Semester 2 2025 - DUE 18 September 2025; 100%
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LEGAL OPINION ON THE CASE OF MR MBHEKWE AND THE
MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY IN THE REPUBLIC OF
KAMARARA
The Movement Against Death Penalty (MADP) has requested
legal advice on whether it can take the case of Mr Mbhekwe
to the Human Rights Committee (HRC) in terms of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
its two Optional Protocols. This opinion examines the
procedural requirements for lodging a complaint before the
HRC, the merits of the case with reference to the relevant
human rights provisions, and the remedies that may be
granted.
Procedural Issues
The Republic of Kamarara is a State Party to the ICCPR as well
as its First and Second Optional Protocols. By ratifying the First
Optional Protocol, Kamarara has recognised the competence
of the HRC to receive and consider individual complaints
alleging violations of the ICCPR. According to Article 1 of the
First Optional Protocol, a communication may be submitted by
, an individual or by someone acting on their behalf. MADP, as
an international non-governmental organisation, may
therefore represent Mr Mbhekwe provided it can demonstrate
that it has his consent to act on his behalf.
Article 5(2)(b) of the First Optional Protocol requires the
exhaustion of all available and effective domestic remedies
before a complaint can be lodged with the HRC. Mr Mbhekwe
has exhausted domestic remedies, having appealed to both
the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court,
which is the highest court in Kamarara. Furthermore, Article
5(2)(a) prohibits the HRC from considering matters that are
being examined under another international procedure. There
is no indication that the matter is pending before another
body, such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights. On this basis, the procedural requirements for lodging
a communication with the HRC appear to be satisfied.
Merits of the Case
The principal issue in this case is whether the mandatory
death penalty for murder, as provided for in Section 14 of the
Criminal and Other Offences Act 15 of 1939, is compatible
with the ICCPR. Several provisions of the ICCPR are implicated.
Article 6(1) of the ICCPR recognises the inherent right to life
and prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of life. Although Article
6(2) permits the death penalty for the “most serious crimes”