Automatism - Complete absence of control
● Sane automatism entitles a defendant to a complete acquittal
● Fearful of there being too many of these complete acquittals, the law has fearfully
circumscribed the parameters of the defense of automatism. This has been achieved in
particular by insisting that the defendant be blameless in causing the state of automatism
and by adopting a broad definition of disease of the mind.
● In many cases where there is the slightest risk of repetition of the conduct, the defendant
is declared insane giving the court the power to make orders in relation to that person.
● There have been 2 main consequences of this restrictive approach:
○ The number of cases in which automatism can be successfully pleaded are few
and far between. Apart from diabetic hypoglycemia and the possibility of
anomalous decisions in sleepwalking, it would appear that it is only in cases of an
isolated incident of an external cause prompting the involuntary behaviour that
the defense will be available.
○ E.g. physical compulsion, like being pushed over as to injure someone else and
reflex actions of external origin, e.g. reflexive actions while benign attacked by a
swarm of bees, this was the hypothetical example given in Hill v Baxter (1958)
● Automatism occurs when D suffers a complete absence of self control caused by an
external factor.
● If the defendant raises credible evidence raising the possibility of automatism, the
prosecution must show that beyond reasonable doubt the accused was not acting as an
automation.
● In cases where D is engaged in a particularly dangerous activity such as driving, the law
has adopted a strict stance that only a complete absence of consciousness will exempt
from liability.
● In Broome v Perkins (1987) D was charged with driving without due care and attention,
he claimed hypoglycemic. He was acquitted at first instance on the basis that his
conduct was involuntary but on appeal it was held his actions were only automatic in
intervals, at time his mind must have been controlling his limbs and therefore he was
driving.
● This was perceived as a very harsh decision, especially since D had handed himself in.
● Despite this, the same approach was adopted in AG’s Ref (No 2 of 1992) (1994), where
it was held that conduct was only involuntary if there was a total loss of voluntary control.
● In this case, D a lorry driver, crashed into a broken down vehicle parked on the hard
shoulder of a motorway and killed 2 people. Experts described his condition as driving
without awareness, the driver's capacity to avoid a collision ceased to exist as he was in
a trance. However the expert said this amounted to reduced or imperfect awareness but
not complete lack of awareness. Accordingly the CoA held this could not amount to
involuntary conduct.
● This robust approach, requiring there be a complete loss of control was confirmed
recently in R v Coley (2013), where Hughes LJ stated “the essence of... [the defence] is
● Sane automatism entitles a defendant to a complete acquittal
● Fearful of there being too many of these complete acquittals, the law has fearfully
circumscribed the parameters of the defense of automatism. This has been achieved in
particular by insisting that the defendant be blameless in causing the state of automatism
and by adopting a broad definition of disease of the mind.
● In many cases where there is the slightest risk of repetition of the conduct, the defendant
is declared insane giving the court the power to make orders in relation to that person.
● There have been 2 main consequences of this restrictive approach:
○ The number of cases in which automatism can be successfully pleaded are few
and far between. Apart from diabetic hypoglycemia and the possibility of
anomalous decisions in sleepwalking, it would appear that it is only in cases of an
isolated incident of an external cause prompting the involuntary behaviour that
the defense will be available.
○ E.g. physical compulsion, like being pushed over as to injure someone else and
reflex actions of external origin, e.g. reflexive actions while benign attacked by a
swarm of bees, this was the hypothetical example given in Hill v Baxter (1958)
● Automatism occurs when D suffers a complete absence of self control caused by an
external factor.
● If the defendant raises credible evidence raising the possibility of automatism, the
prosecution must show that beyond reasonable doubt the accused was not acting as an
automation.
● In cases where D is engaged in a particularly dangerous activity such as driving, the law
has adopted a strict stance that only a complete absence of consciousness will exempt
from liability.
● In Broome v Perkins (1987) D was charged with driving without due care and attention,
he claimed hypoglycemic. He was acquitted at first instance on the basis that his
conduct was involuntary but on appeal it was held his actions were only automatic in
intervals, at time his mind must have been controlling his limbs and therefore he was
driving.
● This was perceived as a very harsh decision, especially since D had handed himself in.
● Despite this, the same approach was adopted in AG’s Ref (No 2 of 1992) (1994), where
it was held that conduct was only involuntary if there was a total loss of voluntary control.
● In this case, D a lorry driver, crashed into a broken down vehicle parked on the hard
shoulder of a motorway and killed 2 people. Experts described his condition as driving
without awareness, the driver's capacity to avoid a collision ceased to exist as he was in
a trance. However the expert said this amounted to reduced or imperfect awareness but
not complete lack of awareness. Accordingly the CoA held this could not amount to
involuntary conduct.
● This robust approach, requiring there be a complete loss of control was confirmed
recently in R v Coley (2013), where Hughes LJ stated “the essence of... [the defence] is
