SPĒD SFPC – All Areas Exam (2025) | Complete Certification Prep with
Verified Questions & Answers
Indicators of insider threats - -1. Failure to report information
overseas travel or contact with foreign nationals
2. Seeking to gain higher clearance or expand access
outside job scope
3. Engaging in classified conversations without NTK The purpose of the Foreign Visitor Program - -To
4. Working inconsistent hours track and approve access by a foreign entity to information
5. Exploitable behavior traits that is classified; and to approve access by a foreign entity
6. Repeated security violations to information that is unclassified, related to a U.S.
7. Unexplainable affluence/living above one's means Government contract, or plant visits covered by ITAR.
8. Illegal downloads of information/files
Special Access Program - -A program established
Elements that should be considered in identifying Critical for a specific class of
Program classified information that imposes safeguarding and
Information - -Elements which if compromised access requirements that exceed those normally required
could: for information at the same classification level.
1. cause significant degradation in mission effectiveness,
2. shorten expected combat-effective life of system
3. reduce technological advantage
4. significantly alter program direction; or Enhanced security requirements for protecting Special
5. enable adversary to defeat, counter, copy, or reverse Access Program (SAP) information - -Within
engineer technology/capability. Personnel Security:
• Access Rosters;
• Billet Structures (if required);
• Indoctrination Agreement;
Elements that security professional should consider when • Clearance based on appropriate investigation completed
assessing and managing risks to DoD assets (risk within last 5/6
management process) - -1. Assess assets years;
2. Assess threats • Individual must materially contribute to program and
3. Assess Vulnerabilities have need to know (NTK);
4. Assess risks • SAP personnel subject to random counterintelligence
5. Determine countermeasure options scope polygraph;
6. Make RM decision • Polygraph examination, if approved by the DepSecDef,
may be used as a
mandatory access determination;
• Tier review process;
The three categories of Special Access Programs - • Personnel must have Secret or TS clearance;
-acquisition, intelligence, and operations & support • SF-86 must be current within one year;
• Limited Access;
• Waivers required for foreign cohabitants, spouses, and
immediate family
Types of threats to classified information - -Insider members.
Threat, Foreign Intelligence Entities (FIE), criminal Within Industrial Security:
activities, cyber threats, business competitors The SecDef or DepSecDef can approve carve-out
provision to relieve Defense
Security Service of industrial security oversight
responsibilities.
The concept of an insider threat - -An employee Within Physical Security:
• Access Control;
who may represent a threat to
• Maintain SAP Facility;
national security. These threats encompass potential
• Access Roster;
espionage, violent acts against the Government or the
• All SAPs must have unclassified nickname/ Codeword
nation, and unauthorized disclosure of classified
(optional).
, SPĒD SFPC – All Areas Exam (2025) | Complete Certification Prep with
Verified Questions & Answers
Within Information Security: oversee/administer security requirements
• The use of HVSACO;
• Transmission requirements (order of precedence).
Primary authorities governing foreign disclosure of
classified military information - -1. Arms Export
Responsibilities of the Government SAP Security Control Act
Officer/Contractor Program 2. National Security Decision Memorandum 119
Security Officer (GSSO/ 3. National Disclosure Policy-1
CPSO) - -• Possess personnel clearance and 4. International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR)
Program access at least equal to highest level of Program 5. E.O.s 12829, 13526
classified information involved. 6. Bilateral Security Agreements
• Provide security administration and management for 7. DoD 5220.22-M, "NISPOM,"
organization.
• Ensure personnel processed for access to SAP meet
prerequisite personnel clearance and/or investigative
requirements specified. Factors for determining
• Ensure adequate secure storage and work spaces. whether U.S. companies are under Foreign Ownership,
• Ensure strict adherence to the provisions of NISPOM, its Control or Influence
supplement, and the Overprint. (FOCI) - -1. Record of economic and government
• When required, establish and oversee classified material espionage against the U.S. targets
control program for each SAP. 2. Record of enforcement/engagement
• When required, conduct an annual inventory of in unauthorized technology transfer
accountable 3. Type and sensitivity of information that shall be
classified material. accessed
• When required, establish SAPF. 4. Source, nature and extent of FOCI
• Establish and oversee visitor control program. 5. Record of compliance with pertinent U.S. laws,
• Monitor reproduction/duplication/destruction capability of regulations and contracts
SAP information 6. Nature of bilateral & multilateral security & information
• Ensure adherence to special communications exchange agreements
capabilities within SAPF. 7. Ownership/control, in whole or part, by foreign
• Provide for initial Program indoctrination of employees government
after access is approved; rebrief and debrief personnel
• Establish and oversee specialized procedures for
transmission of
SAP material to and from Program elements The purpose and function of the Militarily Critical
• When required, ensure contractual specific security Technologies List (MCTL). - -1. Serves as technical
requirements are accomplished. reference for development and implementation of DoD
• Establish security training and briefings specifically technology, security policies on international transfers of
tailored to unique requirements of SAP. defense-related goods, services, and technologies as
administered by the Director, Defense Technology
Security
Administration (DTSA).
