-party dissent, and a preference for security-first
approaches to protest and conflict (Onwutuebe, 2022).
Illustrative “infractions.”
Executive overreach & rule-of-law slippage: Recurring executive interference
in anti-corruption prosecutions, budget implementation stand-offs, and disregard
of court orders—patterns consistent with commandist habits (Onwutuebe, 2022;
Freedom House, 2024a).
Securitised civil order: Crackdowns on protest (e.g., episodes around
#EndSARS) and the heavy use of the military in internal policing reflect a blurred
civil-military boundary inherited from junta eras (Freedom House, 2024a).
Party discipline via hierarchy rather than rules: Godfatherism, winner-takes-
all cabinet formation, and top-down candidate imposition mirror barracks logics of
, obedience and patronage chains (Oni et al., 2013, cited in Religions special
issue summary; see also Freedom House, 2024a).
How far does military culture explain today’s problems?
Strong explanatory power: The biographies and socialisation of post-1999
presidents and many governors help to explain the persistence of centralised
executive power and securitised policy reflexes (Onwutuebe, 2022).
But not self-sufficient:
o Electoral rules and party finance incentivise zero-sum competition and
monetisation independent of military legacies.
o Federal rentierism (oil revenue centralisation) sustains patronage
presidentialism that would test any democracy.
o Societal security shocks (e.g., Boko Haram, banditry) invite militarised
responses even by civilianised elites.
o Institutional counter-trends exist: courts, civil society, media, and
subnational alternation sometimes constrain overreach (Freedom House,
2024a).
Judgement. Onwutuebe’s core insight—that military political culture continues to shape
decision-making styles and tolerances for illiberal shortcuts—holds significant
explanatory weight for Nigeria’s democratic infractions. Yet, full causality must include
party system weakness, rentier political economy, and security crises. Democratic
deepening therefore requires both de-securitising governance (clearer civil-military
separation, policing reform, human-rights-based crowd control) and institutional/party
reforms (intra-party democracy, campaign finance transparency, judicial
independence).
Key evidence: Onwutuebe’s study directly links the civilian tenures of Obasanjo and
Buhari to military legacies and documents associated infractions; Freedom House’s
2024 profile flags continuing constraints on civil liberties and accountability in Nigeria.
Taylor & Francis OnlineResearchGateFreedom House
, 2) Ghana: Do strong civil society organisations (CSOs) best tame state excess?
Sefa-Nyarko’s thesis. In Ghana’s Fourth Republic, formal checks (parliament,
judiciary, constitutional bodies) are necessary but insufficient, given executive
dominance and winner-takes-all dynamics. Sefa-Nyarko (2022) contends that an
organised, assertive civil society—think tanks, faith groups, media coalitions, social
movements—has often provided the most effective, timely check on state excess by
shaping agenda-setting, monitoring, and norm enforcement. Taylor & Francis
Onlineideas.repec.org
Evidence that CSOs restrain the state in practice.
Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2019 (Act 989): After two decades of advocacy
by coalitions like the RTI Coalition, Media Foundation for West Africa, and
OccupyGhana, Ghana finally enacted access-to-information legislation,
expanding transparency and enabling investigative accountability (Open
Government Partnership report; academic analyses). Open Government
Partnershipajic.wits.ac.zair.parliament.ghscielo.org.zaoccupyghana.com
Curbing political vigilantism: Persistent civil society pressure culminated in the
Vigilantism and Related Offences Act, 2019 (Act 999), criminalising party
militia groups; CSOs now monitor enforcement and push parties to comply with
codes of conduct (Parliament text; GhaLII; National Peace Council).
ir.parliament.ghghalii.orgpeacecouncil.gov.gh
Election integrity & governance monitoring: Independent think tanks (e.g.,
CDD-Ghana, IMANI) routinely audit public policy, track campaign promises, and
provide election observation and manifestos scrutiny—functions that create
reputational and political costs for abuse (Botchway, 2018; Freedom House,
2024 Ghana). ResearchGateFreedom House
Limits and caveats.