The five Cognizant 2. Formulation of export control proposals and export
Security Agencies (CSAs) - -Department of Defense license review
(DoD), Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Department
of Energy (DoE), Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
Security Infraction - -Failure to comply with security
requirements which cannot reasonably be expected to and
does not result in loss, compromise, or suspected
Cognizant Security Agencies (CSA)s' role in the National compromise of classified information
Industrial Security Program (NISP). - -Establish
general industrial security programs and
Verified Questions & Answers
Indicators of insider threats - -1. Failure to report information
overseas travel or contact with foreign nationals
2. Seeking to gain higher clearance or expand access
outside job scope
3. Engaging in classified conversations without NTK The purpose of the Foreign Visitor Program - -To
4. Working inconsistent hours track and approve access by a foreign entity to information
5. Exploitable behavior traits that is classified; and to approve access by a foreign entity
6. Repeated security violations to information that is unclassified, related to a U.S.
7. Unexplainable affluence/living above one's means Government contract, or plant visits covered by ITAR.
8. Illegal downloads of information/files
Special Access Program - -A program established
Elements that should be considered in identifying Critical for a specific class of
Program classified information that imposes safeguarding and
Information - -Elements which if compromised access requirements that exceed those normally required
could: for information at the same classification level.
1. cause significant degradation in mission effectiveness,
2. shorten expected combat-effective life of system
3. reduce technological advantage
4. significantly alter program direction; or Enhanced security requirements for protecting Special
5. enable adversary to defeat, counter, copy, or reverse Access Program (SAP) information - -Within
engineer technology/capability. Personnel Security:
• Access Rosters;
• Billet Structures (if required);
• Indoctrination Agreement;
Elements that security professional should consider when • Clearance based on appropriate investigation completed
assessing and managing risks to DoD assets (risk within last 5/6
management process) - -1. Assess assets years;
2. Assess threats • Individual must materially contribute to program and
3. Assess Vulnerabilities have need to know (NTK);
4. Assess risks • SAP personnel subject to random counterintelligence
5. Determine countermeasure options scope polygraph;
6. Make RM decision • Polygraph examination, if approved by the DepSecDef,
may be used as a
mandatory access determination;
• Tier review process;
The three categories of Special Access Programs - • Personnel must have Secret or TS clearance;
-acquisition, intelligence, and operations & support • SF-86 must be current within one year;
• Limited Access;
• Waivers required for foreign cohabitants, spouses, and
immediate family
Types of threats to classified information - -Insider members.
Threat, Foreign Intelligence Entities (FIE), criminal Within Industrial Security:
activities, cyber threats, business competitors The SecDef or DepSecDef can approve carve-out
provision to relieve Defense
Security Service of industrial security oversight
responsibilities.
The concept of an insider threat - -An employee Within Physical Security:
• Access Control;
who may represent a threat to
• Maintain SAP Facility;
national security. These threats encompass potential
• Access Roster;
espionage, violent acts against the Government or the
• All SAPs must have unclassified nickname/ Codeword
nation, and unauthorized disclosure of classified
(optional).
, SPĒD SFPC – All Areas Exam (2025) | Complete Certification Prep with
Verified Questions & Answers
Within Information Security: oversee/administer security requirements
• The use of HVSACO;
• Transmission requirements (order of precedence).
Primary authorities governing foreign disclosure of
classified military information - -1. Arms Export
Responsibilities of the Government SAP Security Control Act
Officer/Contractor Program 2. National Security Decision Memorandum 119
Security Officer (GSSO/ 3. National Disclosure Policy-1
CPSO) - -• Possess personnel clearance and 4. International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR)
Program access at least equal to highest level of Program 5. E.O.s 12829, 13526
classified information involved. 6. Bilateral Security Agreements
• Provide security administration and management for 7. DoD 5220.22-M, "NISPOM,"
organization.
• Ensure personnel processed for access to SAP meet
prerequisite personnel clearance and/or investigative
requirements specified. Factors for determining
• Ensure adequate secure storage and work spaces. whether U.S. companies are under Foreign Ownership,
• Ensure strict adherence to the provisions of NISPOM, its Control or Influence
supplement, and the Overprint. (FOCI) - -1. Record of economic and government
• When required, establish and oversee classified material espionage against the U.S. targets
control program for each SAP. 2. Record of enforcement/engagement
• When required, conduct an annual inventory of in unauthorized technology transfer
accountable 3. Type and sensitivity of information that shall be
classified material. accessed
• When required, establish SAPF. 4. Source, nature and extent of FOCI
• Establish and oversee visitor control program. 5. Record of compliance with pertinent U.S. laws,
• Monitor reproduction/duplication/destruction capability of regulations and contracts
SAP information 6. Nature of bilateral & multilateral security & information
• Ensure adherence to special communications exchange agreements
capabilities within SAPF. 7. Ownership/control, in whole or part, by foreign
• Provide for initial Program indoctrination of employees government
after access is approved; rebrief and debrief personnel
• Establish and oversee specialized procedures for
transmission of
SAP material to and from Program elements The purpose and function of the Militarily Critical
• When required, ensure contractual specific security Technologies List (MCTL). - -1. Serves as technical
requirements are accomplished. reference for development and implementation of DoD
• Establish security training and briefings specifically technology, security policies on international transfers of
tailored to unique requirements of SAP. defense-related goods, services, and technologies as
administered by the Director, Defense Technology
Security
Administration (DTSA).
The five Cognizant 2. Formulation of export control proposals and export
Security Agencies (CSAs) - -Department of Defense license review
(DoD), Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Department
of Energy (DoE), Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
Security Infraction - -Failure to comply with security
requirements which cannot reasonably be expected to and
does not result in loss, compromise, or suspected
Cognizant Security Agencies (CSA)s' role in the National compromise of classified information
Industrial Security Program (NISP). - -Establish
general industrial security programs and
